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Abstract
This dissertation deals with the relation between form and meaning in the
domain of transitivity, in particular with respect to the cross-linguistic
phenomenon of differential object marking. Transitive sentences are sen-
tences with a two-place predicate (verb) that takes two arguments, a
subject and an object. Languages may differ, however, in how they map
semantic (in)transitivity to syntactic (in)transitivity. There are construc-
tions that are transitive from a semantic point of view, as they involve
two participants (arguments), while they can be argued to be intransitive
from a syntactic point of view. Examples are passive, antipassive, and
object incorporation constructions. The same can be observed for seman-
tically intransitive constructions that come out as syntactically transitive.
In particular, I will argue in chapter 2 that cognate object constructions
are semantically intransitive, yet in many languages get mapped to syn-
tactically transitive constructions. I will present a fine-grained approach
to transitivity that can deal with one-to-many and many-to-one mappings
between meaning and form.
Differential object marking, which is the central domain of investi-
gation in this thesis, also involves a shift in transitivity, since sentences
with caseless objects can be argued to be syntactically less transitive
than those with case-marked ones. One explanation of differential ob-
ject marking phenomena lies in the problem of ambiguity: a speaker may
case mark a direct object in order to ensure recoverability of the intended
interpretation on the side of the hearer. Avoidance of ambiguity as a
speaker’s strategy can explain why some instantiations of object marking
are not driven by semantic or syntactic features of the object per se, but
by these features in relation to the features of the subject. In chapter 3
I will present an asymmetric speaker’s model of bidirectional optimiza-
tion, in order to account for this strategy of case-marking. Clearly not all
instantiations of differential object marking can be explained in terms of
recoverability, however. Towards the end of the chapter I will show how a
language can develop a strategy to mark all and only prominent objects
out of a strategy of ambiguity avoidance.
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This latter strategy of mere prominence marking is further investi-
gated in chapter 4. In the literature both animacy and definiteness/-
specificity are claimed to be features of the object that trigger case mark-
ing in differential object marking languages. Both features can be sub-
sumed under the notion of prominence. Animate and definite/specific
objects are more prominent than inanimate and indefinite/non-specific
ones. I will argue, however, that animacy and definiteness/specificity
each play a radically different role when it comes to differential object
marking. While case-marking can change the hearer’s interpretation of
the definiteness or specificity of an object, it cannot change the animacy
of the object. Thus, animacy features trigger case-marking but not the
other way around. In chapter 4, I will argue that animacy takes priority
over definiteness/specificity, in accordance with the general pattern that
inherent features take priority over derived features.
Differential object marking, and hence the transitivity of a clause, is
thus shown to be an interplay of two independent factors, recoverability
and prominence marking.
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter I provide a further introduction to the issues
discussed in the chapters to come. First, I posit the central
questions addressed in this thesis. Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3
then give an overview of the discussion presented in chapter
2, 3, and 4 respectively.
Consider the following examples from Malayalam, a Dravidian language
spoken in India:
Malayalam (Dravidian; Asher and Kumari 1997:203)
(1) Avan
he
oru
a
paSuvin-e
cow-acc
vaññi.
buy.pst
‘He bought a cow.’
(2) ñaan
I
teeñña
coconut
vaññi.
buy.pst
‘I bought a coconut.’
From a semantic point of view these two sentences are very similar in
that both report a buying event which took place in the past. Yet, from
a morphosyntactic point of view the sentences differ crucially as only the
direct object in (1) is marked with accusative case. This morphosyntactic
difference between the two sentences results from the different nature of
the objects involved in the buying event. The case marked object ‘cow’
in (1) represents an animate entity, the object without case marking ‘co-
conut’ in (2) an inanimate one. This semantic difference between the
two objects results in a morphosyntactic difference between them. This
contrast reflects a general rule in Malayalam, only animate, but not inan-
imate objects are marked with accusative case. The Malayalam pattern is
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a reflection of a cross-linguistic phenomenon known as differential object
marking (Bossong 1985; Aissen 2003).
These Malayalam examples illustrate nicely how a semantic difference
can result in a morphosyntactic difference. At the same time, the contrast
between (1) and (2) raises a number of questions. For instance, what is
the formal status of the construction in (2), in which the direct object is
not case marked? Given that accusative case on the direct object is often
considered the hallmark of a transitive clause, we may conclude that (2)
does not represent a transitive construction. This, however, is in conflict
with the fact that it does express a semantically two-place predicate. A
second question concerns the influence of animacy on the morphosyntac-
tic alternation between (1) and (2). Why should animacy have this effect
on morphosyntactic structure and why does this effect surface the way it
does? The fact that the animate but not the inanimate object is overtly
case marked awaits an explanation. Third, are there other semantic fea-
tures of arguments which have an effect on morphosyntactic structure
similar to that of animacy in Malayalam? If such features can be identi-
fied we may question to what extent they are similar to or different from
animacy.
The three questions raised above represent the main issues with which
this dissertation is concerned. The three chapters following on this in-
troductory chapter each single out one of them. The recurrent theme
of this dissertation is the relation between semantics on the one hand
and morphosyntactic expression on the other. The semantic domain of
investigation is confined to semantically transitive relations, which will
be taken to be relations between two entities. In particular, the discus-
sion will focus on the influence of semantic features of the object, such as
animacy, on its mapping to morphosyntax.
1.1 Grades of Transitivity
The contrast between the Malayalam examples (1) and (2) above is prob-
lematic for a traditional definition of transitivity. In particular, it speaks
against a clear-cut division between transitivity and intransitivity. From
a semantic point of view the two examples represent transitive construc-
tions, as in both cases we are dealing with the same two-place relation
‘buy’. The formal realization of the examples leaves room for discussion
with respect to their transitive status. On the assumption that accusative
case is the signal of direct objecthood, we must conclude that (1) has a
direct object, and as a result should be considered transitive.
But what about example (2)? Should it be considered an intransitive
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construction? Such an analysis seems problematic. Although the absence
of accusative case on the postverbal noun phrase makes the construction
different from a transitive one, at the same time the presence of this noun
phrase makes the construction different from an intransitive one as well.
As such, the contrast between (1) and (2) asks for a more fine-grained
approach to transitivity, instead of the traditional categorical definition.
I will discuss such an approach in chapter 2.
Much of the discussion in chapter 2 is devoted to the cognate object
construction as it constitutes a prime example of a construction in which
semantic and formal transitivity do not align. I will argue that the cog-
nate object in English patterns like a direct object syntactically, while
it semantically behaves like an adverbial. This means that in English
there is a mismatch between the semantic and the syntactic status of
the cognate object. This is corroborated by cross-linguistic evidence. In
languages with a more transparent mapping from semantic transitivity
to formal transitivity than English we do find that the cognate object is
realized in a formally less-transitive construction.
By putting the English cognate object construction in a cross-linguis-
tic perspective the questions it posits can be answered straightforwardly.
An analysis of this construction in which the object semantically behaves
like an adverbial and syntactically as a direct argument follows natu-
rally if one takes into account that English is a language which shows a
many-to-one mapping from semantic transitivity to formal transitivity.
As a result, the semantically deviant status of the cognate object gets
obscured in its morphosyntactic expression. Indeed, in languages with
a more transparent, one-to-one, mapping from semantic transitivity to
formal transitivity the morphosyntactic (adverbial) status of the cognate
object does mirror its semantic status. The discussion of the English cog-
nate object construction shows that a gradient approach to transitivity
is a viable one, given that languages differ in the transparency of their
mapping from semantic transitivity to formal transitivity.
1.2 Animacy and Ambiguity Avoidance
One of the central questions raised by the Malayalam examples at the
beginning of this chapter concerns the influence of animacy on the case
alternation on direct objects. Why should animacy have this effect on
morphosyntactic structure? One explanation entertains the idea that
overt case marking is used on animate objects in order to distinguish
them from the subject argument in the clause, which shows a strong
tendency to be animate. When both arguments are animate, confusion
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may arise as to which argument is the subject of the sentence. This
potential ambiguity of grammatical function does, however, not occur
when the animate object is overtly marked or in case the direct object
refers to an inanimate entity. In the latter situation, case marking is not
needed to distinguish the subject from the object. This analysis of the
use of overt case marking in terms of ambiguity avoidance is supported
by further data from Malayalam, discussed in chapter 3.
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of morphosyntactic phenomena, like
the use of overt case marking in Malayalam, which can be attributed to a
need to avoid ambiguity of grammatical functions. This kind of ambiguity
generally only occurs in sentences with two third person arguments, and
animacy can be shown to play an important role here as it influences the
assignment of semantic roles to arguments. Certain semantic roles typi-
cally select for animate arguments and others for inanimate arguments.
In particular, semantic roles realized as the transitive subject show a
preference for animate arguments and as a result the transitive subject
generally turns out to be animate. In combination with the thematic in-
formation of a verb, the animacy of an argument can be used to determine
the grammatical function of an argument. This is particularly relevant in
languages which do not mark these functions by morphosyntactic means.
Sometimes absence of such morphosyntactic marking can result in am-
biguity. In chapter 3, I investigate strategies languages employ to avoid
such potential ambiguities.
The various mechanisms used by different languages to minimize the
chance of potential ambiguity of grammatical functions can be analyzed
as mechanisms which minimize the costs of the interpretational process
of such sentences. Due to the presence of these morphosyntactic mecha-
nisms the hearer needs less effort to arrive at the correct interpretation
of a sentence. Therefore, one should not only take into account the pro-
duction perspective but also the interpretation perspective. I will argue
in favour of a model in which the production of a sentence is constrained
by its interpretation. If the speaker, by taking into account the hearer’s
perspective, realizes that the sentence he is about to utter will result in
an ambiguous sentence he will decide to disambiguate it.
When we reconsider the initial Malayalam examples (1) and (2) above,
we must conclude that such a hearer-sensitive model does not necessarily
explain all uses of accusative case on objects in Malayalam. A sentence
like (1) he bought a cow is very unlikely to result in ambiguity and as such
the use of accusative case on the object is unexpected. In fact, all ani-
mate objects are marked with accusative case in Malayalam irrespective
of potential ambiguity. I therefore assume that we can distinguish two
strategies with respect to the case marking of direct object: one strategy
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marks direct objects in order to avoid ambiguity, the other marks them
because they are prominent. I will use the historical development of dif-
ferential object marking in Spanish to show how these two strategies can
be related to one another.
1.3 Prominence
The Malayalam examples in (1) and (2) show how animacy can influence
the case marking of direct objects. Discussion in the previous section
showed that the marking of animate objects is not necessarily due to am-
biguity avoidance, but instead can be analyzed as being due to a principle
which requires the marking of prominent arguments. In this light, con-
sider the following two examples from Turkish:
Turkish (Turkic; Kornfilt 2003:127)
(3) Ahmet
Ahmet
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
pasta-yı
cake-acc
ye-di.
eat-pst
‘Yesterday evening, Ahmet ate the cake.’
(4) Ahmet
Ahmet
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
pasta
cake
ye-di.
eat-pst
‘Yesterday evening, Ahmet ate cake.’
Again we observe a pattern in which direct objects are differentiated
with respect to overt case-marking. This time, however, the use of case
marking on direct objects is not determined by animacy: the examples in
(3) and (4) both have an inanimate direct object. Instead, the use of overt
object-marking in Turkish is determined by the specificity of the object:
only specific objects are marked with accusative case. Non-specific direct
objects, by contrast, are left unmarked. This marking of specific objects
cannot be analyzed in terms of ambiguity avoidance, but should be seen
as an instantiation of the tendency to mark prominent direct objects.
In chapter 4, I investigate the influence of the prominence of argu-
ments on their morphosyntactic realization. In particular, I discuss how
animacy and definiteness/specificity contribute to the prominence of an
argument and how these features relate to each other. When one com-
pares the Malayalam examples in (1) and (2) on the one hand, with the
Turkish examples in (3) and (4) on the other, one may get the impression
that these two features influence overt case-marking in a similar way. I
will, however, argue that the two features should be seen as fundamen-
tally different from one another. More specifically, I argue that animacy
can only trigger the occurrence of overt case marking. Definiteness/-
specificity on the other hand can itself be determined by the occurrence
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of overt case marking. That is, the occurrence of overt case on a direct
object can result in a definite/specific interpretation. Moreover, I show
that case marking can only be used to indicate the definiteness/specificity
of a direct object, when it is not required by animacy. In particular, I ar-
gue that animacy takes priority over definiteness/specificity with respect
to differential object marking.
This asymmetry between animacy and definiteness/specificity will be
explained in terms of a fundamental difference between the two semantic
features. Animacy is an inherent (lexical) feature of noun phrases which
cannot be altered by case (or any other) marking. Nouns are, by contrast,
not inherently specified for definiteness or specificity, but can be marked
as such by means of articles or case marking. Thus, the observation that
animacy takes priority over definiteness can be seen as an instantiation
of a more abstract pattern in which inherent features take priority over
contextually-derived features.
Let me end this introductory chapter with a few remarks about the
concept of grammar adopted in this dissertation. I belief that most of
the observations and claims put forward are compatible with a variety
of frameworks. Nevertheless, in those cases where I present an explicit
formal analysis of phenomena I adopt a model that is in line with what
has been labelled functional Optimality Theory (cf. Aissen 1999, 2003;
Bresnan and Aissen 2002, a.o.). In this model grammar is viewed as
non-modular and consists of violable constraints that are (potentially) in
conflict with each other and act in parallel. In chapter 3 I introduce a
bidirectional version of this model in which both the speaker’s and the
hearer’s perspective are integrated. I will not go into further details here,
instead I introduce the relevant concepts when I need them.
Chapter 2
Gradient Transitivity
In this chapter, I show that a strict division between transitive and intran-
sitive constructions cannot be maintained. Instead, I argue that transitiv-
ity should be seen as a gradient phenomenon with the result that clauses
can be assigned different degrees of transitivity. This will be illustrated
with differential object marking, where sentences with caseless objects
are less transitive than those with case-marked ones. Furthermore, I ar-
gue that the relation between semantic and morphosyntactic transitivity
is not necessarily one-to-one. That is, formally transitive constructions
can correspond to semantically intransitive configurations and seman-
tically transitive configurations can correspond to formally intransitive
constructions. Moreover, languages differ in the way they relate seman-
tic transitivity to formal transitivity. This will be illustrated with a case
study of the cognate object construction in English. Whereas the cognate
object semantically functions as an adverbial, syntactically it behaves like
a direct object. English will be shown to differ from Russian in this re-
spect, as in the latter language cognate objects syntactically behave like
direct objects and hence exhibit a one-to-one relation between meaning
and form.
2.1 Introduction
In his well-known article on ergativity Dixon writes that “all human lan-
guages classify actions into two basic types: those involving one obligatory
participant, which are described by intransitive sentences, and those in-
volving two obligatory participants, which are dealt with by transitive
sentences” (Dixon 1979:102). True as it may be, this quote also raises
some immediate questions. What does it mean for a sentence to be intran-
sitive or transitive? What kind of morphosyntactic or semantic clues can
help us to classify a sentence one way or the other? Can every sentence be
classified as intransitive or transitive or do we need additional categories?
Is it always the case that an action with one obligatory participant is real-
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ized as an intransitive sentence and one with two obligatory participants
as a transitive one, or do we also find mismatches? Is it possible, for
instance, to express a two participant action as an intransitive sentence?
If we indeed find such instances, do we find cross-linguistic variation in
the way the semantics is related to the morphosyntactic expression of
transitivity? These questions are central to the present chapter.
A very traditional way of defining the notion of transitivity is in terms
of valency, i.e., the number of arguments a verb takes. The relation be-
tween these two notions can be seen from the following quote “[a] pred-
icate is commonly said to be transitive if it has two arguments and in-
transitive if it has only one” (Bowers 2002:183, emphasis in original). In
this section I take this traditional view as my point of departure, starting
with the intransitive construction, and then moving on to the transitive
one. Finally, I discuss a set of data that cannot readily be accommodated
in terms of such a strict division between intransitivity and transitivity.
I argue that instead these data require a more fine-grained set of distinc-
tions.
2.1.1 Intransitivity
In terms of valency, intransitive verbs are verbs with a valence of one.
Intransitive constructions consist of a subject and a predicate, examples
of which are given in (1) and (2).
(1) I walked.
(2) John slept.
From a semantic point of view, intransitive predication constitutes the
simplest form of (verbal) predication. In terms of predicate logic we can
translate an intransitive construction as a one-place predicate, i.e., as
the relation between a predicate and a single argument, cf. (3).1 The
translation of (2) above, leaving out the contribution of past tense, into
1There is no one-to-one correspondence between logical predicates and English
verbs. In predicate logic nouns and adjectives, for instance, are also treated as predi-
cates as can be seen from the translations into predicate logic of the English sentences
John is tall and There is a blue vase:
(i) tall′(john′)
(ii) ∃x(vase′(x) ∧ blue′(x))
The treatment of adjectives and nouns as logical predicates is justified from a cross-
linguistic perspective as there exist languages in which these categories behave as verbs.
See Stassen (1997) for a detailed cross-linguistic study of intransitive predication.
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predicate logic is given in (4).
(3) P(x)
(4) sleep′(john′)
From the view of type theory an intransitive verb is analyzed as being of
type 〈e,t〉, a function from entities e to truth values t, the basic types of
type theory. In other words, a predication like John sleeps maps John to
true if John is a member of the set of sleepers and to false if he is not.
Moving on to the morphosyntactic expression of intransitive construc-
tions, we find that, if we restrict ourselves to non-pronominal subjects,
a clear pattern emerges. A typical intransitive construction, as, for in-
stance, exemplified by the English example in (2) above, consists of a
subject noun phrase and a verb phrase (which in English may be more
complex in case of a progressive form (I am walking) or a non-present
tense (John has slept)).
Shifting our attention to the use of case marking in intransitive con-
structions in languages with overt case morphology, we find that typically
the subject has a so-called unmarked case. That is, in a nominative-
accusative language, exemplified by Latin in (5), nominative case is used
and in an ergative-absolutive language, illustrated by Yup’ik in (6), ab-
solutive case is used.
Latin (Indo-European; Song 2001:143)
(5) Puer
boy.nom
labora-t.
work-3sg
‘The boy is working.’
Yup’ik (Inuit; Bok-Bennema 1991:2)
(6) Arnaq
woman.abs
yurar-tuq.
dance.ind.3sg
‘The woman dances.’
If we also take into account pronominal subjects, we find more variation
between languages in the realization of intransitive constructions. This
becomes clear when we compare the English example in (1) above with
the following example from Italian.
Italian (Romance)
(7) (Io)
I
dorm-o.
sleep-1sg
‘I am sleeping.’
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Where in English the overt expression of pronouns is obligatory, in a so-
called pro-drop language like Italian pronouns can be omitted (a process
which seems to be largely dependent on discourse considerations).2 As a
result an intransitive construction in these languages can consist of solely
a verb (the same holds for head-marking languages in general, cf. Nichols
1986).
There are yet other sources of variation in markedness within the
class of intransitive constructions. Additional morphosyntactic structure
can be used in order to highlight some semantic contrast. To give one
example, one of the semantic factors cross-linguistically influencing the
morphosyntactic complexity of (intransitive) constructions is the notion
of volitionality or control. A subject may have more or less control over
the action he is performing or he may be acting in a more or less volitional
manner. Sometimes these differences in control and volitionality result
in a different marking of the subject noun phrase, as is the case in the
examples from Bats in (8).
Bats (Caucasian; Holisky 1987:105)
(8) a. As
I.erg
wozˇe.
fell
‘I fell.’ (It was my own fault that I fell down)
b. So
I.abs
wozˇe.
fell
‘I fell.’ (No implication that it was my fault)
Alternatively, differences in control or volitionality result in a different
marking on the verb, as shown in the examples from Thompson in (10).
Thompson (Salish; Thompson and Thompson 1992:55)
(9) a. Xwes´ıt.
walk
‘He walks.’
b. Xwesit-nwe´ìn.
walk-nc
‘He managed to walk.’
Bats is a so-called fluid-S language in which the subject of an intransi-
tive verb can change its marking depending on semantic features such
as control and volitionality (see, e.g., Dixon 1994 for discussion of this
2Pronounless constructions are possible in English as well, as is demonstrated by
the use of imperatives such as walk!, sleep!, etc.. Other examples of pronounless con-
structions in English can be found in ‘diary language’, e.g., slept for hours, walked
through town, etc..
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phenomenon).3 In Bats we clearly see that the marking of an intransitive
subject which is in control follows the marking of the transitive subject
by taking ergative case, cf. (8a). Intransitive subjects which are not in
control take absolutive case following the marking of the transitive object,
cf. (8b).
In the Thompson Salish examples we find something similar. The
Salish languages are well-known for having a range of devices to mark
the control a subject has over the action he performs (see Thompson
1986 for a discussion of control marking in Salish and how it differs from
the notion of control and volitionality in other languages). If we compare
example (9a) with (9b) we see that only the latter is marked with the
suffix -nwe´ìn which indicates that the subject did perform the action
denoted by the verb but that it took a certain amount of effort.
The examples in (8) and (9) present us with one way in which in-
transitive constructions can exhibit variation in their formal markedness.
One could easily provide many more examples, but they will not be given
here. Instead, I move on to the discussion of transitive constructions.
2.1.2 Transitivity
As opposed to intransitive verbs, which have a valence of one, transitive
verbs have a valence of two. Apart from a subject such verbs also take a
direct object. The contrast between the two constructions is illustrated
by the examples below, the first one being transitive, the second one
intransitive.
(10) Ernie tickled Bert.
(11) Bert laughed.
Semantically, transitivity is often characterized as an activity which
is carried over or transferred from an agent to a patient (cf. Hopper
and Thompson 1980:251). From the point of view of predicate logic, a
transitive verb denotes a relation between two entities, i.e., a two-place
relation, cf. (12). A translation of (10) into predicate logic is given in
(13).
(12) R(x,y)
(13) tickle′(ernie′,bert′)
3Fluid-S languages contrast with so-called split-S languages in which the marking
of the intransitive subject varies depending on the verbal lexeme, which often roughly
follows the distinction between verbs taking an agent argument and verbs taking a
patient argument (see Dixon 1994 for further discussion).
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In terms of type theory a transitive verb denotes a function from entities
to a function from entities to truth values, that is, a transitive verb is
of type 〈e,〈e,t〉〉. Another way of expressing this is to view a transitive
verb as a function from entities to intransitive verbs which illustrates the
complexity of transitive verbs over that of intransitive verbs. A sentence
like Ernie tickled Bert is true if Ernie is an element of the set of entities
that tickled Bert, otherwise it is false.4
If we now turn to the morphosyntactic realization of such transitive
relations we find that some languages overtly mark transitive verbs for
their transitivity. This in contrast to a language like English in which
the only difference between intransitive and transitive constructions lies
in the addition of a direct object noun phrase. In the Salish languages, a
transitive verb is overtly marked with a transitivizer, which is suffixed to
the verbal root. This difference between intransitive and transitive verbs
is illustrated by examples (14) and (15) from Halkomelem, a Coast Salish
language.
Halkomelem (Salish; Gerdts 1988:43)
(14) Ni
aux
ĳ´ım@sˇ-(*@t)
walk-tr
ì@
det
sìe´niĳ.
woman
‘The woman walked.’
(15) Ni
aux
q’wa´qw-*(@t)-@s
club-tr-3.su
tT@
det
sw@´yĳeĳ
man
tT@
det
spe´ĳ@T.
bear
‘The man clubbed the bear.’
The suffix -t indicates that the verb is used as a transitive verb. The
intransitive verb in (14) resists this transitivizer, whereas it is obligatory
for the transitive verb in (15). The contrast between these examples
shows that in these languages intransitive verbs are less complex than
transitive ones.5
In many languages the difference between intransitive and transitive
constructions is reflected in the use of case marking. We find that lan-
4Another way of formulating this is by saying that the (ordered) pair 〈ernie,bert〉
is an element of the set {〈x,y〉 | x tickled y}.
5This statement is in need of qualification. Within the class of intransitive verbs we
should make a distinction between unaccusative and unergative verbs. As argued by
Davis (1997) Salish languages can be characterized as deeply unaccusative. This claim
is based on the fact that both unergative and transitive verbs are morphologically
derived from unaccusative verbs by means of suffixation. In other words, we can say
that in these languages unaccusative verbs are less complex than both unergative and
transitive verbs. A similar situation is found in some unrelated Finno-Ugric languages,
as shown by Kalinina et al. (2006). This is in line with the approach to argument
structure advocated in Hale and Keyser (1993) among others. See also section 2.2 for
further discussion.
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guages most frequently entertain one of the two possibilities in extending
the case-marking pattern found in intransitive constructions. If the case-
marking pattern used for intransitive subjects is extended to also cover
transitive subjects, and direct objects are marked with a different case,
we speak of a nominative-accusative system, as exemplified by Latin in
(16). If, on the other hand, the case marking used for intransitive sub-
jects is extended to cover the direct object of a transitive verb, and at
the same time the transitive subject is marked with a different case, we
speak of an ergative-absolutive system. The latter system is exemplified
in (17) with examples from Yup’ik.
Latin (Indo-European; Song 2001:143)
(16) a. Puer
boy.nom
labora-t.
work-3sg
‘The boy is working.’
b. Magister
teacher.nom
puer-um
boy-acc
lauda-t.
praise-3sg
‘The teacher praises the boy.’
Yup’ik (Inuit; Bok-Bennema 1991:2)
(17) a. Arnaq
woman.abs
yurar-tuq.
dance.ind-3sg
‘The woman dances.’
b. Angut-em
man-erg
tangrr-aa
see.ind-3sg.3sg
arnaq.
woman.abs
‘The man sees the woman.’
In an accusative/ergative language the NOM-ACC/ERG-ABS case frame
is most often used for the realization of a semantically two-place relation.
Accordingly, some authors have labelled them transitive case frames (e.g.,
Tsunoda 1981, 1985). We do, however, also find deviations from these
transitive case frames. For instance, in many languages dative case is
used for experiencer subjects to contrast them with agent subjects which
receive nominative or ergative case (see, for instance, the contributions
to Bhaskararao and Subbarao 2004). Returning to the notion of volition-
ality, discussed for intransitive verbs in the previous section, we also find
transitive constructions in which the marking of the subject changes when
it is more or less volitional. A good example is the so-called ‘involuntary
agent construction’, which is attested in many languages (Kittila¨ 2005),
and demonstrated below with examples from Lezgian.
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Lezgian (Caucasian; Haspelmath 1993:292)
(18) a. Zamira-di
Zamira-erg
get’e
pot.abs
xana.
broke
‘Zamira broke the pot.’
b. Zamiradi-waj
Zamira-adel
get’e
pot.abs
xana.
broke
‘Zamira broke the pot by accident, involuntarily.’
The examples in (18) show a clear difference in the marking of the subject
of the transitive construction. In (18a) the subject is marked with erga-
tive case whereas in (18b) it shows up with adelative case. A concomitant
change in meaning can be observed, in (18a) the subject is interpreted
as performing the action of breaking volitionally in contrast to (18b) in
which the subject performs the action in an involuntary manner. As with
intransitive verbs, discussed in the previous section, the degree of volition-
ality of the subject can be marked on the verb in transitive constructions
as well. This is illustrated by the following examples from Lhasa Tibetan:
Lhasa Tibetan (Tibetan; DeLancey 1984 via Kittila¨ 2002)
(19) a. Na-s
I-erg
dkaryol
cup
bcaq-pa-yin.
break-pf-vol
‘I broke the cup purposefully.’
b. Na-s
I-erg
dkaryol
cup
bcak-soN.
break-pf.invol
‘I broke the cup accidentally.’
The examples in (19) essentially express the same opposition as the ones
in (18). The main difference lies in the fact that in Lhasa Tibetan the
difference in volitionality is expressed on the verb by means of volitionality
markers and not through case marking, as the subject is marked with
ergative case in both sentences. As with intransitive constructions we
find much variation in the marking of transitive constructions, but I will
not venture deeper into this here.
2.1.3 (In)transitivity
Up to now I have given a rather simplistic view of the differences between
intransitive and transitive constructions. As we have seen, the difference
between the two can be conceived of as a difference in valency. Intran-
sitive verbs take only one argument which shows up as the subject, and
transitive verbs take two arguments, one showing up as the subject the
other as the direct object. But how strong is this correlation between the
absence/presence of a direct object and (in)transitivity?
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In the remainder of this section I want to present some test cases to
examine the validity of this proposed correlation. The main questions I
want to address are the following two: (i) is a direct object a necessary
ingredient in order for a construction to be classified as transitive or do
we find transitive constructions without a direct object?; (ii) does the
presence of a direct object automatically entail we are dealing with a
transitive construction or do we find constructions with a direct object
which should still be considered intransitive? These two questions can be
approached and answered from both a syntactic and a semantic point of
view. Most importantly, the answers to these questions can shed some
light on the relation between form and meaning. If we make a semantic
distinction between one-place predicates and two-place predicates, will
the first always be realized as a syntactically intransitive construction
and the second as a transitive one? Or may it be the case that we find
variation, that is, a one-place predicate can also be realized as a transitive
construction and a two-place predicate as an intransitive one? In the first
case, the relation between semantic and morphosyntactic transitivity can
be considered a one-to-one relation. If, on the other hand, the second
scenario holds, we have to treat this relation as asymmetrical.
Consider a verb like kill which is often treated as a prototypical transi-
tive verb as the action indicated by the verb involves a clear individuated
agent and patient (see, e.g., Tsunoda 1985). In principle, we might ex-
pect this verb always to occur with a direct object. An example of such
a transitive use is given in (20).
(20) The bear killed a sheep.
Now consider the following (real-life) scenario. In the spring of 2006 a
bear, named Bruno by the media, coming from the Italian Alps made his
way through the southern part of Germany killing sheep and other farm
animals. Day after day news reports reported killings made by the bear.6
In such a situation one could have uttered the following:
(21) Last night the bear killed again.
This example shows that given the right discourse, even a strongly transi-
tive verb such as kill can occur without a direct object, i.e., in a formally
intransitive construction (see Goldberg 1995 for the original tiger-example
and further discussion). Due to the absence of a direct object the occur-
rence of kill in (21) should be considered an intransitive use, despite
the fact that on the semantic level the construction has to be consid-
6Eventually, Bruno was shot dead in the early morning of June 26, 2006.
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ered transitive. In order to perform the act of killing there has to be a
participant involved that was alive before the killing event and dead af-
terwards. In other words, in (21) we are still dealing with a semantically
transitive event despite its intransitive formal realization. This example
clearly shows that there is not a necessary one-to-one correspondence be-
tween semantic and formal transitivity. The phenomenon in (21) is much
discussed in the literature and sometimes referred to as indefinite object
deletion (cf. Mittwoch 1982; Goldberg 1995; Næss 2004a).
Not only do we find semantically transitive verbs realized in an intran-
sitive fashion, we also find constructions in which an alleged intransitive
verb occurs with something which looks like a direct object. This is the
case in the so-called cognate object construction. Cognate objects are
objects whose head noun is the event or state nominalization of the verb.
Furthermore, it is possible, but not necessary that the object NP shares
its morphological root with the main verb. These cognate objects can
occur with verbs that normally do not take a direct object, that is, with
intransitive verbs. This seems to be the most common scenario cross-
linguistically. Consider the examples from Latin in (22) and (23):
Latin (Indo-European; Sall., Cat. IX,4; Plaut., Ps. 525)
(22) In
in
hoste-m
enemy-acc
pugna-v-erunt.
fight-pf-3pl
‘They have fought against the enemy.’
(23) Ista-m
that-acc
pugna-m
fight-acc
pugna-b-o.
fight-fut-1sg
‘I will fight that fight.’
The Latin verb pugnare ‘to fight’ normally only takes prepositional com-
plements like in hostem ‘against the enemy’ in (22). However, in (23) an
accusatively marked noun phrase istam pugnam ‘this fight’ occurs with
this verb. Cognate objects are also found with verbs that normally take
only one direct complement, i.e., transitive verbs. This is not only found
in Latin but also, for instance, in Arabic and Ancient Greek. The exam-
ple in (24) is from Arabic.
Arabic (Arabic; Lazard 2003b:8)
(24) Yafhamu
he.understand
l-’adab-a
the-literature-acc
fahm-an
understanding-acc
’amıˆq-an.
deep-acc
‘He has a profound understanding of literature.’ (lit. he under-
stands the literature a profound understanding)
The Arabic verb for ‘understand’ normally takes as its direct object only
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that entity of which the subject has understanding. In (24) we see that
the verb can take a second accusatively marked complement, which in
this case expresses the degree to which the person in question has under-
standing of literature.
Cognate objects provide us with another example on the basis of which
we might consider the relation between semantic and formal transitivity
to be asymmetric in nature. The present asymmetry proceeds in the
opposite way from the asymmetry observed above in the case of indef-
inite object deletion. It can be argued that in the case of the cognate
object construction in (23) the formal construction is transitive due to
the occurrence of the cognate object whereas on the semantic level it is
intransitive as it represents a one-place predicate. Likewise in the case
of example (24), where we have a semantically two-place relation which
is morphosyntactically realized as a construction with two direct objects.
The exact relation between semantic and formal transitivity in the cog-
nate object construction is more complicated than can be done justice
here. I will therefore return to this issue in section 2.4.
In the phenomena discussed so far I have observed an asymmetry be-
tween formal and semantic transitivity. Either a semantically transitive
configuration was realized as a formally intransitive construction or a se-
mantically intransitive configuration was realized as a formally transitive
construction. There are also situations which pose interesting questions
concerning the relation between formal and semantic transitivity but in
which a profound asymmetry as discussed above is absent. In these phe-
nomena a change in the referential properties of one of the participants
correlates with a change in the formal realization of the construction. We
have already seen such situations above in the discussion of volitionality
and its effects on morphosyntactic expression. In the above discussion,
however, I have focused on the variation in marking due to the semantics
of the subject, the argument shared by transitive and intransitive con-
structions. In the following discussion I focus solely on the influence of
changes in the referential properties of direct object arguments on the
formal structure, as direct objects have been considered a defining formal
characteristic of transitivity.
Differential object marking, introduced in the previous chapter (see
also chapters 3 and 4), is a prime example of a phenomenon in which
the referential features of a direct object influence its formal realization.
Bossong (1991) reports that over 300 languages in the world are known
to exhibit some sort of differential object marking system. The refer-
ential properties involved differ from one language to the other but two
recurrent dimensions are animacy and definiteness/specificity. Hebrew,
for instance, is a language in which only definite objects receive the ac-
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cusative marker ’et, indefinite objects stay unmarked.
Hebrew (Semitic; Aissen 2003:453)
(25) Ha-seret
the-movie
her’a
showed
’et-ha-milxama.
acc-the-war
‘The movie showed the war.’
(26) Ha-seret
the-movie
her’a
showed
(*’et)-milxama.
acc-war
‘The movie showed a war.’
In example (25) the object milxama ‘war’ occurs with the definite article
ha and consequently is marked with the object marker ’et. In (26) the
object occurs without a definite article and as a result use of the object
marker leads to ungrammaticality. Differential object marking presents
an interesting case for the relation between semantic and formal tran-
sitivity. From a semantic point of view the two examples differ in the
referential status of the direct object, definite versus indefinite, but ar-
guably both constructions are semantically transitive, as in both cases we
are dealing with a two-place relation.
The formal realization leaves room for discussion with respect to its
transitivity. Judging from the number of noun phrases both examples
are equally transitive. There is, nevertheless, a difference in the encoding
of the object noun phrases in the two examples, i.e., the presence vs.
absence of ’et, which may point to a difference in transitivity. On the
assumption that (in this language) accusative case is a signal of direct
objecthood, we must conclude that only (25) but not (26) has a direct
object, and that as a result only (25) should be considered transitive. The
consequence of this view is that in (26) the relation between semantic
and formal transitivity is asymmetrical, i.e., a semantically two-place
relation is realized as an intransitive construction. Although we have
seen that such an asymmetrical relation is not uncommon in language, we
can question whether it is the right analysis for the present example. The
problematic aspect is the treatment of (26) as an intransitive construction.
The fact that the postverbal noun phrase does not receive accusative case
makes the construction different from a transitive one, but at the same
time it is the presence of this noun phrase that makes the construction
different from an intransitive one as well. Hence, example (26) does not
so much seem to advocate against a one-to-one relation between semantic
and formal transitivity but more so against a black-and-white contrast
between intransitivity and transitivity.
A phenomenon related to differential object marking is that of object
incorporation. In an object incorporation construction the direct object
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argument is not constructed syntactically as a separate entity but is in-
cluded in the predicate instead. Compare the following two examples
from West-Greenlandic.
West-Greenlandic (Inuit; Van Geenhoven 1998a:232)
(27) Nuka-p
N.-erg
iipili
apple.abs
neri-v-a-a.
eat-ind-3sg-3sg
‘Nuka ate the/a particular apple.’
(28) Nuka
N.abs
iipili-tur-p-u-q.
apple-eat-ind-intr-3sg
’Nuka ate an apple/apples.’
We can observe two differences between the two examples in (27) and
(28). When we consider the form, (27) shows an ergative-absolutive tran-
sitive construction with two independent noun phrases. In (28), on the
other hand, the object is not expressed as an independent noun phrase but
rather as a part of the predicate. Furthermore, the morphology has shifted
from transitive in (27) to intransitive in (28).7 Given its morphosyntac-
tic realization, the West-Greenlandic incorporation construction has to
be considered intransitive on structural grounds. But what about its se-
mantic transitivity? Is it the case that only (27) should be analyzed as a
semantically two-place relation whereas (28) should be considered to be
intransitive at the semantic level? As in the case of the Hebrew differen-
tial object marking example, we can observe a difference in the semantic
interpretation of the object when we compare (27) to (28). In (27) the O-
argument is referential whereas in (28) this is not the case. The absence
of case in Hebrew and the use of noun incorporation in West-Greenlandic
do not seem to be due to the fact that they express a semantically in-
transitive construction, but instead they seem to be correlated with the
referential feature of the patient argument.8
7West-Greenlandic has two verbs which can express the meaning ‘to eat’ (see, e.g.,
Van Geenhoven 1998a:240-243). One is the incorporating verb -tur- ‘to consume’,
illustrated in (28), which depending on the incorporated noun can mean ‘to drink’ or
‘to eat’. The other is the non-incorporating verb neri- ‘to eat’, illustrated in (27).
8Baker (1996) notes that not in every language with object incorporation does this
process occur with such differences in interpretation of the object NP. In particular,
these meaning differences seem to be absent in (most) polysynthetic languages. For
instance, Baker (1996:287-291) shows that in Mohawk (Iroquoian) “incorporated nouns
can have the full range of interpretations of any other nominal, except for those as-
sociated with focal stress” (Baker 1996:291). Furthermore, he shows that in some
languages the incorporation construction remains transitive as witnessed by verbal
agreement with the object argument (see also Baker et al. 2004 for discussion). These
cross-linguistic differences point to the fact that different languages may show different
types of object incorporation (see Mithun 1984 for an overview of such types and Baker
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Indeed, Van Geenhoven (1998b) presents a semantic analysis of ob-
ject incorporation in West-Greenlandic in which the incorporated object
is semantically still an argument of the verb, although of a different se-
mantic type than a non-incorporated object. That is, we are still dealing
with a semantically transitive configuration in (28). More specifically,
Van Geenhoven (1998b) argues that not only at the morphological level
does the object get incorporated but also at the semantic level. In her
framework an incorporating verb is of the semantic type 〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉 and
an incorporated object of the semantic type 〈e,t〉, resulting in a VP of
type 〈e,t〉 when the verb takes the object as its argument.9
This shows that in West-Greenlandic a formally intransitive construc-
tion can correspond to a semantically transitive configuration.10 Further-
more, it shows that we should allow for different characterizations of se-
mantic transitivity instead of a strict division between intransitive and
transitive.
Although the above discussion is somewhat simplified it has made
clear two important points. First, it has been shown that the relation
between semantic and morphosyntactic transitivity is not necessarily a
one-to-one relation. That is, formally transitive constructions can corre-
spond to semantically intransitive configurations, as for instance in the
case of the cognate object construction, and at the same time seman-
tically transitive configurations can correspond to formally intransitive
constructions, as in the case of indefinite object deletion and object in-
corporation. Secondly, the discussion has made clear that the distinction
between intransitivity and transitivity is not as strict as has often been as-
sumed, as there exist inbetween configurations both on the syntactic and
on the semantic level, cf. the phenomena of differential object marking
and object incorporation.
In the next two sections I turn to theoretical approaches to transi-
tivity. First, I discuss the representation of transitivity in the structural
framework of generative grammar (section 2.2). I then argue that we
1996:19-20 for the defining characteristics of true noun incorporation).
9Van Geenhoven (1998b) phrases her approach in an intensional semantics. In her
framework the lexical meaning of an incorporating verb can be represented as in (i)
and that of a regular (non-incorporating) transitive verb as in (ii) (Van Geenhoven
1998b:132):
(i) λP〈s,〈e,t〉〉 λws λxe ∃y[Verbw(x,y) ∧ Pw(y)]
(ii) λws λxe λye[Verbw(x,y)]
10This view is, for instance, also defended in Baker (1988) who argues that “verbs
with incorporated objects in . . . Eskimo are morphologically (although not semantically
or syntactically) intransitive” (Baker 1988:126, emphasis added).
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need a more gradient view on transitivity as for instance developed in
functional-typological approaches (section 2.3). In section 2.4, I show
how such a gradient view on transitivity can be applied to the English
cognate object construction.
2.2 Transitivity in Generative Grammar
Transitivity plays an important role in many of the (formal) syntactic
theories out on the market today. The present section cannot and, more
importantly, does not want to provide a full overview of approaches to
transitivity in syntactic theory in general. Instead it presents a discussion
of a single framework, that of Chomskyan generative grammar, as a test
bed for the implementation of the intransitive-transitive distinction in a
structural framework.
In the previous section I have argued that intransitive verbs are less
complex than transitive verbs as the former in contrast to the latter only
take one argument, i.e., the subject. If we are going to implement this
distinction between the two types of verbs in a structural framework we
would expect that transitive verbs end up structurally more complex than
intransitive verbs. When we consider the development of the notion of
transitivity in Chomskyan generative grammar, we will see this prediction
is borne out by and large.
Chomsky (1965) argues that transitivity should be represented as a
contextual feature. That is, if we consider the subcategorization of verbs
as context-sensitive rules, then the contextual feature [+ NP] indicates
that a verb is transitive and [+ #] that a verb is intransitive. In other
words, the classification of verbs into the two classes is based on the
presence of a direct object. In this sense it resembles the simple view
of transitivity as presented at the very beginning of this chapter. This
specific formulation of the distinction between intransitive and transitive
verbs has been challenged by many authors, on different grounds (see, for
example, Gazdar 1982 on word order variation, and Amritavalli 1979 on
the relevance of transitivity for transformational rules instead of lexical
insertion only). But what is most important to the present discussion
is that instead of relating transitivity to the presence of a direct object
more recent proposals have argued that it is not the object but rather the
subject which is of importance for the notion of transitivity. For instance,
Hoekstra (1984) claims that “a more sensible classification of verbs could
be made in terms of the property of selecting a Θ-subject. The traditional
class of intransitives can be divided into two subclasses, one of which dis-
plays the properties of transitives, while the other share[s] its properties
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with passives of traditional transitives. I suggest that transitivity is re-
garded no longer as a property of combining with an NP to form a VP (or
rather V’), but rather as having an external Θ-role” (Hoekstra 1984:227).
The thematic role that is assigned to the subject is usually referred to as
an ‘external’ role because it is assigned to an argument outside the VP
(cf. Williams 1981). An external thematic role is written as ‘Θ’.
Hoekstra, thus, proposes to change the traditional classification based
on subcategorization as shown in (29) into a classification based on the
presence of an external thematic role as shown in (30) for some Dutch
verbs.11
(29) Verb classification based on subcategorization:
intransitive: [V ′ ]
examples: lachen ‘laugh’, sterven ‘die’, breken
‘break’ (non-causative)
transitive: [V ′ NP ]
examples: doden ‘kill’, breken ‘break’ (causative),
opvallen ‘strike’
(30) Verb classification based on external theta roles:
intransitive: no Θ-subject
examples: sterven ‘die’, breken ‘break’ (non-
causative), opvallen ‘strike’
transitive: Θ-subject
examples: doden ‘kill’, lachen ‘laugh’, breken ‘break’
(causative)
As the examples above show, some verbs, e.g., lachen ‘laugh’, which were
classified as intransitive under the subcategorization approach are classi-
fied as transitive under the external subject approach in (30). At the same
time other verbs, e.g., opvallen ‘strike’, which were classified as transitive
are now classified as intransitive. Hoekstra claims that there is no relation
between semantic and formal transitivity: “I claim that the logical na-
ture of the predicate [i.e., being one-place or two-place] that is expressed
by a particular verb is not a relevant property from a linguistic point
of view” (Hoekstra 1984:227). The intransitive verbs that are classified
together with transitive verbs are the so-called unergative verbs, whereas
the class of intransitive verbs in Hoekstra’s classification corresponds to
11Example (29) corresponds to Hoekstra’s example (223) and (30) to his (224). The
ordering [V ′ NP ] for transitive verbs in (29) reflects the fact that Dutch, in contrast
to English, has a head-final VP.
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the class of unaccusative verbs. As noted by Hoekstra evidence for this
split within the class of intransitives is based on their linguistic behavior.
Unergative verbs often share properties with transitive verbs. In Dutch,
for instance, transitive verbs and unergative verbs select the same per-
fective auxiliary hebben ‘to have’ whereas unaccusative verbs select zijn
‘to be’ (cf. Perlmutter 1978; a similar situation is found in Italian, as is
well-known from Burzio 1986). Furthermore, we find languages in which
unergative verbs surface as transitive constructions with a direct object,
similar to transitive verbs, as is the case in Basque (Levin 1989). As we
will see in section 2.4, the cognate object construction, introduced above,
occurs much more readily with unergative verbs than with unaccusative
verbs, which is often taken to be an argument for the higher transitiv-
ity of the former class of verbs. In fact, Hale and Keyser (1993) assume
that unergative verbs are derived from underlying transitive verbs with
an incorporated cognate object.
The observation that transitivity should not be equated with the pres-
ence of a direct object but rather with properties of the subject also made
its way into recent formulations of the generative framework as proposed
in Chomsky (1995) and related literature. In most accounts the external
subject is positioned in a special functional projection (but see Horvath
and Siloni 2002). As Bowers (2002) reports “[c]urrent minimalist accounts
of argument structure all share the assumption that there is a functional
category between T and V that has the following two correlate prop-
erties: (a) its specifier contains the external argument of transitive and
unergative sentences; (b) its head contains a probe with object agreement
features” (Bowers 2002, footnote 1). This functional projection comes in
many guises depending on the author as the following non-exhaustive list
shows: vP (Chomsky 1995), VoiceP (Kratzer 1993), TrP (Collins 1997),
Pr(ed)P (Bowers 1993). Several authors (e.g. Ramchand 1997; Ritter
and Rosen 2001) have argued that this functional projection is realized
as an aspectual projection AspP.
The examples in (31)-(33) provide the tree structures corresponding
to the three types of verbs, transitive, unergative, and unaccusative re-
spectively (where FP indicates the functional projection associated with
the external subject):
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(31) Transitive: subject in specFP, object in complement of V (e.g.
kill)
FP


HH
H
DP
subject
F′
 HH
F VP


HH
HH
V′


HH
H
V
transitive verb
DP
object
(32) Unergative: subject in specFP (e.g. laugh)
FP


HH
H
DP
subject
F′
 HH
F VP


HH
H
V′
 HH
V
unergative verb
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(33) Unaccusative: subject in complement position of V (e.g. fall)
FP
 HH
F′


HH
H
F VP


HH
HH
V′


HH
HH
V
unaccusative verb
DP
subject
The above structures show that transitive and unergative verbs share
the property of having a subject argument in the specifier of the func-
tional projection. Furthermore, transitive verbs also have an object in
the complement position of V. Unaccusatives only have a subject argu-
ment in the complement position of V (which subsequently raises to a
higher position in the structure). It should be noted that there exists
some disagreement about the precise realization of the functional projec-
tion above the VP containing unaccusative verbs. I have drawn it here
as a full-fledged functional projection, but some would consider it to be
a functional projection lacking a specifier position, whereas others would
argue that there is no functional projection at all with these verbs. Irre-
spective of one’s preference in this matter, the characteristic which sets
unaccusative verbs apart from transitive and unergative verbs is their
VP-internal subject.
As for their complexity, the structures show that it is not simply the
case that intransitive verbs are less complex than transitive verbs but that
we also have to make a distinction within the class of intransitives, where
unergative verbs arguably are more complex than unaccusative ones (see
also footnote 5). In this framework, there is a strict structural division
between the three different kinds of verbs, and variations in the surface
transitivity of a sentence have to be related to a structural difference.
For instance, the differential object marking pattern observed in Hebrew
and discussed above can be analyzed by having the definite object move
out of the VP where it gets assigned accusative case and leaving the
indefinite object in a caseless position inside the VP. Likewise, structural
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Parameter high low
A. Participants 2 or more, A and O 1
B. Kinesis action non-action
C. Aspect telic atelic
D. Punctuality punctual non-punctual
E. Volitionality volitional non-volitional
F. Affirmation affirmative negative
G. Mode realis irrealis
H. Agency A high in potency A low in potency
I. Affectedness of O O totally affected O not affected
J. Individuation of O O highly individuated O non-individuated
Table 2.1: Hopper and Thompson’s (1980) transitivity parameters
explanations can be provided for other transitivity alternations, although
perhaps not with equal ease for every (semantic) feature involved in such
alternations. In particular, argument features such as volitionality and
animacy do not have a straightforward position in such an approach. In
the next section, I turn to a discussion of semantic features which have
been argued to influence the transitivity of a clause and I discuss a (non-
structural) gradient approach to transitivity.
2.3 Transitivity As a Gradient Phenomenon
2.3.1 Hopper and Thompson (1980)
The study of transitivity and related phenomena has a long history in
the typological literature and made enormous headway due to the con-
tribution of Hopper and Thompson (1980). After having studied the
grammars of a number of languages these authors concluded that transi-
tivity should be regarded as a complex notion which is determined by the
parameters listed in Table 2.1.12 On the basis of these parameters a sen-
12Independently of Hopper and Thompson (1980), Tsunoda (1981) developed a mul-
tifactorial account of transitive encoding based on similar parameters as the ones pro-
posed by Hopper and Thompson. Tsunoda (1981) formulates the so-called Effective-
ness Condition (EF-CON) a measurement of the degree to which the action described
by the verb is transferred from the agent to the patient. The degree of satisfaction
of the EF-CON is determined by parameters such as the impingement of the action
on O, O-individuation, completeness of the verbal action, actuality and telicity of the
event. The degree of satisfaction of the EF-CON determines the degree of transitivity
encoding of a two-argument clause. With the EF-CON Tsunoda wants to describe
not only transitivity alternations, where the same verb takes alternative case frames
depending on the properties of the clause (tense, aspect, mood (TAM) properties) but
also verb splits, in which different classes of verbs select different case frames. He ar-
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tence can be qualified as more or less transitive. In other words, Hopper
and Thompson argue that transitivity should be viewed as a gradient or
scalar phenomenon: the more features a sentence has in the high column
the more transitive it should be regarded to be and the more marking
for transitivity we should expect. That is, a sentence that scores high on
all parameters listed in the table should show more marking for transi-
tivity than one that scores low on all parameters. As this table shows,
transitivity in this view involves much more than only the presence of
an object to the verb. With respect to the interaction of the transitivity
parameters Hopper and Thompson introduce the notion of co-variation.
As they state “we find that these component features of Transitivity co-
vary extensively and systematically . . . whenever an obligatory pairing
of two Transitivity features occurs in the morphosyntactic or semantics
of a clause, the paired features are always on the same side of
the high-low transitivity scale” (Hopper and Thompson 1980:254;
emphasis in original). This notion of co-variation is reflected in their
Transitivity Hypothesis:
Hopper and Thompson’s Transitivity Hypothesis:
If two clauses (a) and (b) in a language differ in that (a) is
higher in Transitivity according to any of the features A-J,
then, if a concomitant grammatical or semantic difference ap-
pears elsewhere in the clause, that difference will also show
(a) to be higher in Transitivity. (Hopper and Thompson
1980:255)
Let me illustrate this hypothesis by reconsidering the differential ob-
ject marking examples from Hebrew discussed above (examples (25) and
(26)), repeated as (34) and (35) for convenience.
Hebrew (Semitic; Aissen 2003:453)
(34) Ha-seret
the-movie
her’a
showed
’et-ha-milxama.
acc-the-war
‘The movie showed the war.’
(35) Ha-seret
the-movie
her’a
showed
(*’et)-milxama.
acc-war
‘The movie showed a war.’
On the morphosyntactic level the two sentences differ in the absence and
presence of the object marker ’et. On the semantic level this morphosyn-
gues that TAM splits and verb splits are “fundamentally no different from each other,
their semantics and case-marking mechanisms involving common principles” (Tsunoda
1981:391).
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tactic difference is accompanied by a difference in the definiteness of the
object milxama ‘war’: in (34) the object is definite, in (35) it is indefinite.
Given that definiteness contributes to the individuation of the object in
that definite objects are more individuated than indefinite objects, (34)
scores higher on the individuation parameter (parameter J) than does
(35). As a result, the former is higher in transitivity than the latter. In
accordance with the Transitivity Hypothesis, the morphosyntactic differ-
ence between the two sentences, i.e., the presence/absence of accusative
case, also shows (34) to be higher in transitivity than (35). In this way
Hopper and Thompson’s framework provides an account of the relation
between semantic and formal transitivity.
Hopper and Thompson present a large amount of cross-linguistic data
to support their view that transitivity should be regarded as a continuum.
Their view inspired many authors but has also been critized.
Strikingly, in the view presented by Hopper and Thompson a sen-
tence with two participants may rate lower on the transitivity scale than
a clause with a single participant. That is, the distinction between in-
transitivity and transitivity has disappeared in their framework. Hopper
and Thompson (1980:254) illustrate this with the following two English
examples.
(36) Susan left.
Kinesis: action
Aspect : telic
Punctuality : punctual
Volitionality : volitional
(37) Jerry likes beer.
Participants: two
For the parameters on which they differ, the intransitive sentence in (36)
scores high on four of the transitivity parameters. This in contrast to
the transitive example in (37) which scores high on only one parameter.
This means that the intransitive construction should be considered to
be higher in transitivity than the transitive one. The authors themselves
seem perfectly at ease with this consequence of their view. Other authors,
however, have expressed their doubts about it. Kittila¨ (2002:118) for
instance writes “[u]nlike Hopper and Thompson (1980:253), we do not
wish to claim that intransitive clauses can rate higher for transitivity
than transitive ones . . . Different features become relevant only if there
are two participants involved.” Lazard (2003a) shares the view that only
within the class of two-participant clauses we can distinguish degrees of
transitivity. He argues that the requirement of two participants should
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not be placed on a par with the other transitivity parameters. Instead,
two-participancy should be regarded as a basic condition of transitivity.
This does not mean that Lazard wants to argue that we cannot make
any differentiation within the class of one-participant clauses but that
“they are better studied outside the framework of transitivity” (Lazard
2003a:180). Thus, these authors maintain the (traditional) distinction
between intransitivity and transitivity, but at the same time they allow
for different grades within each category.
The relative importance of the different parameters has been debated
by other authors as well. In Hopper and Thompson’s view all Transi-
tivity parameters are equally important and all of them are predicted to
co-vary with each other. Tsunoda (1985), however, argues that the Tran-
sitivity Hypothesis as expressed by Hopper and Thompson is too strong
as some parameters show structural co-variation whereas other parame-
ters simply cannot co-vary. Furthermore, he argues that not all param-
eters are equally relevant. As for the first criticism, Tsunoda notes that
some parameters have a very close correlation with each other. As ex-
amples he puts forward the parameters (E) Volitionality and (H) Agency
which appear always to co-vary. On the other hand, co-variation seems
to be non-existent for some parameters as is, for instance, the case for
the parameters (E) Volitionality and (H) Agency on the one hand and
(I) Affectedness on the other. As Tsunoda (1985:386) puts it “in certain
instances, they always contradict each other and never co-vary.”
For his second point of criticism which affects the equal importance
of all parameters Tsunoda remarks “[f]eatures/notions such as (E) Voli-
tionality, (H) Agency or agentivity are often referred to in the discussions
of transitivity or related issues. However, as far as the manifestation of a
transitive case frame is concerned, they appear to be irrelevant.” (Tsun-
oda 1985:393). He argues that on the other hand a feature like (I) Affect-
edness is a crucial parameter in the marking of transitivity. Tsunoda thus
concludes that the conception of the transitivity parameters formulated
by Hopper and Thompson as an unordered list cannot be validated.
More recently, Malchukov (2006) reassesses the discussion of co-varia-
tion initiated by Tsunoda (1985). He proposes to group the transitiv-
ity parameters formulated by Hopper and Thompson on the basis of
the element in a sentence they primarily pertain to. He distinguishes
between A-related parameters (e.g., volitionality), O-related parameters
(e.g., affectedness) and V-related parameters (e.g., aspect). Malchukov
proposes to transform the unhierarchized list of Hopper and Thompson
into a transitivity scale. This scale, presented in Figure 2.1, explicates
the “mutual semantic affinities between particular transitivity parame-
ters” (Malchukov 2006:333).
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A-parameters V-parameters O-parameters
[animacy] [volitionality] [kinesis] [factivity] [tense/aspect] [affectedness]
[individuation]
Figure 2.1: Malchukov’s (2006) transitivity scale
In Malchukov’s view “[t]his scale is intended to represent selective se-
mantic affinities between individual parameters through placement of the
related parameters adjacently on the scale. Some of these affinities can
be captured in semantic terms while some other are rather pragmatic in
nature and based on world knowledge. Thus, volitionality presupposes
animacy of the A argument while completeness/non-completeness of a
transitive action [=aspect, PdS] entails that O is completely/partially
affected. Affectedness in its turn is related to O-individuation, inas-
much as total affectedness is easier to envisage in case of definite objects”
(Malchukov 2006:333). With respect to the notion of co-variation and
the Transitivity Hypothesis Malchukov assumes “a weaker form of the
Transitivity Hypothesis that predicts that only parameters that are se-
mantically related (and placed adjacently on the Transitivity Scale) will
show a systematic co-variation” (Malchukov 2006:334).
By means of his transitivity scale, Malchukov constrains the co-varia-
tion of parameters proposed by Hopper and Thompson and thus meets the
main criticism advocated by Tsunoda and others (e.g., Lazard 1998). The
representation of the parameters in the form of a scale, nevertheless, has
limitations of its own. The division between verb related and argument
related features is useful and straightforward. The further division among
the argument related parameters into A-related and O-related parameters
and their subsequent positioning at other ends of this scale seems to be
more useful for some features than for others.
A clear case in point is the feature of animacy. Malchukov puts ani-
macy at the higher end of the scale as in his view it is closely connected
with volitionality and agency. Indeed, animacy, and in the case of voli-
tionality, humanness, is a necessary condition for both features. Without
being animate it is impossible to be agentive let alone volitional. An-
imacy, however, is also argued (for instance by Hopper and Thompson
themselves) to be relevant for the feature of O-individuation and affected-
ness (see Næss 2004b for a discussion of the relation between individuation
and affectedness). This is, for instance, illustrated among other phenom-
ena by differential object marking (cf. the discussion of Malayalam in
chapter 1; see also chapters 3 and 4).
This shows that animacy should be considered both an A-related and
an O-related feature. This ‘dual’ behavior of animacy is impossible to
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Figure 2.2: Transitivity triangle
capture in a scalar approach presented by Malchukov in which A-related
and O-related parameters each represent one end of the scale. It requires
a more complicated configuration than a scale. As long as we maintain
the important insight that the adjacency of parameters corresponds to
their possible co-variation, we can replace the scale by any other configu-
ration. This is due to the fact that Malchukov’s scale is not really a scale
but rather an ordered list. That is, his scale does not possess characteris-
tics normally associated with (typological) scales such as hierarchization,
i.e., the features towards the top end are more important than the ones
towards the lower end, and implication, i.e., if a feature at a certain posi-
tion on the scale is involved in the process under investigation, so are all
higher features. The most straightforward way to modify the ‘scale’ in
order to incorporate the ‘dual’ behavior of animacy is by joining the two
ends such that a closed circuit is created. This modification preserves the
established adjacency of the features and it furthermore adds the adja-
cency between animacy and individuation. A graphic representation of
such a configuration is given in Figure 2.2.
In the next chapter, the fact that animacy is both an A-related and an
O-related feature will be shown to be an important source for variation
in formal transitivity. Given that animacy is related to both arguments
of a transitive relation, ambiguity may arise when they are equal in ani-
macy. In order to eliminate such ambiguities, languages can be shown to
develop certain mechanisms. For instance, they mark objects with overt
accusative case to secure one interpretation over the other, in this way
also increasing the formal transitivity of a clause.
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2.3.2 The Relation between Meaning and Form
A final problematic aspect of Hopper and Thompson’s framework con-
cerns the relation between semantic and morphosyntactic transitivity.
Lazard (2003a) provides an in-depth study of Hopper and Thompson’s
contribution to the study of transitivity. Although he agrees with them
and credits them for the observation that transitivity should be regarded
as a gradient phenomenon, he is very critical about the relation between
semantic and formal transitivity, in particular the formulation of their
Transitivity Hypothesis. In order to fully appreciate this discussion let me
first quote the relevant passage from Hopper and Thompson (1980:255)
“[t]he Transitivity Hypothesis is stated in such a way that the transitivity
features can be manifested either morphosyntactically or semantically”.
As Lazard notes “[a]ccording to this formulation, morphosyntax and se-
mantics are somehow on a par and both are able to ‘manifest’ such a
quality as transitivity” (Lazard 2003a:176). In his view this is a strange
conception of language as we should not view language as a mixture of
morphosyntactic and semantic features but rather as a correlation be-
tween the two. By having the degree of transitivity determined by both
semantic and morphosyntactic parameters, Hopper and Thompson ob-
scure the relation between semantic transitivity on the one hand and
morphosyntactic transitivity on the other.
Lazard (2003a) himself develops an asymmetric view of the relation
between form and meaning: whereas different meanings can be expressed
by the same form, different forms express different meanings. His ap-
proach is very much in line with what I am arguing for in the present
chapter (barring any sociolinguistic variation, cf. Weiner and Labov 1983).
We should refrain from an approach in which semantic and formal tran-
sitivity are devoted to each other in a one-to-one fashion, but rather opt
for a view which allows for an asymmetric relation between the two. A
concomitant advantage of such an approach is that it can account for
attested cross-linguistic variation in the mapping from semantic to for-
mal transitivity. As shown by Drossard (1991) not every language relates
variation in semantic transitivity to formal transitivity in the same way
(see the discussion in 2.4.4; see also Hawkins 1986; Mu¨ller-Gotama 1994;
Testelec 1998). English, for instance, is a language which uses a sin-
gle formally transitive construction to cover a wide domain of semantic
transitivity. This in contrast to Russian which mirrors changes in the
semantics more closely in its morphosyntax. In other words, we can state
that English shows a strong asymmetry between semantic and formal
transitivity, whereas Russian comes closer to a one-to-one relation.
In the next section I apply such an asymmetric view between meaning
2.4 Cognate Objects and the Syntax-Semantics Interface 33
and form to the cognate object construction and I show how such a view
provides a fruitful approach to this phenomenon.
2.4 Cognate Objects and the Syntax-Semantics
Interface
In section 2.1, I presented the cognate object construction as an example
of divergence between semantic and formal transitivity. In this section, I
show how exactly these two levels of transitivity relate to each other in
the construction under discussion.
Cognate objects can be characterized as elements which look like di-
rect objects but which occur with verbs which normally do not take a
direct object. Consider the following examples.
(38) While in The Who, Keith Moon lived a fast life.
(39) Right in the middle of the scene, the actress sneezed a horrific
sneeze.
(40) After he told the joke, the comedian laughed a loud laugh.
Verbs like live, sneeze, and laugh would normally be considered to express
a predication over a single participant. Nevertheless, these examples seem
to occur with a second argument. The occurrence of this additional noun
phrase poses several questions. In this section I am concerned with the
following three: (i) Are cognate objects proper semantic arguments or do
they constitute a different semantic type?; (ii) Should cognate objects be
considered real syntactic arguments or are they of a different type?; and
(iii) What is the relation between the semantic and syntactic status of
cognate objects?
The cognate object construction is most frequently discussed in re-
lation to Indo-European, Semitic, and West African languages, but has
also been reported for Chinese, Vietnamese, and Australian languages
(see Rice 1987; Pereltsvaig 1999b). My main focus is on the cognate
object construction in English with occasional reference to other (Ger-
manic) languages, but in the second part of this section I will embed it
in a wider cross-linguistic perspective. Before I turn to the three ques-
tions posited above, I will first discuss some characteristics of the cognate
object construction in English.
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2.4.1 Ingredients of the Cognate Object Construction in
English
Can we predict which verbs enter the cognate object construction and
which ones do not? Placing it in a cross-linguistic perspective Pereltsvaig
(1999a) answers this question in the negative as she claims that “whether
a particular object is cognate to the verb or not is a matter of language-
specific lexical idiosyncrasy” (Pereltsvaig 1999a:287). Even for a single
language like English, it has been proven difficult to present a good work-
ing definition of the cognate object construction (see, e.g., Macfarland
1995 for discussion). Nevertheless, I want to use this section to give some
ingredients of the cognate object construction in English in order to ar-
rive at a recipe for this phenomenon. First, I discuss some restrictions on
the verb in the cognate object construction, followed by a discussion of
the restrictions on the cognate object itself.
One restriction often referred to in the discussion about the types of
verbs, which can enter the cognate object construction is unergativity.
Following Kuno and Takami (2004) we can refer to this as the unerga-
tive restriction on the cognate object construction which states that only
unergative verbs can appear in the cognate object construction.13 Unac-
cusative verbs, on the other hand, are generally thought to be ungram-
matical with a cognate object (but see below).
(41) Unergative:
a. Mary laughed a sad laugh at the meeting.
b. Bob grinned a sideways grin.
c. Jack sneezed the most tremendous sneeze I had ever heard.
(42) Unaccusative:
a. *The glass broke a crooked break.
b. *The door opened its noisy opening.
c. *She arrived a glamorous arrival.
In generative grammar this asymmetry between unergative and unac-
cusative verbs is often related to an assumed difference in underlying
structure between them. As discussed in section 2.2, the subject of
unergative verbs is assumed to occupy a specifier position of a func-
tional projection above the VP. This subject is assigned a theta-role by
the unergative verb and following Burzio’s Generalization (Burzio 1986),
given in (43), the verb can assign accusative case to a potential (cognate)
object.
13Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) take the ability to occur with a cognate object
to be a test for unergativity.
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(43) Burzio’s Generalization:
All and only the verbs that can assign a thematic role to their
external argument can assign accusative case to an object.
The subject of unaccusative verbs, on the other hand, is assumed to
occupy the complement position in the initial structure, i.e., direct object
position, where it is assigned a thematic role. By Burzio’s Generalization
the verb cannot assign case to its object position, the object therefore
has to move to the subject position in order to escape a violation of the
Case Filter which requires overt NPs to have case. This then is possible
because no theta-role is assigned to the standard subject position. Hence,
the Theta Criterion, which states that an argument must be assigned one
and only thematic role, is not violated either. Given that unaccusative
verbs cannot assign accusative case to complements, cognate objects are
predicted to be ungrammatical as they would violate the Case Filter.
At first sight, the unergative restriction seems to give us the right
descriptive statement, but under closer scrutiny it comes out problem-
atic. Kuno and Takami (2004) argue that some unaccusative verbs can
actually enter the cognate object construction. Relevant examples are
the following (Kuno and Takami 2004:116):
(44) a. The tree grew a century’s growth within only ten years.
b. Stanley watched as the ball bounced a funny little bounce
right into the shortstop’s glove.
c. The stock market dropped its largest drop in three years
today.
The occurrence of a cognate object with the unaccusative verbs in (44)
shows that the unergative restriction is not the right descriptive statement
with respect to the distribution of cognate objects. What then restricts
the ability of verbs to enter the construction?
In my view the aspectual nature of the verb plays a crucial role. As
noted by different authors, in order for a verb to enter the cognate object
construction it must have certain aspectual features. According to Mas-
sam (1990) verbs which can occur in cognate object constructions tend to
be activities. Kuno and Takami (2004) claim that the verb must repre-
sent an activity or event involving a temporal process (duration) without
a set endpoint.
A well-known test to distinguish between atelic and telic verbs is mod-
ification with frame-adverbials in α time and durative adverbials for α
time (see, e.g., Vendler 1967; Dowty 1979). Frame-adverbials pick out
telic events, i.e., they have a natural endpoint, whereas durative adver-
bials select events which are atelic, i.e., ongoing events without a natural
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endpoint.14 This test opposes the class of states and activities (processes)
against the class of accomplishments and achievements (transitions). It
is demonstrated in (45):
(45) a. Mary was happy with John for twenty years/*in twenty years.
[state]
b. Max ran for half an hour/*in half an hour. [activity ]
c. Max read a book in twenty minutes/*for twenty minutes.
[accomplishment ]15
d. The vase broke in a second/*for a second. [achievement ]
Cognate object verbs pattern with atelic verbs as they reject modifi-
cation with frame adverbials, but allow for durative adverbials:
(46) a. Mary laughed for a minute/*in a minute.
b. Chris smiled for a minute/*in a minute.
A second test for telicity is the behaviour of verbs with respect to the
imperfective paradox (cf. Dowty 1979). For atelic verbs the progressive
form entails the corresponding perfect form, cf. (47a), which is not the
case for telic verbs, cf. (47b).
(47) a. Max is running entails Max has run.
b. The vase is breaking does not entail The vase has broken.
Again cognate object verbs pattern with atelic verbs:
(48) a. Max is smiling entails Max has smiled.
b. Max is laughing entails Max has laughed.
Given this behavior of cognate object verbs, I argue the following
restriction to hold for such verbs:
(49) Aspectual Restriction on the Cognate Object Construction:
Only atelic verbs, i.e., verbs without an inherent endpoint, can
occur in the cognate object construction.
My claim that only verbs which are atelic can enter the cognate ob-
ject construction is in conflict with Macfarland’s (1995) claim that such
14Verbs without an inherent endpoint are also referred to as, unbounded, non-
delimited, non-culminating and verbs with an inherent endpoint are referred to as
telic, bounded, delimited, culminating.
15Modification with for twenty minutes is possible with accomplishment predicates
but then the overall interpretation of the sentence is that of a non-telic accomplishment,
cf. Rothstein (2004:24).
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verbs may be specified as telic. More specifically, Macfarland claims that
these verbs do not form a homogeneous class aspectually and she argues
that cognate object verbs must only be specified for the feature [+dy-
namic] and may but need not be specified for the features [+telic] and
[+durative]. Her claim is based on the occurrence of cognate objects
with obligatorily transitive verbs such as tell, do, and say. Consider the
following examples (from Macfarland 1995:11):
(50) a. Oh, sometimes within our family we told a tale about a bull
howling at the crescent moon, thinking it was his own horn
caught up there.
b. From the way she talked to him then, you would have thought
that he had done some noble deed.
It is, however, problematic to use these verbs to support a claim about
the telicity of bare cognate object verbs. Consider the examples in (51):
(51) a. Max is telling *(a joke).
b. Max is doing *(this project). .¸ Max is saying *(a toast).
These examples show that it is ungrammatical for such verbs to occur
without a direct object. As a result we cannot properly test the aspectual
class of the bare base verb, and hence these verbs do not constitute a
counterexample to my claim that base verbs have to be atelic.
Moreover, I do not consider the examples in (50) to be proper cognate
object constructions due to the fact that when a cognate object appears
with these verbs it substitutes for the normal direct object. That is,
cognate objects cannot occur as an additional direct object with such
verbs, as the examples in (52) show.
(52) a. *Max is telling a joke a tale.
b. *Max did his project a deed.
Obligatorily transitive verbs such as tell, do, and say can only enter the
cognate object construction when their cognate object replaces any other
direct object and expresses a supertype of the range of direct objects the
verb normally takes. This in contrast to the occurrence of cognate objects
with intransitive verbs, where the cognate object acts as an additional
argument.
Given the existence of the aspectual restriction on the cognate ob-
ject construction, the following examples are not ruled out because they
are unaccusative verbs but rather because they have the wrong aspec-
tual specification (cf. Kuno and Takami 2004:123). All verbs in (52) are
achievement verbs which have an inherent endpoint.
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(53) a. *The glass broke a crooked break.
b. *She arrived a glamorous arrival.
c. *The accident occurred a sudden occurrence.
How can this aspectual restriction account for the occurrence in the
cognate object construction of the unaccusative verbs in (44) above?16
The answer to this question lies in the fact that these are atelic verbs.
But then, if there exists such a strong correlation between telicity and
participation in the cognate object construction, one wonders why the
cognate object construction has always been approached from the view-
point of unergativity? This can be explained by the relation between the
two factors telicity and unergativity.
Different researchers (e.g., Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995:172ff;
Alexiadou et al. 2004; van Hout 2004; see also Van Valin 1990; Zaenen
1993) have claimed that there exists a strong correlation between telic-
ity and unaccusativity/unergativity. Unergative verbs turn out to be
atelic verbs very often, whereas unaccusative verbs are generally telic
verbs. In this way the aspectual restriction seems to have been obscured
by the unergative restriction. This correlation between atelic verbs and
unergativity on the one hand and telic verbs and unaccusativity on the
other hand is nevertheless not perfect. As Levin and Rappaport Hovav
(1995:172ff) argue there exist two classes of atelic unaccusative verbs: de-
gree achievement verbs such as cool, widen, harden and atelic inherently
16There seems to exist one exception to the aspectual restriction formulated in (49)
and that is the verb die. Even though this verb is telic, die is an achievement verb,
it figures frequently in the cognate object construction (she died a splendid death).
This is unexpected under the present analysis. Note, however, that this verb is also
problematic in the light of an analysis of the cognate object construction in terms of
unaccusativity/unergativity as die is traditionally taken to be an unaccusative verb.
Macfarland (1995) argues at length that die should not be considered unaccusative,
but unergative. However, Kuno and Takami (2004) argue that the tests on which she
bases her conclusions are problematic as tests of unergativity. Furthermore, they show
that die behaves exactly like unaccusative verbs on other tests. Given that die is an
unaccusative achievement verb it presents a problem to both the unergative restriction
and the aspectual restriction on the cognate object construction.
This problem nevertheless disappears when one takes into account the historical
road to the cognate object construction taken by die. Basing themselves on the Oxford
English Dictionary, Kuno and Takami (2004) report that in Middle English the noun
death in ‘to die a death’ was used with a variety of prepositions and described only the
manner in which one died but not the result. In present-day English this preposition
is dropped making die’s occurrence in the cognate object construction similar on the
surface to that of other cognate object verbs.
If this historical explanation holds, it sets die off from other cognate object verbs and
takes away the problem this verb poses to analyses of the cognate object construction
in English.
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directed motion verbs such as rise, descend, and fall. These atelic unac-
cusative verbs can distinguish between the unergative restriction and the
aspectual one. If they can occur in the cognate object construction, the
latter restriction should be considered the relevant one. Indeed, it seems
that we find cognate objects exactly with unaccusative verbs, belonging
to one of the two classes described above. This is illustrated for fall in
(54) (see also (44) and Kuno and Takami 2004:116 for examples).
(54) They fell a fall that went on and on as though the world had been
switched into slow-motion mode.
It should be noted, however, that not all atelic unaccusative verbs
can occur in the cognate object construction. This is explained by that
fact that apart from telicity other factors influence the occurrence of a
verb in the cognate object construction as well. One of these is the
existence of a rivalling transitive use of the verb in question. Consider
the following examples (where # indicates the unavailability of a cognate
object reading):
(55) #He descended a fast descent.
(56) He descended the hill/the steps of the temple/the ladder.
Descend is an atelic unaccusative verb and is therefore expected to occur
in the cognate object construction. Example (55) shows the opposite to be
true. In my opinion this is due to the fact that there also exists a transitive
use of descend, as shown in (56). The difference between the objects in
the cognate use and the transitive use is that in the latter case the object
is interpreted as an entity existing prior to the act of descending whereas
in the former case the object is the result of the action of descending. The
cognate object use and the transitive use of the verb are morphologically
indistinguishable and it seems that the transitive interpretation takes
priority over the cognate object interpretation. That is, the only possible
interpretation for (55) is one in which a fast descent is interpreted as an
object which can be descended, on a par with a hill or a ladder. This is
impossible under a cognate object reading. In other words, we can say
that the transitive use blocks a potential cognate object use of the verb.17
17The absence of a cognate object use for a verb due to blocking by the existence of
a transitive use of that verb can also be illustrated with the verb climb. The cognate
object use of climb is excluded because a result reading is blocked by a competing
transitive use. Such a transitive use of climb is illustrated in (i).
(i) I climbed the climb called “The Bear”.
In this example, the morphologically cognate noun phrase the climb represents an entity
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Let me now turn to restrictions on the cognate object construction
related to the cognate object itself. Most importantly, the verb must have
a noun phrase which can function as a cognate object. As stated above,
according to Kuno and Takami (2004) this means that there must exist
an NP which represents a specific state or event that is a (subset of the)
possible states/events resulting from the action presented by the verb.18
The cognate object can thus be characterized as a type of effected object.
As such, it contrasts with the class of affected objects. The distinction
between effected and affected objects can be illustrated with the following
example (cf. Fillmore 1968; Hopper 1985).
(57) Max is painting a house.
On the effected object reading of (57) Max is drawing a picture of a house,
i.e., he is creating (an image of) a house. On the affected object reading
Max is changing the colour of a pre-existing house. On this reading the
house is not created by the action of painting but rather undergoes a
change of state. If we now consider the cognate object construction in
(58) we see that the cognate object goes together with an effected object
reading.
(58) Max laughed a loud laugh.
The only possible interpretation for (58) is that a loud laugh is the result
of the laughing action performed by Max. There is no way in which (58)
can be interpreted as saying something about a pre-existing laugh which
has undergone a change of state.
Let me return to the restriction posited by Kuno and Takami (2004)
that the cognate object should represent a specific state or event that is a
(subset of the) possible states/events resulting from the action presented
by the verb. The example in (59) does not meet this restriction, as a very
(path) which exist prior to the action of climbing.
18Often a cognate object is defined in terms of its morphological relationship to
the verb. Macfarland (1995) shows that different authors include different types in
their definition of cognate object. She herself includes only cognate object which are
“zero-related or which share the same root despite morpheme-internal changes (e.g.,
sing a song, live a life, die a death) but which are not related through affixation”
(Macfarland 1995:4). As Pereltsvaig (1999a:287) observes “[e]ven though restricting the
domain of the study in this way may have its merits as far as English cognate objects
are concerned, it can hardly be useful for a study of other languages”. For instance,
Pereltsvaig points out that this definition excludes the possibility of having cognate
objects in a language in which verbs and nouns are always related through affixation,
as she argues to be the case in Russian. Likewise, I will not take morphological cognacy
to be a necessary characteristic of cognate objects in English, although there may be
certain restrictions.
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interesting writing cannot be the result of a reading event.
(59) Max read a very interesting writing.
This restriction explains why we do not find cognate objects with atelic
unaccusative degree achievements such as cool discussed above. These
verbs simply do not have a noun phrase which represents a result state.
This restriction can be carried over to some unergative verbs. Unerga-
tive verbs which do not occur in the cognate object construction are, for
instance, so-called manner of motion verbs that are vehicle names (cf.
Macfarland 1995:38-39).
(60) *We helicoptered a quick helicopter to the airport.
The ungrammaticality of (60) is due to the fact that helicopter does
not represent a result of the act of helicoptering but rather names the
instrument. Such manner of motion verbs can only occur in the cognate
object construction when such a result noun does exist. This is illustrated
in (61) for the verb skate. In this example a quick skate should clearly be
interpreted as the result of the skating event and not as the instrument
by means of which the skating is performed (Macfarland 1995:39).
(61) She skated a quick skate around the rink before rejoining the
team in the center of the ice.
The fact that the cognate object noun phrase must represent a specific
state or event resulting from the action is supported by the difference in
grammaticality of grin and grinning in (62). The noun grin represents
a specific activity which is bounded in time, whereas grinning repre-
sents a continuous activity or “a temporal abstract substance” (Kuno
and Takami 2004:125). Therefore, the use of grinning, or for that matter
any gerundive nominal, as a cognate object results in ungrammaticality.
(62) Max grinned a sideways grin/*grinning.
Finally, the restriction on cognate object noun phrases formulated by
Kuno and Takami (2004) also correctly predicts the asymmetry between
(63) and (64), the latter example is taken from Macfarland (1995:90).
(63) *He grinned a smile at the meeting.
(64) Nancy grinned a mischievous smile of recognition.
A smile does not represent a subset of possible states or events result-
ing from the act of grinning. Nevertheless, when this noun is modified
by a number of adjectives or prepositional phrases as in a mischievous
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smile of recognition it does become an element of this subset. This then
licenses the use of this noun phrase in the cognate object construction
with the verb grin as shown in (64).
On the basis of the above discussion, I arrive at the following charac-
terization of the cognate object construction in English:
(65) The cognate object construction consists of:
1. A verb which:
– is atelic.
– has no transitive counterpart with a non-result object
(reading).
2. A noun phrase which:
– represents a subset of the possible states/events result-
ing from the action of the verb.
– functions as an ‘additional’ object.
Three remarks should be added to (65). First, although only atelic
verbs can enter the cognate object construction, it is not clear whether
they acquire a telic reading in the cognate object construction. Different
researchers (Tenny 1994; Macfarland 1994, 1995) have claimed that the
cognate object construction is telic and intuitively this seems to be the
case, as the cognate object represents the result of the action described
by the verb. However, its telic nature does not follow unequivocally from
the aspectual diagnostics discussed above.
With respect to the in/for α time-test, cognate objects seem to allow
both frame adverbials (in α time) and durative ones (for α time):
(66) a. Mary laughed a mirthless laugh for a minute/?in a minute.
b. Chris smiled a happy smile for a minute/?in a minute.
Tenny (1994) notes that speakers vary in how much they like the sentences
with in a minute and Macfarland (1994) even marks them with a question
mark. Modification with for a minute, on the other hand, is perfectly
well-formed. This clearly indicates that the cognate object construction
is not telic per se.
Application of the imperfective paradox to the cognate object con-
struction does not give a uniform result either. Macfarland (1995) claims
that the progressive form of the cognate object construction does not en-
tail the corresponding perfect form, and therefore should be considered
telic. To me these judgments seem questionable.
(67) a. ?Max is laughing a mirthless laugh does not entail Max
has laughed a mirthless laugh.
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b. ?Chris is smiling a silly smile does not entail Chris has
smiled a silly smile.
This discussion shows that the cognate object construction does not ex-
hibit uniform behaviour with respect to test for aspectual class. This
may be ascribed to properties of the cognate object. In particular, the
existential dependence of the cognate object on the event described by
the verb may play a role, i.e., the simultaneity between the occurrence
of the event described by the predicate and the existence of the cognate
object.
A second remark to (65), morphological cognacy does not play a role
in the current definition (see footnote 18). This means that morphological
cognacy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a construction
to be classified as a cognate object construction. There are indeed many
verbs which take a morphologically cognate noun as their object but
which in my view do not classify as cognate object verbs. Consider the
following examples.
(68) In the burning heat, the fireman drank an ice cold drink.
Dutch (Germanic)
(69) Max
Max
eet
eats
zijn
his
eten
dinner
het
the
liefst
most.preferable
met
with
een
a
lepel.
spoon
‘Max eats his dinner preferably with a spoon.’
In both examples the object, although morphologically cognate to the
verb, does not represent a result noun but rather an affected object.
Given the characterization in (65) neither example qualifies as a cognate
object construction.
The final remark concerns the restriction that the noun in the cognate
object construction should function as an ‘additional’ object with which I
mean an object which is added to a verb but does not belong to the basic
valency of this verb. I have included this restriction in order to exclude
examples such as the one in (70).
(70) Apple produces electronic products.
(71) *Apple produces iPods electronic products.
Although the example in (70) qualifies as a cognate object construction
according to the other restrictions in (65), I do not consider it to be a
real cognate object construction for two reasons. First, the cognate object
electronic products expresses the supertype of possible objects to Apple
produces. As illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (71) this cognate
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object can only occur when it replaces other possible objects. In this
respect it differs crucially from cognate objects with intransitive verbs
discussed above. Secondly, English contrasts with other languages which
do have real cognate objects with transitive verbs such as, for instance,
Ancient Greek. Example (72) gives an example from this language in
which the cognate object ple¯gas ‘blows’ occurs as an additional object
with the transitive verb tuptein ‘to hit’.
Ancient Greek (Indo-European; Antiph., Tetr., γ.1)
(72) ton
the.acc
andra
man.acc
tuptein
strike
tas
the.pl.acc
oligas
few.pl.acc
ple¯gas
blow.pl.acc
‘to strike the man few blows.’
In this example, ton andra ‘the man’ is the regular (affected) object of the
verb and tas oligas ple¯gas ‘few blows’ functions as an additional accusative
object. This example is grammatical both with and without the latter
object. Furthermore, unlike the English example in (70), this cognate
object does not replace the regular object of the verb. In this respect
Ancient Greek differs crucially from English with respect to the behaviour
of cognate objects with transitive verbs.
From now on I exclude English transitive verbs from the discussion as
they cannot take a cognate object in a way similar to intransitive verbs.
This also holds for verbs of re-creation like sing and dance which are often
discussed as prime examples of cognate object verbs (he sang a beautiful
song, they danced a wild dance). However, they are different from other
cognate object verbs in that they can take a range of other objects as
well. As in the case of produce above, these objects represent a subtype
of the morphologically cognate nouns. They are subject to the same co-
occurrence restriction as are transitive verbs, cf. the ungrammaticality of
(73).19,20
(73) *John and Mary danced the tango a beautiful dance.
Moreover, the objects of these verbs are not necessarily the result of the
action. Instead, they should be seen as the realizations of a pre-existing
19Note that this sentence is well-formed under an appositive reading of a beautiful
dance with an accompanying intonational break:
(i) John and Mary danced the tango, a beautiful dance.
In this example, a beautiful dance functions as an evaluative statement pertaining to
the direct object the tango.
20See also footnote 30 for another difference between regular cognate objects and
result objects of re-creation verbs.
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object, e.g., a score in the case of sing and a choreography in the case
of dance. In this respect, they are different from other cognate objects
which constitute a unique entity which does not exist in any other form
independent of their realization at a given time.21
2.4.2 The Semantic Status of Cognate Objects
Now that we have a firm idea of what the cognate object construction is,
we can start looking at its semantic and syntactic aspects. In this section
I concentrate on the semantic status of the cognate object. In particular,
I address the question what kind of semantic entity is the cognate object.
Massam (1990) claims that the cognate object is an element “which
receives a patient theta role from the verb” (Massam 1990:161). She takes
examples such as (74) in which a cognate object cannot occur together
with a direct object to be evidence for this claim. In Massam’s view the
ungrammaticality of this example results from the fact that both objects
are affected patients and the verb only allows for one.
(74) *Mordred killed the knight a gruesome kill.
Furthermore, Massam argues that the cognate object construction “may
only appear with verbs which in their basic sense do not involve an af-
fected entity” (Massam 1990:176). This argument is based on the fact
that the occurrence of a cognate object with verbs which necessary involve
an affected patient such as break, eat, and kill results in ungrammaticality,
cf. (75).
(75) a. *Jo ate her eat.
b. *Meg broke her break.
c. *Beth destroyed a destroy/destruction.
In my view the characterization of cognate objects as affected patients
cannot be right. For, if a cognate object is an affected patient, we would
expect it to occur with verbs that require an affected patient. That is, we
would predict the examples in (75) to be fully grammatical. Moreover, if
the cognate object and the direct object –both being affected patients–
are competing for the same position with a single verb as in (74) we would
expect the construction to be grammatical if we leave out either the direct
21The verb dream is another verb that is often referred to as a typical cognate object
verb. I am not sure about its status. Although it seems to be more transitive than
other cognate object verbs, e.g., it seems related to a verb like say in taking that-
complements (indeed Massam 1990 treats this verb as more transitive than cognate
object verbs), my inclination is to call it a true cognate object verb.
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object or the cognate object. However, as the contrast between (76a) and
(76b) shows, this does not hold true (see also Khalaily 1997).
(76) a. Mordred killed the knight.
b. *Mordred killed a gruesome kill.
It thus seems that the cognate object and the direct object are not com-
peting for the same theta-role. This is in line with the characterization of
cognate objects as objects of result, or effected objects, given above. In
other words, cognate objects are not pre-existing entities affected by the
action denoted by the verb, rather they are entities created by the action
of the verb. It is therefore no surprise that these kinds of objects do not
fit in a thematic slot reserved for affected patients, cf. (75) and (76b). I
conclude from this that Massam’s characterization of cognate objects as
affected patients cannot be maintained.
This conclusion is corroborated by the following data from Russian, a
language which does allow cognate objects with transitive verbs, cf. (77a).
In the absence of a direct object, the sentence is only grammatical if the
referent of the object is understood from the context (Pereltsvaig 1999a).
In other words, it is not possible to interpret the cognate object as the
direct object instead (note that Russian does have instrumental-marked
objects).
Russian (Slavic; Pereltsvaig 1999a:271)
(77) a. Ja
I.nom
vas
you.acc
ljublju
love
ljubovju
love.instr
brata.
brother.gen
‘I love you with a brotherly love.’
b. Ja
I.nom
ljublju
love
ljubovju
love.instr
brata.
brother.gen
‘I love (somebody) with a brotherly love.’
I have established that the cognate object should not be characterized
as an affected patient but rather as a result object. Nevertheless, the
question what is the semantic contribution of a cognate object is not
answered by this characterization. Many researchers have noted that the
cognate object does not add much information to a sentence as it simply
seems to repeat the meaning of the verb. In other words, it seems to
be tautological. Consider, for instance, the following quote from Rice
(1987): “cognate objects in all languages are redundant; they offer little
in the way of new information and they describe entities in the world
that are non-salient or indistinguishable from the activity that engenders
them” (Rice 1987:203). In the remainder of this section, I show that we,
nevertheless, can single out a clear semantic contribution of the cognate
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object.
Pustejovsky (2000) argues that cognate objects are so-called shad-
owed arguments, i.e., they are obscured by the semantics of the verb.
The shadowing of an argument can result in the blocking of its syntactic
expression. When we modify the shadowed argument, i.e., we specify
it such that it comes to stand in a subtype relation with the semantic
content of the verb, this shadow can be lifted and the syntactic expres-
sion becomes available.22 Consider the following examples (adapted from
Pustejovsky 2000:68):
(78) a. Mary buttered her bread (*with butter).
b. Mary buttered her bread with an expensive butter from Wis-
consin.
(79) a. Mary elbowed her partner.
b. Mary elbowed her partner with her *(arthritic) elbow.
(80) a. Mary laughed.
b. Mary laughed a *(happy) laugh.
The verb butter has as part of its semantic content the information that
the act of buttering is performed with butter. Therefore, the expression
with butter is shadowed by the semantics of the verb and syntactic expres-
sion is blocked, cf. (78a). In case the argument is modified as in (78b)
the shadow is lifted and syntactic expression is possible. Likewise for
the verb elbow in (79) for which the expression of the argument elbow is
blocked unless it is modified by an adjective such as arthritic. Pustejovsky
argues that also for the cognate object construction to be grammatical
the argument has to be modified.23 Although, unmodified cognate ob-
jects do appear (see Macfarland 1995 for examples), most authors seem
to agree that modification is an essential ingredient of the cognate object
construction. Some of them even argue that the primary function of a
cognate object is to act as a placeholder for modificational elements (see,
e.g., Rose´n 1981; Moltmann 1989).
But what exactly is modified by these modificational elements? Given
that a cognate object represents the end state or result of the event de-
scribed by the verb it occurs with and exists simultaneously with this
22Pustejovsky’s notion of shadowing is very similar to the notion of exteriorization
used by Lehmann (1991), who also applies it to cognate objects.
23In a similar vein Goldberg and Ackerman (2001) attribute this obligatory modifi-
cation to general conversational pragmatics. The expression of a bare cognate object
would not contribute new information to the sentence and hence is in conflict with
pragmatic principles, in particular Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (‘Make your contribu-
tion necessary’).
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event, the modification of the cognate object also modifies this event and
thus functions as a (manner) adverb. The similarity between manner
adverbs and cognate objects has been observed by several authors (e.g.,
Jones 1988; Moltmann 1989; Khalaily 1997) most of whom notice that
cognate objects can be easily paraphrased in terms of manner adverbs.24
This is illustrated by (82), which is a semantic equivalent paraphrase of
(81).
(81) Bill sighed a weary sigh.
(82) Bill sighed wearily.
Khalaily (1997) argues that the difference between the use of cognate ob-
jects and adverbials is a matter of difference in style or register. Cognate
objects represent a poetic or formal register.25
It is, however, not always possible to paraphrase a cognate object
construction by means of a manner adverb. The following example can
help to illustrate this:
(83) John lived the life of a rockstar.
Obviously, this sentence gives a description about John’s way of life. Nev-
ertheless, it is not easy to come up with an adverbial paraphrase of (83)
mainly due to the fact that there is no lexical adverb rockstarrily. As
such, this example nicely illustrates how a cognate object construction
can be used as an adverbial description in case no alternative (lexical)
adverb is available.26,27
24Zaenen et al. (1985:122-123), discussing Icelandic, also conclude that the semantic
contribution of a cognate object is like that of a manner adverbial. Moreover, they
argue that cognate objects do not undergo the movement or action described by the
verb and in this respect differ from normal accusative direct objects.
25Indeed, the cognate object is not frequent in everyday language (at least not in
English or Dutch, but see footnote 27) but more so in poetic language and also in
lyrics of pop songs. In the Latin grammar tradition the (morphologically related)
cognate object is often considered a literary figure referred to as ‘figura etymologica’.
Rose´n (1996), in an article on cognate objects in Latin, however, argues that the figura
etymologica in Latin should not be considered a stylistic phenomenon as each of the
three types of this construction attested in Latin (nominative, accusative, and ablative
cognates) has its own function.
26Rose´n (1996:141) presents the following quote from Jespersen (1928-1943:III 235)
which expresses the same intuition: “In real speech this kind of object [=cognate
object, PdS] is used for one purpose only, namely to add a descriptive or qualifying
trait, which could not conveniently be joined to the verb in the usual way as a subjunct
[=adverb, PdS].”
27Mittwoch (1998) also treats cognate objects as functionally similar to regular ad-
verbs. She discusses the cognate object construction in Hebrew and shows that this
construction has a much higher frequency in this language than in English. In an at-
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A semantic analysis of cognate objects as manner adverbs is provided
by Moltmann (1989). She analyzes cognate objects as predicates over
the (Davidsonian) event argument e of the verb (see Mittwoch 1998 for
an analysis in the same spirit). Davidson (1967) proposed that certain
classes of verbs have a so-called event argument which plays a crucial
role in adverbial modification. Moltmann extends this analysis to include
cognate objects as well. A cognate object construction like (84a) in her
analysis is assigned the semantic representation in (84b).
(84) a. John screamed a terrifying scream.
b. ∃e[scream(e,John) ∧ terrifying.scream(e) ∧ PAST(e)]
In this respect, the semantic analysis of cognate objects runs parallel to
that of adverbs in an event-based framework. As example (85) shows,
adverbs are also treated as predicates over events.
(85) a. John walked slowly.
b. ∃e[walk(e,John) ∧ slow(e) ∧ PAST(e)]
More recently, an adverbial analysis for cognate objects was proposed by
Bary and de Swart (2005). They argue that (in a non-event semantics)
cognate objects in Ancient Greek and Latin can be analyzed in terms
of predicate modification. Building on work by de Hoop (1992) on the
interpretation of object NPs, they assign cognate objects the semantic
type 〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉 of predicate modifiers. This means that cognate objects
are not semantic arguments of a verb but rather act as its modifier. The
cognate object takes the predicate as its argument and delivers a new
tempt to explain this difference between these languages, Mittwoch argues that cognate
objects “may be said to help fill a gap in the structure of Hebrew” as this language
does not “have a fully productive method of adverb formation analogous to the English
suffix -ly” (Mittwoch 1998:327).
I believe that there might be some truth in the complementarity between a high
frequent cognate object construction and the presence of a productive mechanism of
adverb formation (see also below). This correlation, however, seems hard to maintain
in the light of a language like Ancient Greek, which has productive adverb formation,
but at the same time has a highly frequent, although according to Mittwoch less so
than in Hebrew, cognate object construction.
An argument without force about the frequency of the Ancient Greek cognate object
construction can be found in Ku¨hner and Gerth (1963:III,304) who state that “in keiner
Sprache hat sich der Gebrauch dieses Akkusativs, . . . so umfangreich und zugleich so
ungemein sinnreich ausgebildet wie in der griechischen.” (in no language has the use
of the cognate accusative been developed to such an extent and at the same time with
so much meaning as in Greek, translation mine).
Even if such a correlation between a highly frequent cognate object construction and
the absence of a productive mechanism of adverb formation cannot be maintained, this
does not take away the functional similarity between adverbs and cognate objects.
50 Chapter 2. Gradient Transitivity
predicate. This means that cognate objects are interpreted as a part of
the predicate.
The event-based analysis and the predicate modification analysis of
cognate objects both treat them in a way similar to adverbs. In fact, the
two approaches represent the two main semantic approaches to adverbial
modification. Eckardt (1998) argues that these two approaches are not
necessarily incompatible with one another but that they can be combined
in a unified account. I will not explore that possibility here (but see
Scha¨fer 2005 for additional discussion).
I started this section with the question what is the semantic contri-
bution of the cognate object. I have established that the modification
of the cognate object modifies the action described by the verb. In this
respect, cognate objects function semantically in a way similar to manner
adverbials.
2.4.3 The Syntactic Status of Cognate Objects
Does the syntactic status of the cognate object mirror its semantic status?
In the literature on cognate objects the syntactic argumenthood of the
cognate NP is the most debated issue. Whereas some researchers have
argued that cognate objects should be treated as internal arguments of
the verb they occur with, i.e., on a par with regular direct objects, others
have argued for an adjunct status of cognate objects. In this section I
give an overview of the arguments put forward by each side.
Jones (1988) argues that cognate objects are adjuncts, i.e., modifiers
of the VP on a par with manner adverbials (cf. also Zubizaretta 1987).
One of the motivations for this analysis comes from the fact that the one
can be paraphrased easily in terms of the other, as was discussed in the
previous section. His main argument for this position, however, is that in
his view cognate objects do not readily passivize as the following examples
illustrate (Jones 1988:91; this argument is repeated by Moltmann 1989).
(86) a. *An uneventful life was lived by Harry.
b. *A weary sigh was sighed by Bill.
If cognate objects were considered to be direct objects of the verb, Jones
argues, they would receive a theta role and case and we would expect them
to passivize. By treating cognate objects as adjuncts they fall outside the
scope of the theta criterion and we do not have to worry about the fact
that the verb has available only one (external) theta role.
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Macfarland (1994, 1995) takes issue with Jones’ claim that cognate
objects cannot passivize.28 As she notes “[t]he passive is as marked for
cognate object constructions as it is for all other constructions, and it
requires contextual justification, rather than syntactic rules, to make it
acceptable” (Macfarland 1994:179). She illustrates her claim with exam-
ples such as the following (Macfarland 1995:112):
(87) a. Each person’s life is lived as a series of conversations.
b. It is a smile that could be smiled by the whole country.
Why do different researchers have different opinions about the grammat-
icality of passive cognate object constructions? According to Macfarland
we can distinguish two factors which influence the acceptability of such
passives. The first factor is the aspectual nature of the cognate object
construction (see also the discussion in 2.4.1). According to Macfarland
(1994) the cognate object construction should be aspectually character-
ized as a transition, i.e., a sequence of a process followed by a state.
Following observations by Grimshaw and Vikner (1993), she claims that
with so-called “constructive transitions” both parts of the complex event
structure have to be identified syntactically. This analysis is carried over
to cognate objects. The state part of the complex event is identified by
the cognate object in subject position, e.g., “the laugh laughed”, and the
process part of the event has to be realized as an adjunct, either as a
by-phrase or as a temporal, location or manner phrase. Absence of such
a by-phrase may downgrade the acceptability of a passive cognate object
construction.
This aspectual restriction on passive formation of cognate object con-
structions can partly explain the mixed attitudes people express towards
these kind of constructions. However, as Macfarland notes, it still has to
be explained why so many people, among them Jones (1988) and Molt-
mann (1989), object to passive cognate object constructions even when
an overt by-phrase is present, cf. the examples in (86) above. The answer
to this comes from discourse considerations. According to Macfarland
(1994, 1995) a passive construction in general, because of it being the
marked member of the opposition active-passive, needs contextual justi-
fication, cf. the acceptability of (88). That this also holds for ‘normal’
transitive constructions with a direct object is illustrated by the asym-
metry in acceptability between the examples in (89). The awkwardness
of the examples in (86) and (89a) is then explained by the fact that
28A discussion of the possibilty of cognate objects to passivize can already be found
in Rice (1987). She also presents examples of passive constructions involving cognate
objects (Rice 1987:210-211).
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the indefinite subjects in these examples express new information, which
clashes with the factor that the subject position is ordinarily reserved
for old information (cf. also Kuno and Takami (2004) on cognate passive
constructions). This clash can be overcome by embedding these indefinite
subjects in a wider context, as in the examples in (88) and (89b) (from
Macfarland 1994:178-179).
(88) a. An uneventful life was lived by Clark Kent after he gave up
his superhero status.
b. A weary sigh was sighed by the overworked field worker at
the end of a long day.
(89) a. #A new dress was bought by Becky.
b. A new dress was bought for the first time in three years by
the homeless woman with her first welfare check.
The above discussion shows that Jones’ claim that cognate objects
cannot passivize does not hold true. As a result, his main argument for
treating cognate objects as adjuncts loses its force. Instead of patterning
with adjuncts, cognate objects behave like regular direct objects with
respect to passivization. It should be noted however that this behaviour
of cognate objects with respect to passivization cannot be taken as a
direct evidence for direct argument status of cognate objects. This is due
to the fact that passivization in English is not restricted to direct internal
arguments but can also apply, for instance, to NPs inside prepositional
phrases.
Moltmann (1989), as discussed above, takes a view similar to that of
Jones (1988). She argues that cognate objects are adjuncts, i.e., predi-
cates over the Davidsonian event argument of the verb. Moltmann ad-
duces several types of evidence for her claim. She notes that cognate
objects exhibit several characteristics of adjuncts. For instance, like ad-
verbs, cognate objects are optional, cf. (90).
(90) John screamed (a terrifying scream).
One can debate the status of this argument. In the introduction to this
chapter, I have shown how even with highly transitive verbs the direct
object can sometimes be omitted. Moreover, taking optionality as a char-
acteristic of adverbs is problematic in itself as some verbs require an ad-
verb to be present, cf. (91). As such, the optionality of cognate objects
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for their status.
(91) They treated her *(well).
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A second argument discussed by Moltmann concerns the influence of
cognate objects on auxiliary selection. In German, cognate objects do
not change the have/be alternation, where regular direct objects require
the auxiliary have, cf. (92).
German (Germanic; Moltmann 1989:301)
(92) a. Maria
Maria
ist/*hat
is/has
gesprungen.
jumped.
‘Maria has jumped.’
b. Maria
Maria
ist/*hat
is/has
einen
a
weiten
far
Sprung
jump
gesprungen.
jumped
‘Maria has jumped a far jump.’
c. Maria
Maria
hat/*ist
has/is
den
the
Mann
man
gesehen.
seen.
‘Maria saw the man.’
A further argument for the adjunct status of cognate objects presented
by Moltmann concerns her observation that cognate objects share with
predicates an indefiniteness effect as they cannot occur with strong de-
terminers:
(93) a. *John screamed this scream/every scream we heard today.
b. John is a/*every man.
Subsequent authors (Massam 1990; Macfarland 1995; Kuno and Takami
2004) have shown that such an indefiniteness restriction does not hold and
that we do find definite cognate objects (see cited authors for examples;
see also example (95) below).
Finally, Moltmann claims that, like certain adverbial event predicates,
cognate objects cannot be topicalized, cf. (94).
(94) a. *A shrill scream, John screamed t.
b. *Beautifully, Mary sang the song.
But again subsequent authors, in particular Massam (1990) and Mac-
farland (1995), have shown that cognate objects in fact do allow topi-
calization. The following example from Massam (1990:181) contains a
topicalized definite cognate object:
(95) The big cheery smile, Fran smiled; it was Elsie who smiled the
insipid smirky smile.
Massam (1990) and Macfarland (1995) notice that such topicalized cog-
nate objects are indeed rare and that this should not be related to a
54 Chapter 2. Gradient Transitivity
structural explanation. Instead, they argue that topicalization is often
ruled out by pragmatic and discourse factors.
Moltmann’s (1989) main claim is that cognate objects are predicates
over the event argument of the verb. Massam (1990) provides evidence
for the fact that cognate objects should not be considered predicates but
rather referential NPs (see also Macfarland 1995). She comes to this con-
clusion on the basis of several tests for referentiality as laid out in Doron
(1988). With respect to non-restrictive relative clause formation, pronom-
inalization, quantification, and scope facts, cognate objects pattern with
referential objects and not with predicate nominals.
As for pronominalization, cognate objects can be referred to by a
pronoun (it) in a later sentence,29 something which is also possible for
direct objects but not for predicate nominals, cf. the contrast between
(96a-b) and (96c).30
(96) a. Mona smiled a tantalizing smilei. Penelope noticed it and
decided immediately that she would photograph iti.
b. Mona hit the balli. The dog caught iti and chewed iti up.
c. *John, Daniel, and Morris have all three been [president of
the club]i. Hei is always a distinguished member of the com-
munity.
Given the semantic similarity between (96a) and (97), it is questionable
whether it in (96a) refers to the cognate object or to the event as a whole
(see also Mittwoch 1998 for similar examples). As such, pronominaliza-
tion may not be such a good test for the status of cognate objects.
(97) Mona smiled. Penelope noticed it and decided immediately that
she would photograph it.
Up to now I have mainly discussed arguments put forward by pro-
ponents of an adjunct status for cognate objects and the objections that
29As Massam (1990, fn9) notes “[t]he use of it is unavoidable here, however, since
the objects of CO constructions are never human, thus can never be referred to with
she, he, etc.”
30Pronominalization teases apart the regular cognate object verbs and verbs of re-
creation which were excluded as cognate object verbs in section 2.4.1. With a cognate
object verb like smile pronominal reference is excluded in contexts of object-sharing,
cf. (i). Verbs of re-creation, by contrast, do allow pronominalization in these contexts
as (ii) shows.
(i) *Mona smiled a tantalizing smilei and then Penelope smiled iti.
(ii) Mona sang a beautiful songi and then Penelope sang iti.
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were opposed against these arguments. Let me now turn to the argu-
ments put forward in favour of an argument status of cognate objects by
those who defend such a view.
Massam (1990) argues that “the cognate object is best characterized
as a syntactic direct object which receives a patient theta role from the
verb” (Massam 1990:161; see also the discussion in the previous section
about the theta role associated with cognate objects). According to her
the view that cognate objects are adjuncts may explain why cognate ob-
jects do not behave like other objects, but it cannot explain why they do
not behave like other modifiers. Unlike normal adverbials, cognate ob-
jects cannot occur together with a direct object, as the contrast between
(98a-b) and (98c-d) shows.
(98) a. *Mordred killed the knight a gruesome kill.
b. *Ethel moved her lips a slight move(ment).
c. Mordred killed the knight gruesomely.
d. Ethel moved her lips slowly.
According to Massam these ungrammaticalities indicate that cognate ob-
jects are syntactically direct objects.31
A second argument for this position comes from case. As shown by
Jones (1988), in languages with morphological case cognate objects show
up with case, often accusative case. The observation that cognate objects
need case in English as well is supported by the fact that they need to be
adjacent to the verb, as illustrated in (99).
(99) a. Ben always runs (quickly) that way.
b. Let Ben run (*quickly) a little run.
c. Ben sneezed (*that way) a glorious sneeze.
d. Ben [saw] (*quickly) that man.
These examples show that a (nominal) adverbial can be separated from
the verb by an intervening adverbial (99a), whereas this is impossible for
both cognate objects (99b-c) and direct objects (99d).
However, as pointed out by Khalaily (1997), the adjacency require-
ment in (99) fails to distinguish arguments from predicates as adjacency
also holds for the latter, cf. (100).
31According to Massam, this view allows to account for the fact that cognate objects
do not occur with unaccusative verbs and psych verbs as with these verbs the direct
object position at D-structure is already necessarily filled. However, as I have shown
in section 2.4.1 we do find cognate objects with unaccusative verbs.
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(100) a. John became a doctor very quickly.
b. *John became very quickly a doctor.
In other words, adjacency cannot prove cognate objects to be arguments.
Interestingly, Khalaily (1997) provides another distributional fact which
seems problematic for Massam’s assumption that cognate objects are the-
matic objects. Compare the following two pairs of examples.
(101) a. John smiled a nice smile (to Bill).
b. *John smiled Bill a nice smile.
(102) a. John wrote a letter (to Bill).
b. John wrote Bill a letter.
In treating cognate objects like a smile as thematic objects on a par
with objects like a letter (cf. Massam 1990), it becomes unclear how we
can explain the fact that only the latter allows for dative shift. Note,
however, that the ungrammaticality of (101b) may be ascribed to the
fact that dative shift also seems sensitive to the kind of verb involved (cf.
Levin 2007 for a recent overview).
Let me return briefly to the use of case on cognate objects but now
from the perspective of languages with overt case marking on their direct
objects. Recall the following examples from Latin:
Latin (Indo-European; Sall., Cat. IX,4; Plaut., Ps. 525)
(103) In
in
hoste-m
enemy-acc
pugna-v-erunt.
fight-pf-3pl
‘They have fought against the enemy.’
(104) Ista-m
that-acc
pugna-m
fight-acc
pugna-b-o.
fight-fut-1sg
‘I will fight that fight.’
The Latin verb pugnare normally only takes a prepositional complement
which expresses the person who is fought against. This is shown in (104a)
where the PP in hostem ‘against the enemy’ fulfills this role. In case of
a cognate object such as istam pugnam ‘this fight’ in (104b) the comple-
ment of the verb receives accusative case. This makes cognate objects
morphologically similar to the accusative-case marked direct objects of
regular transitive verbs. It should, however, be noted that in Latin, as
for instance in German, accusative case is also used to mark adverbial
expressions of time and space. As such, the use of accusative case on
cognate objects cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for their direct
object status in these languages.
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The use of accusative case on cognate objects forms a counterexample
to the correlation between accusative case and affectedness often assumed
(see, e.g., Tsunoda 1981). Under these approaches accusative case is re-
served for entities that are totally affected by the action of the verb. As I
have shown above, cognate objects do not represent affected entities but
rather effected entities. It is puzzling for these approaches why in Latin
a verb, which normally takes an affected argument as a PP-argument,
assigns accusative case to a non-affected entity, cf. (104). This asks for
a different approach to accusative case. Here, I will mention two such
approaches without choosing between them. Smith (1996) proposes to
treat accusative case on cognate objects as a default case, i.e., a case
assigned to elements which need case but do not receive it through some
other mechanism. Under such an approach a link between the semantics
of an element and its case is absent. Such a link can be found in ap-
proaches which try to relate the use of accusative case to the aspectual
contribution of the NP it occurs on (cf. Wechsler and Lee 1996; Kratzer
2004). From this perspective the use of accusative case on cognate ob-
jects could be explained by the fact that they turn an atelic event into a
telic one. However, in order to pursue this explanation it first has to be
established properly that the cognate object indeed makes this aspectual
contribution, cf. the discussion in section 2.4.1 above.
In accordance with Massam, Macfarland (1994, 1995) argues that cog-
nate objects are arguments of the verbs they occur with. In order to vali-
date this claim she applies a number of tests for argumenthood. The first
of these tests concerns though-movement and VP preposing. Following
Reinhart (1983), though-movement preposes the VP including its argu-
ments but excluding adjuncts as they are not part of the VP. Cognate
objects allow for though-movement as shown in (105), and therefore are
considered to be arguments by Macfarland.
(105) a. Read that book though I did, (I didn’t understand it).
b. Smile a happy smile though Chris did, (everyone could see
that her happiness was forced).
c. *Read that day though I did, (I didn’t understand anything).
Do-So copying (Jackendoff 1977) is another test that differentiates
between adjuncts and arguments. Do so can be substituted for the verb
and all its internal arguments as the following examples show.
(106) a. I gave Chris a book, and John did so, too.
b. *I gave Chris a book, and John did so a magazine.
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Adjuncts on the other hand are not necessarily substituted by do so as
the grammaticality of the examples in (107) shows.
(107) a. I saw Chris that day, and John did so, too.
b. I saw Chris that day, and John did so another day.
As Macfarland (1995) shows, cognate objects pattern with arguments
on do-so copying as they also undergo necessary substitution, which is
illustrated by the following examples.
(108) a. Chris smiled a happy smile, and Mary did so, too.
b. *Chris smiled a happy smile, and Mary did so a sarcastic
smile.
A third test is provided by the formation of questions. In question
formation arguments, but not adjuncts, can be moved to initial position,
i.e., only arguments can undergo long wh-movement (Cinque 1990; Rizzi
1990). This contrast between arguments and adjuncts is shown in the
following examples.
(109) a. Chris wondered [whether Lee read that book].
b. ?What booki did Chris wonder [whether Lee read ti]?
(110) a. Chris wondered [whether Lee read that day].
b. *What dayi did Chris wonder [whether Lee read ti]?
As with the previous two tests, Macfarland (1995) shows that again cog-
nate objects pattern with arguments:
(111) a. Chris wondered [whether Lee smiled a happy smile].
b. ?[What kind of smile]i did Chris wonder [whether Lee smiled
ti]?
Khalaily (1997) judges an example similar to (111b) to be ungrammatical
(marking it with *) taking this as an argument for adjunct status of
cognate objects. Macfarland ascribes her ?-judgement to a violation of
subjacency. I agree with her that although (111b) does not sound perfect
it is much better than (110b). If we want to include long wh-movement
as a test for the argumenthood of cognate objects it classifies them as
direct arguments.
On the basis of the three diagnostics for argument/adjunct status pre-
sented above, Macfarland (1995) concludes that cognate objects should
be considered direct arguments. She presents further evidence for this
claim from adjectival passives (Macfarland 1994, 1995). Adjectival pas-
sives are adjectives derived from the passive form of the verb. According
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Syntactic test Cognate object patterns with:
VP-preposing direct object
Do so-copying direct object
Topicalization direct object
Adjectival passive direct object
WH-movement direct object
Case direct object/other
Passive direct object/other
Dative shift other
Table 2.2: Overview of the syntactic behaviour of cognate objects in
English
to Levin and Rappaport (1986) adjectival passives externalize the verb’s
direct internal argument, regardless of thematic role. The following ex-
amples from Carrier and Randall (1992) show that only the direct internal
argument (books) but not the indirect internal argument (to the kids) can
be externalized by adjectival passive formation.
(112) a. John read books to the kids.
b. John read books.
c. John read to the kids.
(113) a. the recently read books
b. *the recently read kids
This means that adjectival passive formation can be used to distinguish
between direct internal arguments of the verb and adjuncts. If cognate
objects are arguments of their verbs, Macfarland reasons, they should
be able to occur in adjectival passives. Indeed, she presents naturally
occurring examples of cognate objects which show that they can occur in
such a configuration (Macfarland 1995:109).
(114) a. She felt slightly superior, more his equal. With an unlived
life of her own she felt reality breaking into the illusion with
which her husband was content.
b. In that pure face where woe grown bright/ Seems rapture
chastened to the mild/ And equal light of smiles unsmiled.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the relevant syntactic tests for object-
hood of the cognate object in English discussed above. It shows that
in English cognate objects display a mixed syntactic behaviour vis a` vis
direct objects. On the one hand cognate objects pattern with direct ob-
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jects (VP-preposing, do so copying) and on the other hand they seem to
exhibit some characteristics of non-objects as well.
This mixed behaviour of cognate objects with respect to direct ob-
ject properties has been reported in the literature for languages other
than English and poses a dilemma for a purely syntactic account. For
instance, Lehmann notes that “the resulting cognate object bears some
resemblance to a normal direct object . . . the cognate object does not
have the same degree of independence vis-a`-vis the verb as a normal di-
rect object” (Lehmann 1991:193). The observation that cognate objects
have a different degree of independence is also voiced by other authors
(e.g., Austin 1982; Lichtenberk 1982) who note that cognate objects show
a lower degree of individuation.
This lower degree of individuation can be explained by the fact that
cognate objects are always inanimate and typically, though not exclu-
sively, indefinite. A lower degree of individuation, being one of the tran-
sitivity parameters formulated by Hopper and Thompson (1980), leads to
a lower degree of transitivity of the overall clause. Moreover, the lower de-
gree of transitivity of the cognate object construction can also be related
to the fact that the cognate object is not affected by the action, affected-
ness of the object being a characteristic of high transitivity (Hopper and
Thompson’s Parameter I). The claim that the cognate object construc-
tion shows a lower degree of transitivity is warranted by cross-linguistic
evidence, discussed in the next section.
2.4.4 A Cross-Linguistic Perspective
In 2.4.1 I have discussed the restrictions on verbs which can enter the cog-
nate object construction in English. I also noted that these restrictions
do not necessarily carry over to other languages and that some cross-
linguistic idiosyncrasy may occur (cf. Pereltsvaig 1999a). Nevertheless,
we can identify a class of verbs which typically occur in the cognate object
construction in different languages. This class consists of verbs of bod-
ily activity which includes ‘cough’, ‘sneeze’, ‘smile’, and ‘laugh’. Lazard
(1985) notes that cross-linguistically these verbs often behave differently
from both transitive and intransitive verbs. Let me illustrate this with
an example from the Australian language Bandjalang, data from Austin
(1982). In this language there is a set of verbs (e.g. ‘urinate’, ‘yawn’,
‘smoke’) that occur with a transitive subject noun phrase but can never
take a transitive object. Nevertheless, they enter a construction which
is morphologically transitive as it shows ergative case on the subject (cf.
(115)) and they can undergo an antipassive transformation which only
applies to transitive verbs (cf. (116)).
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Construction Subject Object
Transitive ergative absolutive
Intransitive absolutive —
Cognate object absolutive absolutive
Table 2.3: Cognate objects and case marking in Australian languages.
Bandjalang (Australian; Austin 1982:38)
(115) Mali-yu
that-erg
jaajam-bu
child-erg
jaluba-ni.
urinate-pst
‘That child urinated (some urine).’
(116) Ngay
I.nom
gala
this.nom
juuma-le-ela.
smoke-antp-prs
‘I here am smoking (a cigarette).’
Lazard (1985) shows that there exist many languages with what he
labels anti-impersonal verbs: intransitive verbs which enter a (transitive)
ergative construction without having an object (e.g., Pashto, Kurdish,
Hindi, Georgian, Menominee). Verbs which are anti-impersonal verbs
in one language correspond to cognate object verbs in another language
(see, e.g., Austin 1982 for a comparison among Australian languages).
Thus, these verbs, although thought to be intransitive, cross-linguistically
show a higher degree of morphosyntactic transitivity either because of
transitive subject marking, i.e., ergative case, or through the occurrence
of an element which looks like a direct object, i.e., the cognate object.
Following Austin (1982), Lazard puts forward the hypothesis that anti-
impersonal verbs occupy an intermediate position between transitive and
intransitive verbs. There indeed is some cross-linguistic evidence that the
cognate object construction also occupies such an intermediate position.
Above we have seen examples from the Australian language Band-
jalang in which some verbs entered into an anti-impersonal construction.
As demonstrated by Austin (1982) these same verbs occur as cognate ob-
ject verbs in other Australian languages like Diyari, Bayungu, and Djaru.
In these languages the cognate object construction behaves differently
from both transitive and intransitive constructions, as is illustrated in
Table 2.3. Whereas transitive constructions have an ergative subject and
an absolutive object, and intransitive constructions only an absolutive
subject, the cognate object construction appears with both its subject
and cognate object in the absolutive case. This shows that in these lan-
guages the cognate object construction indeed occupies an intermediate
position on the transitivity continuum.
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Lichtenberk (1982, 1983) discusses the object status of cognate ob-
jects in the Austronesian language Manam. Based on their behavior with
respect to object agreement he concludes that cognate objects are direct
objects to a lesser degree than non-cognate objects. The relevant exam-
ples are given in (117) through (119).
Manam (Austronesian; Lichtenberk 1982:273)
(117) A´ine
woman
i-tamı´m.
3sg-urinate
‘The woman urinated.’
(118) A´ine
woman
tamı´m
urine
i-tamı´m.
3sg-urinate
‘The woman urinated/produced some urine.’
(119) A´ine
woman
bang
taro
i-tamı´mi-ra´P-i.
3sg-urinate-tr-3pl
‘The (mythical) woman urinated taros.’32
In Manam direct objects are indexed on the verb by means of suffixes,
as illustrated in (119). However, as can be seen from (118) this object
marker is missing in case of a cognate object. Furthermore, in (119) the
verb is suffixed with a transitive marker absent in (118). This shows that
the cognate object construction in Manam is different from a transitive
construction in this language.
A similar situation is found in the Papuan language Awtuw (Feldman
1986). As noted by Feldman there is a class of verbs, the class of in-
transitive bodily processes, which intersects the categories of transitivity.
He labels them as “idiomatic composite constructions with an obligatory,
lexically specified noun which may not accept object marking” (Feldman
1986:103). This is illustrated in (120).
Awtuw (Papuan; Feldman 1986:103)
(120) Tey
3f.sg
ewkit(*-re)
cough-obj
d@-k-owk-ey.
fac-imp-cough-imp
‘Is she coughing?/Does she have a cough?’
The absence of object marking on such cognate objects is expected when
one takes into account that Awtuw only uses this marking for animate
objects.
Finally, Rice (1987) shows how in Swedish the cognate object con-
struction differs from transitive constructions in the way it behaves with
32Taros are the edible vegetables from the taro plant. This may explain the addition
of mythical in the translation of (119).
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respect to passivization. Swedish has three types of passives. Two of
these are periphrastic passives formed with either the auxiliary vara or
the auxiliary bli and a passive participle. The third type is a morpho-
logical passive formed by means of the suffix -s. Highly transitive verbs
of physical activity permit both types of periphrastic passive but are
less felicitous with the s-passive. Outside the domain of physical activ-
ity verbs, transitive verbs such as see permit all three passives, whereas
constructions showing a low degree of transitivity, such as reflexive and
reciprocals, only allow the s-passive. In fact, the suffix -s also functions
as a marker of reflexivity/reciprocity. Thus, in Swedish passive formation
is sensitive to the degree of transitivity of a clause. The fact that cognate
objects can only occur with the s-passive indicates the lower degree of
transitivity of this construction.
Swedish (Germanic; Rice 1987:208)
(121) Asta
Asta
levde
lived
ett
a
gott
good
liv.
life
‘Asta lived a good life.’
(122) *Ett
a
gott
good
liv
life
blev/var
aux/aux
levt
lived
av
by
Asta.
Asta
‘A good life was lived by Asta.’
(123) Ett
a
gott
good
liv
life
levde-s
lived-pass
av
by
Asta.
Asta
‘A good life was lived by Asta.’
The above cross-linguistic overview shows that in several languages
the cognate object construction displays a lower degree of formal transi-
tivity. This makes one wonder why this is not observed in equal measure
in English, where the cognate object construction behaves only marginally
differently from a regular transitive construction.
As discussed in section 2.3, there seems to be a general asymmetry
between the mapping from meaning to form on the one hand and the
mapping from form to meaning on the other. As for the mapping from
meaning to form, it is possible for a language to map verbs with differ-
ent degrees of semantic transitivity to one and the same form. In other
words, variation in semantic transitivity does not necessarily lead to vari-
ation in formal transitivity. If, on the other hand, we find variation in
formal transitivity we also find variation in the semantic transitivity of
the different forms. In other words, variation in formal transitivity does
correspond to variation in semantic transitivity.
Not every language relates variation in meaning to form in the same
way. If we take the formally transitive construction to be that construc-
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Class Role Scheme German Russian English
effect ag-pat nom-acc nom-acc nom-acc
contact ag-pat nom-acc nom-acc nom-acc
experience exp-thm nom-acc nom-acc nom-acc
pursuit ag-goal nom-acc/pp nom-gen nom-acc
attitude ag-adr nom-acc nom-dat nom-acc
attitude ag-instr nom-acc nom-instr nom-acc
control ag-com nom-acc nom-pp/dat nom-acc
soc. interaction ag-loc nom-pp/acc nom-pp nom-acc
psych. effect sti-exp nom-acc nom-dat nom-acc
similarity n.a. nom-dat nom-pp nom-acc
Table 2.4: Extension of the nom-acc case frame across verb types (cf.
Drossard 1991:412)
tion with a nom-acc or erg-abs case frame, we find that languages differ
in the extension of the semantic domain for which they use this construc-
tion. Drossard (1991) compares a number of languages on their encoding
of arguments for ten different verb classes. These different verb classes
express different degrees of transitivity in terms of Hopper and Thomp-
son (1980).33 Table 2.4 shows the case frames associated with each verb
type in German, Russian, and English. A comparison between German
and Russian shows a significant difference between the two languages.
German uses the transitive nom-acc case frame for seven of the ten verb
types and treats it as a possibility for two more verb types. Russian, on
the other hand, uses this case frame for only three verb classes, making
use of other case frames for the remaining seven. On the basis of the dis-
tribution of the case frames in these two languages, Drossard concludes
that German should be considered to be syntactically more transitive
than Russian.
When we compare English to German we find that the former is even
more transitive as it uses the nom-acc case frame for all ten verb classes,
cf. Table 2.4. This conclusion is in line with the results of a study by
Hawkins (1986) who compared the two languages on a great number of
dimensions. Recasting his own findings in terms of a scale of fundamental
transitivity (a notion based on work by Nichols; see, for instance, Nichols
1982, 1984), Drossard places English on the higher end of the scale with
German a bit lower and Russian much lower. The fact that a language
like English extends the use of the transitive construction to a wider do-
33Or in their satisfaction of the effectiveness condition (Tsunoda 1981). See also
footnote 12.
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main of semantic structures than say a language like Russian, reflects a
fundamental difference between these languages in the way they relate
syntax to semantics. Whereas English shows a many-to-one mapping
from meaning to form, Russian comes closer to a one-to-one correspon-
dence.
Given this difference in the mapping from semantic transitivity to
formal transitivity one may expect that in Russian the cognate object
construction is formally realized differently from the canonical transitive
construction in order to reflect its lower degree of semantic transitivity.
This prediction is borne out, as in Russian cognate objects are realized not
with accusative case but with instrumental case (cf. Pereltsvaig 1999a).
Russian (Slavic; Pereltsvaig 1999a:269)
(124) On
he.nom
ulybnulsja
smiled
ulybkoj
smile.instr
angela.
angel.gen
‘He smiled an angelic smile.’
Pereltsvaig demonstrates that in Russian the instrumental cognate ob-
jects behave identically to manner adverbials on a number of linguistic
properties and differently from accusative direct objects.34,35 Cognate
objects share their instrumental case with manner adverbials, they are
paraphrased by means of a manner adverbial, and they can be coordi-
nated with a manner adverbial but not with an accusative direct object.
Furthermore, cognate objects share with manner adverbials their incom-
patibility with strong determiners such as this and every, the impossibility
of pronominalization, and the lack of passivization. On the basis of these
tests, Pereltsvaig proposes that similarly to instrumental-marked adver-
bials, instrumental-marked cognate objects are predicated of the event
argument of the verb (Pereltsvaig 1999a:278-283).
The conclusion that in Russian cognate objects are semantically very
similar to manner adverbials is in accordance with the semantic character-
34Russian also has a class of instrumental-theme objects. Although they share their
case marking with adverbials and cognate objects, they pattern syntactically with
accusative objects and not with cognate objects (cf. Pereltsvaig 1999a).
35The verb ‘smile’ in Russian is inherently reflexive indicated by the suffix -sja. One
might therefore think that the cognate object with this verb is forced to adverbial
status as the object position is already taken by the reflexive suffix. That this is not
a case can be shown with the verb zhitj ‘live’ in (i) (A. Malchukov, p.c.), which is not
inherently reflexive but still takes its cognate object in instrumental case:
(i) On
he.nom
zhivet
lives
zhiznju
life.instr
otsheljnika.
hermit.gen
‘He lives a secluded life.’
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ization of English cognate objects I proposed in 2.4.2. The big difference
between English and Russian then is that in Russian the morphosyntactic
behaviour of cognate objects is in accordance with their semantic status,
whereas in English the relation between the semantic and the morphosyn-
tactic status of cognate objects is asymmetric.
It should be noted that Pereltsvaig makes a distinction between two
types of cognate objects in Russian. She argues that, besides the al-
ready discussed instrumental cognate objects, there also exist accusative
cognate objects. These accusative cognate objects behave identically to
accusative direct objects on the tests discussed above. One can, however,
question whether these accusative cognate objects are really cognate ob-
jects. Pereltsvaig only gives examples with two different verbs both of
which are questionable cognate object verbs. The first is the Russian
equivalent of dance which was shown in section 2.4.1 above to behave dif-
ferently from standard cognate object verbs. The second one is the verb
delat’ which is a general verb with the meaning ‘do, make’. Apart from
a morphologically cognate object delo ‘job’ this verb can take a range
of other accusative complements as demonstrated in (125). Pereltsvaig
notes that (125a) and (125b) are paraphrases of one another.
Russian (Slavic; Pereltsvaig 1999a:270,273,277)
(125) a. On
he.nom
sdelal
did
delo.
job.acc
‘He did (his) work.’
b. On
he.nom
sdelal
did
rabotu.
work.acc
‘He did (his) work.’
c. On
he.nom
sdelal
did
uroki.
homework.acc
‘He did the homework.’
d. Sdelaj
do.imper
dve igrusˇku.
[two toys].acc
‘Make two toys.’
e. Oni
they.nom
delali
did.imp
vyvody
conclusions.acc
celyj den.
[all day].acc
‘They were drawing conclusions all day.’
The occurrence of delat’ with a wide range of complements is reminiscent
of the behaviour of the English verb produce discussed in section 2.4.1
above and repeated in examples (126) and (127) for convenience.
(126) Apple produces electronic products.
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(127) *Apple produces iPods electronic products.
Although produce occurs with a morphologically cognate object in (126), I
concluded that it cannot be considered a proper cognate object verb as the
morphologically cognate object products cannot be used as an additional
object but, being a super type of possible objects to the verb produce,
only instead of any other object. This sets the transitive ‘cognate object
verbs’ in English apart from transitive cognate verbs in other languages.
Cross-linguistically we find that cognate objects occur with transitive
verbs as additional objects (see, e.g., Pereltsvaig 1999b; Mittwoch 1998).
Evidence for this can also be found in Russian, as is illustrated by the
following example:
Russian (Slavic; Pereltsvaig 1999a:269)
(128) Ja
I.nom
vas
you.acc
ljublju
love
ljubovju
love.instr
brata.
brother.gen
‘I love you with a brotherly love.’
In (128) the transitive verb for ‘love’ occurs with a direct object vas
‘you’ in the accusative case and an additional cognate object ljubovju
brata ‘brotherly love’ in the instrumental case. Thus, in Russian cognate
objects of transitive verbs pattern on a par with cognate objects found
with intransitive verbs.
The verb delat’ behaves unlike other Russian transitive verbs, but like
English transitive verbs, in that it cannot take a cognate object either in
the accusative or in the instrumental case along with a regular object.
This is illustrated in (129):
Russian (Slavic; A. Malchukov, p.c.)
(129) *On
he.nom
sdelal
did
uroki
homework.acc
prilezhnoe
careful.acc
delo/prilezhnym
job.acc/careful.instr
delom.
job.instr
‘He did his homework carefully.’
Therefore, we can conclude that the Russian verb delat’ patterns like
English transitive verbs in that it occurs with objects which are morpho-
logically cognate but which cannot be considered to be proper cognate
objects. The special behaviour of this verb might be due to the fact that
it is not a lexical verb but rather a light verb and in this respect is com-
parable to French faire and Italian fare. As a result, we must conclude,
contra Pereltsvaig (1999a), that Russian only has one type of cognate
object, the ones that are marked with instrumental case.
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Thus, Russian provides us with evidence for the observation that cog-
nate object constructions show a lower degree of transitivity. Further-
more, given that Russian comes close to a one-to-one relation between
semantic and formal transitivity, the fact that Russian cognate objects
behave exactly as manner adverbs supports a semantic analysis of these
items in terms of manner modification. An adverbial analysis of cognate
objects can be extended to English as well under the observation that
the asymmetry between the semantic contribution of cognate objects and
their morphosyntactic behaviour in this language is due to the fact that
in this language the relation between semantic and formal transitivity is
far from one-to-one.
There is additional cross-linguistic evidence for the analysis of cognate
objects as adverbials. In Standard Arabic, for instance, the expression
of manner is only possible through a cognate object (Khalaily 1997), cf.
(130)-(132):
Standard Arabic (Semitic; Khalaily 1997:9-10)
(130) D. arab-a
hit.pst.3m.sg
Zayd-un
Zayd-nom
l-h. imaar-a
the-donkey-acc
*(d. arb-an)
hit-acc
qawiyy-an.
strong-acc
‘Zayd hit the donkey strongly.’
(131) Pah. abb-a
love.pst.3m.sg
Zayd-un
Zayd-nom
Yasmiin-a
Jasmin-acc
h. ubb-an
love-acc
Quriyy-an.
pure-acc
‘Zayd loved Jasmin platonically.’
(132) Karih-a
hate.pst.3m.sg
Zayd-un
Zayd-nom
Yasmiin-a
Jasmin-acc
kurh-an
hate-acc
Sadiid-an.
strong-acc
‘Zayd hated Jasmin strongly.’
Further cross-linguistic evidence for the semantic treatment of cog-
nate objects as manner adverbials comes from Ancient Greek (cf. Bary
and de Swart 2005, also for Latin). In this language we find two types of
additional objects with both intransitive and transitive verbs. First, there
are the familiar cognate objects, complements of verbs whose head noun
is the event or state nominalization of the verb and which often share
their morphological root with the verb. Secondly, there are neuter forms
of pronouns and substantivized adjectives. The two types are illustrated
in (133) and (134), respectively:
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Ancient Greek (Indo-European; Pl., Ap. 19c)
(133) poll-e¯n
much-acc
fluari-an
nonsense-acc
fluar-ounta
talk.nonsense-ptc.acc
‘talking a lot of gibberish’
(134) hedu
sweet.ntr.acc
gela¯n
smile.inf
‘to smile sweetly’
Historically, the second class developed from the first class. Starting with
a combination of adjective and cognate noun, the noun was dropped leav-
ing the bare adjective. Compare (135) with (136):
Ancient Greek (Indo-European; Antiph., Tetr. γ.1, Xen., An. 5.8.12)
(135) ton
the.acc
andra
man.acc
tuptein
strike
tas
the.f.pl.acc
oligas
few.f.pl.acc
ple¯gas
blow.f.pl.acc
‘to strike the man few blows’
(136) Touton
he.acc
men
prt
anekragon
scream.aor.3pl
hoos
that
oligas
few.f.pl.acc
paiseien.
strike.aor.opt.3sg
“They screamed that he stroke the man few (blows).”
At the final stage this bare adjective is put in its neuter accusative form,
cf. (134), and has developed into a proper adverb (cf. Bornemann and
Risch 1978; Ku¨hner and Gerth 1963). Although one cannot take the
fact that an element has developed into a given function at time t as
direct evidence for the fact that this element had the same function at
times earlier than t, the development described for Ancient Greek is at
least very suggestive for an adverbial function of cognate objects.36 At
any rate, if one rejects this explanation, one would have to explain how
36A similar analysis can be applied to Latin. Moreover, Rose´n (1996) describes a
change in case-marking patterns associated with cognate objects in this language. In
earlier stages of this language, most cognate objects are marked with accusative case
but some occur with ablative case. In some cases, the accusative case can even be
substituted with ablative case. This is significant as the “two cases are otherwise
quite marginally interchangeable, the first belonging essentially in the center of the
predication, the second in the periphery” (Rose´n 1996:143). According to Rose´n (1996),
the commutability of cognate accusatives and cognate ablatives becomes much higher
at later stages and reaches an extreme in Biblical Latin. She takes this to indicate the
affinity of cognate objects with adverbials.
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and why neuter forms of adjectives could develop into elements with an
adverbial function when the configurations they derived from did have
nothing to do with this function.37
The above discussion shows that there is good evidence to treat cog-
nate objects semantically as manner adverbials. In particular, the use
of cognate objects with transitive verbs supports the view that cognate
objects semantically are adverbial elements. Indeed, Pereltsvaig (1999b)
provides cross-linguistic evidence that such ‘transitive’ cognate objects,
her Type A, also behave syntactically as adverbials. I hope to have shown
that also in a language like English in which cognate objects syntactically
seem to function as arguments they can still be treated semantically as
adverbials. This asymmetry between form and meaning can be explained
if one takes into account that English extends its transitive construction
to cover a wide semantic domain.
2.5 Conclusions
I have argued that a strict division between intransitivity and transitivity
cannot be maintained and that the relation between semantic and mor-
phosyntactic transitivity is not necessarily one-to-one. That is, formally
transitive constructions can correspond to semantically intransitive con-
figurations and at the same time semantically transitive configurations
can correspond to formally intransitive constructions.
I subscribed to a gradient approach to transitivity in which clauses
can be assigned different degrees of transitivity depending on a variety of
features. I have shown that languages differ in the way semantic transi-
tivity is related to morphosyntactic transitivity. That is, in one language
differences in semantic transitivity may all be related to one single tran-
sitive construction, whereas in another language we may observe a more
transparent relation between semantic and morphosyntactic transitivity
in that different degrees of semantic transitivity correspond to different
degrees of morphosyntactic transitivity.
The cognate object construction is a case in point. Semantically, the
37Grammars of Ancient Greek indeed ascribe the use of the accusative neuter form
of adjectives to the historical development sketched above (e.g. Ku¨hner and Gerth
1963). There might, however, be an alternative analysis for this use of the neuter form
of adjectives (brought to my attention by Leon Stassen). These elements can also be
taken as modifiers of the entire clause which is often considered to be neuter in many
languages. Under such an analysis the adjective shows gender agreement with the
sentence as a whole. I am not aware of a proposal along these lines for Ancient Greek.
Moreover, I believe that these two explanations are not necessarily incompatible with
one another.
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cognate object behaves like a manner adverbial as it modifies the action
described by the verb. Indeed, in Russian the cognate object also behaves
syntactically like a manner adverbial. In English, by contrast, it behaves
syntactically as a direct argument of the verb. I have argued that the
observed mismatch in English between the semantic and syntactic status
of cognate objects can be understood when one takes into account that
English uses a single transitive construction to cover a wide semantic do-
main, while Russian shows a more transparent relation between semantic
and morphosyntactic transitivity. The cognate object construction pro-
vides a nice example of how a phenomenon in a given language can be
better understood from a cross-linguistic perspective.
Differential object marking was also argued to involve a shift in transi-
tivity, since sentences with caseless objects are syntactically less transitive
than those with case-marked ones. In the next chapter I will show that
the need to avoid ambiguity is an important factor behind this increase in
formal transitivity. That is, direct objects are often case marked in order
to secure one interpretation over the other. Animacy, which was shown
in this chapter to be a special transitivity feature as it relates both to the
subject and the object argument, plays a central role here, as ambiguity
may arise when the two arguments are equal in animacy.
72 Chapter 2. Gradient Transitivity
Chapter 3
Recovering Grammatical
Roles
In this chapter, I show that the need to distinguish the two arguments of
a transitive relation from one another in order to avoid problems in inter-
pretation has a profound effect on the grammar of languages. Animacy
plays a central role in this process as it provides crucial information about
the role an argument plays in the event described by the predicate. How-
ever, due to the fact that it is a shared feature of subjects and objects,
animacy can cause severe problems in interpretation as well. Languages
display various mechanisms in order to prevent such misunderstandings
to occur and differential object marking is identified as one of them. I
develop a model of bidirectional optimization in which the speaker takes
the hearer’s perspective into account and in which the recoverability of
the intended meaning drives the occurrence of overt case marking. This
bidirectional model is then shown to carry over to other recoverability
phenomena, in particular one nominal interpretation and word order re-
strictions on exceptional case marking constructions. Finally, I show how
a strategy to mark all and only animate objects irrespective of ambiguity
can develop out of a strategy of pure ambiguity avoidance.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I want to show that differences in morphosyntactic tran-
sitivity are not restricted to the parameters proposed by Hopper and
Thompson (1980) but that another major factor can be identified. This
is the need to distinguish the A-argument and the O-argument of a tran-
sitive relation from one another in order to avoid problems in the inter-
pretation of sentences. In English the interpretation of a sentence such as
the man sees the woman is uniquely determined by the syntactic rules of
the language. The only possible interpretation is one in which the man is
the subject and the woman the object. In languages without such strong
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morphosyntactic cues the interpretation of this sentence becomes a much
less trivial task. In those languages, hearers have to rely on other types
of information such as the animacy of the participants involved. In the
previous chapter, animacy was singled out as a special transitivity pa-
rameter given its relation to both arguments of a transitive relation and
its influence on the encoding of both (cf. Figure 2.2). In this chapter,
I show that because animacy is a feature pertaining to both arguments,
severe problems in interpretation may arise due to potential ambiguity as
to the grammatical roles of arguments involved. Languages can be shown
to display various mechanisms in order to prevent such ambiguities from
occurring.
In interpreting a sentence, one must determine which argument plays
which role in the event described by the verb, i.e., who is doing what to
whom. In order to indicate the role a noun phrase plays in a sentence,
linguists traditionally use semantic role labels (cf. the discussion of the
role associated with the cognate object in the previous chapter). Seman-
tic roles, also referred to as thematic role, theta role, θ-role, thematic
relation, or case role amongst others, are a widely used but heavily de-
bated concept in linguistic theory (see Fillmore 1968; Dowty 1991; Palmer
1994; Williams 1994; Wechsler 1995; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997; Acker-
man and Moore 2001; Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005 amongst many
others for discussion). A list of frequently mentioned roles is given in (1).
(1) agent instigator of an event
experiencer recipient of a cognitive stimulus
recipient entity receiving an object
goal end point of motion
patient undergoer of an event
theme object in motion
instrument object used to perform an action
location point in space
source origin of motion
Generally, authors working with semantic roles try to keep the inventory
as small as possible without consensus about the exact members. One
reason for this may be the fact that it is not always easy to give a good
definition of a semantic role.1 Nevertheless, many earlier approaches mak-
ing use of semantic roles treat them as primitive concepts, that is, they
are considered semantically unanalyzable. Not everyone agrees on this
1Cf. also “I never know how people are able to pick out thematic relations with
such security, I can’t” (Chomsky 1982:89 via Schlesinger 1995:28). See also Dowty
(1991:553-555) for discussion.
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though and attempts have been made to decompose the semantic roles
into features (cf. e.g., Rozwadowska 1988). A very influential approach is
that of Dowty (1991; see also Primus 1999; Ackerman and Moore 2001)
who treats semantic roles as cluster concepts. Dowty (1991:572) makes
a distinction between Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient, each with its own
proto-properties:
(2) Proto-Agent properties:
a. Volitional involvement in the event or state
b. Sentience (and/or perception)
c. Causing an event or change of state in another participant
d. Movement (relative to the position of another participant)
e. Exists independently of the event named by the verb
(3) Proto-Patient properties:
a. Undergoes change of state
b. Incremental theme
c. Causally affected by another participant
d. Stationary relative to movement of another participant
e. Does not exist independently of the event, or not at all
The semantic proto-roles are clusters of properties which themselves are
lexical entailments imposed by groups of predicates on one of their ar-
guments. These proto-properties can be used to determine argument
selection with individual verbs. Generally, the argument with the high-
est number of Proto-Agent properties will become the subject and the
argument with the highest number of Proto-Patient properties the direct
object (see Ackerman and Moore 2001 for a detailed discussion).
In contrast to earlier semantic role approaches in which semantic roles
are treated as discrete entities and an argument could only be associated
with a single semantic role, Dowty’s system allows a single argument
to have mixed, i.e., both Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient, properties. In
order to generalize this approach to ditransitive verbs, Primus (1999)
enriches the set of proto-roles with that of Proto-Recipient.
Proto-roles can be viewed as general roles each subsuming a num-
ber of ‘traditional’ semantic roles. Primus (1999:3) gives the following
correspondences:
(4) Proto-Agent Proto-Recipient Proto-Patient
agent recipient patient
causer addressee causee
experiencer benefactive stimulus
possessor possessed
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← ACTOR UNDERGOER →
Arg of > 1st arg of > 1st arg of > 2nd arg of > Arg of state
do do′(x,. . . ) pred′(x,y) pred′(x,y) pred′(x)
agent effector location theme patient
mover possessor possessed entity
performer experiencer creation
obligatorily animate > very likely animate > need not be animate
Figure 3.1: Thematic relations and argument positions (adapted from
Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:127,146,305)
Dowty’s proto-role approach is very similar to the macrorole approach
found within Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984;
Van Valin and LaPolla 1997). Role and Reference Grammar makes use of
the macroroles Actor and Undergoer which correspond closely to Dowty’s
Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient. The Actor is realized as the transitive
subject and the Undergoer as the direct object (see Ackerman and Moore
2001:29 and Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005:52ff for discussion of the
relation between macroroles and proto-roles).
As Dowty’s proto-roles, the macroroles can be viewed as generalized
semantic roles functioning as an umbrella term. However, instead of using
lexical entailments as Dowty does, Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) define
semantic roles in terms of their position in a predicate decomposition
structure, ordered hierarchically, as shown in Figure 3.1.2 Positions at
the higher end of the hierarchy are unmarked for the Actor macrorole and
positions at the bottom end are unmarked for the Undergoer. The figure
also shows which ‘traditional’ semantic roles can be associated with which
position. The association between certain semantic roles and positions in
the argument structure found in Van Valin and La Polla’s approach is also
present in some approaches within generative grammar. For instance,
the specifier position of the functional projection above the VP is often
associated with agentivity (see 2.2; and also, e.g., Hale and Keyser 1993;
Torrego 1998).
Certain associations exist between semantic roles, on the one hand,
and grammatical functions, on the other. With two-place verbs in the ac-
tive voice, the Proto-Agent/Actor is mapped onto the subject function,
2See chapter 3 of Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) for a discussion of predicate decom-
position. A similar approach can be found in Lexical Decomposition Grammar (see
Butt 2005, chapter 5 for discussion).
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and the Proto-Patient/Undergoer onto that of direct object. Thus, from
a production perspective the relation between grammatical functions and
semantic roles is rather straightforward. From an interpretation perspec-
tive then, given the correlation between semantic roles and grammatical
functions, the semantic role of an argument can be inferred when one
can determine the grammatical function of that argument. However, the
question is how one can determine semantic roles in a language in which
the grammatical function of an argument cannot be determined on basis
of the surface structure. In these languages, hearers have to make use of
other cues in order to assign arguments a semantic role. One important
cue is the animacy of an argument, as there are strong relations between
animacy and certain semantic roles.
Animacy plays an important role in the proto-properties associated
with the Proto-Agent, cf. (2). Two of them, volitionality and sentience,
presuppose animacy, sometimes even humanness, of an argument. This
means that in order to be a true Proto-Agent an argument has to be
animate (see also Givo´n 1984 who takes animacy to be a defining property
of agents). The opposite claim, that animates necessarily are true Proto-
Agents, however, does not hold. That is, animacy is a necessary but not
a sufficient feature of true Proto-Agents. Animacy, for instance, does not
entail volitionality of an argument. Besides, animates also fulfill non-
agentive semantic roles such as experiencer. Inanimates, on the other
hand, cannot be true agents even though they may possess Proto-Agent
properties other than volitionality and sentience.
Apart from the relation between semantic roles and grammatical func-
tions, Figure 3.1 also represents the correlations between animacy and
semantic roles and hence between animacy and grammatical functions in
active clauses. The figure shows that animates and inanimates behave
differently with respect to the fulfillment of semantic roles towards the
Actor side of the hierarchy. Many of these higher roles require an animate
argument. Semantic roles towards the Undergoer side of the hierarchy, by
contrast, do not show such an animacy requirement. That is, they can,
but need not, be animate. The figure shows general tendencies in the
association between animacy and semantic roles, and there are individual
‘traditional’ roles which escape these general tendencies. Nevertheless,
we find morphosyntactic phenomena which are sensitive to the general
associations between animacy and semantic role presented in Figure 3.1.
Let me start with the more ‘peripheral’ roles. Aristar (1996, 1997)
studies the distribution of what he labels “non-grammatical cases”, also
called semantic or local cases, such as locative and instrumental case in
comparison to the “grammatical” dative case. Semantic cases index or
identify the semantic role of the argument they occur on. For instance,
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the locative case is used on noun phrases with the semantic role of loca-
tion and the instrumental case is used for those noun phrases with the
semantic role of instrument. The dative case, on the other hand, is most
often used for arguments fulfilling the grammatical function of indirect
object, which generally bear one of the semantic roles subsumed under
Primus’ (1999) concept of Proto-Recipient, i.e., recipient, addressee,
or benefactive.3
Aristar reports that when we consider the relation between animacy
and the cases mentioned above, we find that dative case is cross-linguisti-
cally oriented towards animacy whereas locative and instrumental cases
are oriented towards inanimacy. In the light of the semantic roles as-
sociated with these cases, the observed pattern falls out naturally. The
Proto-Recipient role associated with the dative is typically fulfilled by an-
imate entities, whereas locations and instruments are typically inanimate.
Cross-linguistically we can observe two general patterns with respect to
the animacy of nouns and their occurrence with certain cases. The first
pattern is when cases are in complementary distribution. For instance, as
Aristar (1997:346) reports, in Old Hittite the dative case only appeared
with animate nouns, while the locative case only appeared with inanimate
nouns.
Alternatively, we find a pattern, in which dative case can be used on
inanimates and semantic cases on animates but only when some addi-
tional morphology (“bridges” in Aristar’s terminology) is used. That is,
in order to use dative case on an inanimate noun first some additional
marking has to be put onto the noun before the dative case ending can
be attached and the same holds when a semantic case is used on animate
nouns. This pattern is illustrated in (5) and (6) for the ablative case in
the Australian language Yidiny:
Yidiny (Australian; Aristar 1997:317)
(5) mandi-m
hand-abl
‘from the hand’
(6) buña:-ni-m
woman-marking-abl
‘because of the woman’
3Not for every case in every language such a unique function can be determined.
Often, a case represents a blend of functions, which in many situations can be related
to historical developments. For instance, the Latin ablative is a merger of the Indo-
European ablative, locative, and instrumental case. A similar thing can be observed for
the dative case in Classical Greek which also shows an instrumental use. See Kulikov
(2006) for a discussion of the historical development of case systems.
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The inanimate noun mandi ‘hand’ in (5) takes the ablative case ending
directly. The animate noun buña: ‘woman’ in (6), by contrast, because it
is a non-typical nominal for the ablative case, must first be marked with
a special suffix before the ablative ending can be added. Moreover, a shift
to a causal meaning can be observed in this example. Aristar takes this
second pattern to be an instantiation of a general markedness pattern in
which marked configurations, i.e., dative with inanimate/semantic case
with animate, produce marked morphological expressions.
Thus, oblique grammatical functions marked by so-called semantic
cases and corresponding to semantic roles such as location and in-
strument correlate highly with inanimacy. The dative case, on the
other hand, is used for the grammatical function of indirect object and
correlates highly with semantic roles requiring an animate entity such
as recipient and benefactive. This association between dative case
and animate nouns also emerges from the cross-linguistically recurrent
pattern in which the dative case is used to encode the semantic role of
experiencer. Being recipients of a cognitive stimulus, they are typically
animate nouns.4,5
Let me move away from the more peripheral grammatical functions
and turn to a discussion of the semantic roles and animacy of the subject
argument of active transitive verbs. Languages differ greatly in the range
of entities they allow in the subject function.6 Some languages, like Jacal-
tec (Craig 1976, 1977), Japanese (Palmer 1994), and Lakhota (Van Valin
and LaPolla 1997), do not allow inanimate subjects. In Lakhota, for in-
stance, the transitive subject function is restricted to animates (7) and
pseudo-animates (8), i.e., self-moving, effecting entities like storms, floods
and tornados. Inanimate instruments like ‘a rock’ are ruled out (9):
Lakhota (Siouan; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:385-386)
(7) IxPe´
rock
wa–
a
u–
with
ozˇa´– zˇa–glepi
window
ki
the
ka-ble´cˇha-pi.
by.striking-break-pl
‘They broke the window with a rock.’
4The grammatical function of experiencer datives is the topic of much debate (see
the contributions in Bhaskararao and Subbarao 2004 for discussion).
5The dative is also often used to indicate the degree of control an argument has over
the action performed. More specifically, the dative signals the fact that an argument
has less control over the action in comparison to a nominative or ergative marked
argument. In causative constructions the dative marking of the causee argument often
indicates that this argument, in contrast to an accusative marked causee, is not affected
by the causation (see Ackerman and Moore 2001; Næss 2004a; Butt and King 2005 for
discussion of such facts).
6Unless indicated otherwise the discussion focuses on active transitive verbs.
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(8) Mn´ıhiyaya-tha–ka
flood-big
ki
the
th´ıpi
house
ki
the
wozˇu´zˇu.
smash
‘The big flood smashed (destroyed) the house.’
(9) *IxPe´
rock
wa–
a
ozˇa´– zˇa–glepi
window
ki
the
ka-ble´cˇhe.
by.striking-break
‘A rock broke the window.’
The ungrammaticality of inanimate transitive subjects in Lakhota may
be explained by the fact that these verbs select for a true agent argument.
Japanese, which shows a similar ban on inanimate transitive subjects, has
been reported as a language with relatively many verbs taking an oblig-
atory agentive argument (Kuno 1973; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:120).
English, on the other hand, is much less restrictive as it allows virtually
any kind of semantic role to become subject. Consider the following ex-
amples (see also Hawkins 1986; Minkoff 1997; Levin and Rappaport Hovav
2005):
(10) a. Neil killed the duck. [agent ]
b. This tent sleeps five people. [location]
c. Eight dollars won’t buy a decent meal at McDonald’s. [in-
strument ]
The wide range of semantic roles open to the subject function in English
makes that we can find both animate and inanimate nouns as the sub-
ject.7 Animacy, nevertheless, influences the semantic role associated with
the argument in subject function (cf., e.g., Minkoff 1997). Compare the
following two examples:
(11) Neil opened the door.
(12) The key opened the door.
In (11) the subject argument Neil due to its animacy is most likely inter-
preted as the agent of the action of opening the door. The key in (12),
on the other hand, because of its inanimacy will be interpreted as the
instrument with which the action of opening is performed.
The above discussion shows that there exists an overall correlation
between grammatical function and semantic role. If we adopt a view on
semantic roles in terms of generalized roles, i.e., proto-roles or macro-
roles, we can state it in the following way: the Proto-Agent/Actor is
encoded as the subject of an active transitive verb, whereas the Proto-
7This pattern fits in with the observation presented in 2.4.4 that English has ex-
tended its transitive construction to cover a wide semantic domain.
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Patient/Undergoer is encoded as the direct object. It must be stressed
that this correlation only holds (for active clauses) in languages with ac-
cusative alignment and that it does not carry over to ergative language for
which application of the notions subject and object is notoriously difficult
(cf. Dixon 1979, see also Manning 1996 for discussion).
A further correlation can be found between semantic role and animacy
in that some traditional semantic roles such as agent in the strict sense
and experiencer are always animate, whereas others such as location
and instrument tend to be inanimate. In terms of generalized roles we
can state for Proto-Agents/Actors that they are typically animate. Proto-
Patients/Undergoers, on the other hand, do not show such a preference
for their arguments to be animate, cf. Figure 3.1 above.
Finally, there is a correlation between grammatical function and ani-
macy, again only for accusative languages. Subjects are typically animate
and direct objects inanimate, as is corroborated by several corpus counts
of the animacy feature of subjects and objects (cf. Dahl and Fraurud
1996; Zeevat and Ja¨ger 2002; Øvrelid 2004). For instance, Øvrelid (2004)
reports a study of animacy features in a thousand simple transitive sen-
tences in Norwegian. In her sample approximately 69% of the subjects is
animate whereas 90% of the objects is inanimate. Moreover, in over 97%
of the sentences she found the subject to be higher than or equal to the
object in animacy. This shows that there exists a certain asymmetry in
the animacy features associated with subjects and direct objects. These
correlations between animacy and grammatical function can be inter-
preted as a by-product of the correlation between certain semantic roles
and grammatical functions. That is, those semantic roles that require an-
imate arguments are usually realized as subjects, whereas most semantic
roles selecting inanimate arguments tend to occur in object position.
The observation that the distribution of animacy over grammatical
functions interacts with the semantic roles associated with them is cor-
roborated by the study of Øvrelid (2004). The slightly more than 2% of
sentences in her corpus in which the object is higher in animacy than the
subject are almost all instances of verbs taking an experiencer object
and a theme or stimulus subject. The former semantic role is exclu-
sively reserved for animate entities and the latter are most likely to be
fulfilled by inanimates, although not exclusively so. Consider the follow-
ing sentence from Øvrelid’s corpus:
Norwegian (Germanic; Øvrelid 2004:6)
(13) Spørsm˚alet
question
plager
bothers
Espen.
Espen
‘The question bothers Espen.’
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Using the correlations between animacy, semantic roles, and grammatical
functions, a hearer would interpret Espen as the subject of (13). Only by
taking into account the argument structure of the verb he would arrive
at the right interpretation in which Espen is the object. Compare also
the following two English sentences:
(14) Marianne liked the movie.
(15) The movie pleased Marianne.
In (14) Marianne is the subject and the movie the object, as predicted,
but in (15) it is the other way around. The reason for this is the difference
in argument structure of the two verbs. Although both like and please
are experiencer predicates selecting for a stimulus argument and an
experiencer argument, the first verb links the experiencer to the
subject function whereas the second verb links it to the direct object
function.8
The fact that verbs select semantic roles and link them to grammat-
ical functions in a particular way, has its effect on the possible animacy
feature of their grammatical functions. Given that a verb like please links
the experiencer role to the direct object function, the direct object of
this verb must be animate. The correlation between animacy and se-
mantic roles together with the argument structure of a verb can be very
helpful when we try to interpret a sentence. Take a verb like cook which
selects for an animate (human) agent and typically an inanimate patient.
In Dutch the verb koken ‘to cook’ is a so-called labile or ambitransitive
verb as it has both a transitive use, demonstrated in (16), and intransitive
uses, exemplified in (17) and (18):
Dutch (Germanic)
(16) Max
Max
kook-t
cook-3sg
de
the
rijst.
rice
‘Max boils the rice.’
(17) De
the
rijst
rice
kook-t.
cook-3sg
‘The rice is boiling.’
8The existence of lexical doublets such as like and please can be explained under a
Dowtyian analysis in terms of proto-properties. The experiencer argument and the
stimulus argument both have one Proto-Agent property and no other proto-properties.
Dowty’s argument selection principle (corollary 1) states that in such a case either
argument can be realized as the subject. The existence of both like and please is in
accordance with this principle as either lexical item represents one possible linking.
See Dowty (1991:579-581) for further discussion.
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(18) Max
Max
kook-t.
cook-3sg
‘Max is cooking.’
The intransitive construction can be formed by either omitting the di-
rect object as in (18), or by promoting the direct object to subject and
omitting the original transitive subject as in (17). There is no formal
difference between the two intransitive uses as witnessed by the verbal
agreement, and in both examples the single NP functions as the subject.
Given this formal similarity, we have to rely on other information if we
want to interpret these sentences. Animacy helps out in this case. The
inanimacy of de rijst ‘the rice’ in (17) makes only the patient role available
for it, and hence the patient intransitive reading is the only one possible.
The humanness of Max in (18) strongly favours an agent reading for this
sentence, although under a very marginal (cannibalistic) reading a pa-
tient interpretation is possible as well. This shows that in interpretation
thematic information can be (partially) accessed through the animacy of
arguments.9 In combination with a verb’s argument structure the hearer
can arrive at the right interpretation of the sentence.
We have seen that, due to their argument structure, verbs select for
animacy features of their arguments. For example, the verb sneeze se-
lects an animate subject and the verb surprise selects an animate direct
object. Such animacy requirements are often referred to as selectional re-
strictions. Chomsky (1965) included selectional restrictions in his theory
of transformational grammar as constraints on possible combinations in
‘deep structure’. Selectional restrictions were abandoned from syntactic
theory later on, as they were argued not to be absolute. For instance,
McCawley (1971) argues that many selectional restrictions are actually
not restrictions as they can be violated in certain environments such as
dream reports, belief reports, and science-fiction contexts. Therefore,
they should not be taken as grammatical constraints. McCawley argues
that a person who utters My toothbrush is alive and is trying to kill me
“should be referred to a psychiatric clinic, not to a remedial English
course” (McCawley 1971:219).
McCawley is right that this sentence is well-formed. I am, however,
not convinced that it violates any selectional restrictions. An alternative
analysis is that the toothbrush, although lexically inanimate, is conceptu-
alized as an animate entity. Under this analysis the sentence above does
9There is ample psycholinguistic evidence for the use of animacy information in the
processing of sentences, in particular in the case of local ambiguities. See, for instance,
Bates and MacWhinney (1989), Trueswell et al. (1994), Lamers (2001), Lamers and
de Hoop (2004), and Mak et al. (2006) for discussion.
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not violate any selectional restrictions. Indeed, one can think of many
contexts in which inanimate entities are conceptualized or stand for an
animate entity. A well-known example is The ham sandwich is getting
impatient (Nunberg 1979). Out of context it may seem ill-formed, but in
a restaurant setting it can be used without problems. In a conversation
between a waiter and a chef, the inanimate ham sandwich can be used
to refer to the animate customer who has ordered the ham sandwich.
This means that the NP ham sandwich actually stands for, or in terms
of Pustejovsky (1995) is coerced into, an animate entity. As a result,
the ham sandwich does not violate any selectional restrictions. This kind
of coercion occurs very often in particular in those contexts, i.e., belief
reports and cartoons, which McCawley (1971) considers prime examples
of contexts in which selectional restrictions are violated.
Moreover, there is robust psycholinguistic evidence that language
users make use of selectional restrictions and animacy information, at
least in interpretation. Nieuwland and van Berkum (2006) report two ex-
periments in which they manipulated the selectional restrictions of verbs
and the animacy of arguments. In the first experiment, they made sub-
jects listen to sentences in which the animacy features of an argument
matched, or did not match, the animacy value required by the selectional
restrictions. They found an increase in brain activity for sentences in
which there was a mismatch, e.g., The girl comforted the clock, in com-
parison to sentences without such a mismatch.10 These results indicate
that hearers are sensitive to selectional restrictions and that it takes more
effort to understand a sentence in which these selectional restrictions are
violated.
In the second experiment, Nieuwland and van Berkum investigated
the effect of cartoonlike contexts on interpretation. They embedded inan-
imate entities in a context in which they acquired animate characteris-
tics, e.g., a peanut which was dancing, singing, and smiling. They tested
whether hearers showed a processing difference when these inanimate
words occurred with a predicate showing a ‘lexical fit’, e.g., salted, in
comparison to a predicate showing a ‘contextual fit’, e.g., in love. The re-
sults show an increase in brain activity for predicates with a lexical fit in
comparison to those with a contextual fit. This indicates that the lexical
animacy of an NP can be overruled by context and that the contextual
animacy of an NP is used by hearers to determine whether the selectional
restrictions of a verb are violated.
The experiments by Nieuwland and van Berkum (2006) provide evi-
10In particular, they found an N400 effect which is often explained in terms of prob-
lems with semantic integration.
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dence for the existence of selectional restrictions and the fact that hearers
make use of them. Moreover, the satisfaction of selectional restrictions is
subject to contextual conditions. In this way, they provide strong coun-
terevidence to the claims made by McCawley (1971).
Especially in languages without morphosyntactic means to indicate
grammatical functions, selectional restrictions are of crucial importance
in the interpretation of sentences. Imagine a language L without any mor-
phological marking on noun phrases signaling their grammatical function
and with a free word order. In this language there are no morphosyn-
tactic cues for the grammatical function of an NP and as a result the
interpretation of a sentence has to be based on the selectional restrictions
of the verb and the semantics of the noun phrases. If one now constructs
a sentence with the verb eat and the noun phrases Joe and the cake, the
only semantically possible interpretation is such that Joe eats the cake.
This interpretation is due to the fact that eat requires as its subject an
animate entity. Of the two noun phrases in the sentence only Joe qual-
ifies for this role. Thus, even without morphosyntactic clues we can in
this case arrive at the right interpretation by focusing on the selectional
restrictions of the verb and the animacy of the noun phrases.
Now consider a sentence with the verb hear and the noun phrases
John and Joe. In contrast to the previous situation, verbal restrictions
and the animacy of the noun phrases cannot help us out in computing an
interpretation for this sentence. As both noun phrases share their ani-
macy feature they are equally likely to fulfill the function of either subject
or object. Without any further information this sentence is ambiguous.
This discussion based on the imaginary language L was meant to show
how animacy in concordance with selectional restrictions provided by the
verb can play a role in the interpretation of transitive sentences. Even
though it was based on an imaginary language, the discussion is not en-
tirely outside of linguistic reality. Miyashita et al. (2003) report that in
the language Tohono O’odham (also known as Papago) no overt means
of marking grammatical relations are present in sentences with two third
person arguments. Moreover, word order is rather free, with the con-
straint that an obligatory auxiliary has to appear in the second position
in declarative clauses, cf. ’o in (19). Even prosodic features such as stress
and intonation are argued not to influence assignment of grammatical
functions. As a result, sentences such as (19) are completely ambiguous,
and hearers have to rely on contextual information to disambiguate them:
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Tohono O’odham (Uto-Aztecan; Miyashita et al. 2003:47)
(19) Huan
John
’o
3.subj-imp
g
det
Husi
Joe
ka:.
hear
‘John is hearing Joe.’ or ‘Joe is hearing John.’
The difference between English, in which the grammatical function
of a noun phrase can be determined by means of its position in the sen-
tence, and Tohono O’odham, in which a noun phrase does not provide
any information about its grammatical function, is related to the distinc-
tion between dependent-marking and head-marking languages introduced
by Nichols (1986). The examples in (20) and (21) illustrate the distinc-
tion. The same proposition is expressed first in Abkhaz, a head-marking
language, and subsequently in the dependent-marking language Chechen.
Abkhaz (Caucasian; Nichols 1986:108)
(20) A-xa`c’a
the-man
a-pè◦@`s
the-woman
a-sˇ◦q◦’`@
the-book
∅-l`@-y-te-yt’.
it-to.her-he-gave-fin
‘The man gave the book to the woman.’
Chechen (Caucasian; Nichols 1986:108)
(21) Cu
dem.obl
stag-a
person-erg
zudcˇun-na
woman-dat
kni:ga-∅
book-abs
jelira.
gave
‘The man gave the book to the woman.’
The two sentences (20) and (21) are similar with respect to the gram-
matical relations assigned to the arguments. In both sentences ‘man’ is
the subject, ‘woman’ the indirect object, and ‘book’ the direct object.
They diverge in the way these relations are formally realized. In (20)
the grammatical relations are marked on the predicate, the head of the
construction, by means of affixes. If we were only to look at the nouns
in the Abkhaz sentence we would not be able to figure out which noun
is the subject, which one the direct object, and which one the indirect
object. This is, on the other hand, very well possible in the Chechen
construction in (21) in which these grammatical relations are marked on
the nouns, i.e., the dependents, by means of case markers. By looking at
the ergative marked noun staga we know that we have to assign it the
function of subject independently of the functions of the other nouns or
the type of verb present in the sentence.
The above discussion shows that in head-marking languages, due to
the fact that noun phrases are not marked for grammatical function, am-
biguities may occur. We may therefore expect them to develop strategies
in order to avoid such potential ambiguities (cf. Nichols 1986:112-114).
That is, not every language will tolerate ambiguities to the extent Tohono
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O’odham, discussed above, does, as this may substantially slow down the
interpretation of sentences. In the remainder of this chapter, I investigate
some morphosyntactic phenomena which can be interpreted as strategies
developed by languages to avoid potential ambiguity. In the next sec-
tion (3.2), I consider languages in which case marking is employed in
an economical way, i.e., in those situations where otherwise ambiguities
may arise. I develop an analysis of this pattern within a model of bidi-
rectional optimization in which the hearer also takes into account the
speaker’s perspective. I then extend this analysis to strategies attested in
head-marking languages (section 3.3), and to the role of word order in the
identification of grammatical functions in dependent-marking languages
(section 3.4). Finally, in section 3.5, I demonstrate how case systems
based on the need to distinguish arguments over time can develop into
grammaticalized case systems in which case marking is no longer primar-
ily used for distinguishability.
Before I continue I would like to say a few things about the way I
use the terms grammatical function, subject, and object in the discussion
to follow. There are many ways these notions are used in the literature
and they have acquired a range of different interpretations. I use them
in a loose, descriptive way and not in their formal senses as triggers of
grammatical processes. Most of the examples to follow are concerned
with the recoverability of grammatical or semantic roles, which as stated
above will only correlate with certain grammatical functions in accusative
languages. Thus, whenever I describe a phenomenon in terms of the
distinguishability of grammatical functions, the latter can be interpreted
as grammatical or semantic roles.
3.2 Case Distinguishability
Case marking is an extremely effective mechanism to avoid any ambiguity
of grammatical relations, as it marks the grammatical function on the
noun itself.11 Indeed, in the functional-typological literature one of the
main functions ascribed to case marking is a distinguishing one (Comrie
1989, see Song 2001 for discussion). Under this view, case marking is used
to distinguish the core arguments in transitive sentences. This function
is often taken to explain the fact that the majority of languages with
overt case marking leave one of the arguments in a transitive sentence
unmarked. That is, most languages follow a nominative/accusative or
an ergative/absolutive system in which the subject receives unmarked
nominative or the object unmarked absolutive case respectively. This
11This section is loosely based on de Swart (2003, 2006).
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falls out from the distinguishing function in combination with economy
considerations, as it suffices to mark one argument overtly to assess the
grammatical functions of both arguments of a transitive sentence (cf.
Dixon 1979).
The differential object marking system of Malayalam, introduced in
chapter 1, fits nicely in with this pattern as it presents an even more
economical system by only marking a subset of its direct objects. It was
shown that as a general rule in Malayalam only animate, but not inani-
mate objects are marked with accusative case. This general rule, however,
does not capture the entire range of overt case marking of objects, cf. (22)
and (23):
Malayalam (Dravidian; Asher and Kumari 1997:204)
(22) Kappal
ship.nom
tiramaalakaí-e
waves-acc
bheediccu.
split.past
‘The ship broke through the waves.’
(23) Tiramaalakaí
waves.nom
kappal-ine
ship-acc
bheediccu.
split.past
‘The waves split the ship.’
These sentences go against the general rule described above as they con-
tain inanimate direct objects with overt case marking. The occurrence of
overt case marking in these examples can be explained as a mechanism
to avoid ambiguity. A sentence with the verb ‘split’ and the arguments
‘ship’ and ‘waves’ in principle can have two different meanings, as the
contrast in interpretation between (22) and (23) illustrates. Therefore,
without overt case marking a sentence with these three elements would be
ambiguous. The contrast between (22) and (23) shows that case mark-
ing can be used to secure one interpretation over the other. Thus, in
Malayalam inanimate objects can be case marked in case of a potential
ambiguity in the interpretation of the sentence. Such ambiguity is most
likely to occur in sentences in which the subject is also inanimate.
The relation between overt case marking and ambiguity avoidance is
further illustrated by the examples in (24) and (25). These sentences also
contain two inanimate arguments but this time case marking on the direct
object is absent. This can be ascribed to the fact that these sentences
only allow one interpretation: a situation in which a hut destroys fire or
in which fire extinguishes water is hard to imagine.12
12Apart perhaps from fairy tales or cartoon-like contexts, cf. section 3.1 above.
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Malayalam (Dravidian; Asher and Kumari 1997:204)
(24) Tiiyy@
fire.nom
kuúil
hut
naSippiccu.
destroy.past
‘Fire destroyed the hut.’
(25) Veííam
water.nom
tiiyy@
fire
keúutti.
extinguish.past
‘Water extinguished the fire.’
The connection between object case marking and ambiguity avoidance is
acknowledged by Asher and Kumari (1997) in their Malayalam grammar:
“[w]hen both subject and object are [-anim] and both are in the nomina-
tive, their function is determined by semantic features of the verb, since
it cannot be determined by word order. However, in the presence of a
[-anim] subject it is possible for a [-anim] object to be in the accusative
case to resolve potential ambiguity” (Asher and Kumari 1997:204).
The Malayalam case-marking pattern in (22)-(25) shows how overt
case marking can be used as a mechanism to avoid ambiguity in a very
economical way. In this language, case marking on inanimate objects is
confined to those situations in which ambiguity may arise. Malayalam
does not stand alone in using case marking in situations where absence
of case may result in interpretational problems. Illustrative of the latter
situation are the following two examples from the Sino-Tibetan language
Zaiwa in which direct objects are usually only marked when animate. In
(27), nevertheless, an inanimate object is followed by the object marker
r55 (the superscript numbers indicate tones).
Zaiwa (Sino-Tibetan; Lustig 2002:165)
(26) Nye11
bamboo.thong
sing=31
split(bamboo)
lye31.
also+I
‘I am/we are splitting bamboo thongs.’
(27) Nui31
vine
r55
obj
sing=31
split(bamboo)
gvan31-aq1.
put.into-sim
‘Make thongs out of vines.’
The two examples involve the same verb, which in both cases occurs
with an inanimate object of which only the one in (27) is unexpectedly
case marked. Lustig (2002:165) provides the following explanation for the
unexpected use of the object marker: “either it is for reasons of clarity,
since otherwise the utterance is not readily understood, or the object in
question is not the one which is normally expected . . . the direct object
is marked by an object marker because it is unusual for this entity to be
used in this context, since mostly bamboo, not vines are used to make
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thongs.” Thus, the use of case marking on the inanimate object in (27)
facilitates the interpretation of the sentence.
The distinguishing function of case is closely intertwined with the an-
imacy features of the subject and the object, cf. the Malayalam examples
above. The Papuan language Awtuw presents an intricate interaction be-
tween animacy and case (Feldman 1986). The interpretation of sentences
in this language is dependent on the relative ranking of the arguments
in the animacy hierarchy and the use of overt object marking. In the
absence of such object marking, the argument which ranks highest in the
animacy hierarchy is interpreted as the subject, cf. (28). When the two
arguments are equal in animacy they are interpreted as conjoined sub-
jects, cf. (29).
Awtuw (Papuan; Feldman 1986:110)
(28) Tey
3.f.sg
tale
woman
yaw
pig
d-æl-i.
fac-bite-past
‘The woman bit the pig.’ not: ‘The pig bit the woman.’
(29) Piyren
dog
yaw
pig
di-k-æl-iy.
fac-imp-bite-imp
‘The dog and the pig bite.’ not: ‘The dog is biting the pig/The
pig is biting the dog.’
These default interpretations can be overruled by the use of case marking,
as illustrated (30) and (31):
Awtuw (Papuan; Feldman 1986:110)
(30) Tey
3.f.sg
tale-re
woman-obj
yaw
pig
d-æl-i.
fac-bite-past
‘The pig bit the woman.’
(31) Piyren-re
dog-obj
yaw
pig
di-k-æl-iy.
fac-imp-bite-imp
‘The pig is biting the dog.’
By marking ‘woman’ in (30) with the object suffix it has to be interpreted
as the object of the sentence, which goes against the interpretive hierar-
chy at work in (28). In (31) use of the object marker makes that the two
arguments which are equal in animacy are no longer interpreted as con-
joined subjects. Instead, the argument ‘dog’ has to be interpreted as the
subject. Awtuw only uses case marking in those cases in which absence
of overt marking would result in a different interpretation than the one
intended. Like Malayalam, this language uses case in a very economical
way to ensure recoverability of grammatical functions.
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A very similar situation is found in the Papuan language Fore (Scott
1978; Donohue 1999). This language, however, uses overt marking on the
subject instead of on the object. Moreover, in this language case does not
only interact with the animacy hierarchy, but also with word order. As
such, Fore represents a nice mixture of ambiguity avoidance mechanisms.
In the absence of case marking, the argument highest in the animacy
hierarchy will be interpreted as the subject, cf. (32). This follows the
Awtuw pattern above.
Fore (Papuan; Scott 1978:116)
(32) Yaga:
pig
wa´
man
aegu´ye.
3sg.obj.hit.3sg.su.ind
‘The man kills the pig.’ not: ‘The pig attacks the man.’13
Moreover, it also extends to ditransitive constructions and is independent
of word order, cf. (33):
Fore (Papuan; Scott 1978:115)
(33) a. Naeba´
I
yaga:
pig
naninta:
food
amuwe.
3sg.io.give.1sg.su.ind
b. Yaga: na´eba´ naninta: amuwe.
c. Naninta: na´eba´ yaga: amuwe.
‘I give the pig food.’
When the two arguments are equal in animacy, word order determines
the interpretation, and the first noun phrase is interpreted as the subject
(S<O<IO in ditransitives). Examples (34) and (35) illustrate that the
reversal of the two noun phrases results in different interpretations:
Fore (Papuan; Scott 1978:115)
(34) Ma´si
boy
wa´
man
a´gaye.
3sg.obj.see.3sg.su.ind
‘The boy sees the man.’ not: ‘The man sees the boy.’
(35) Wa
man
ma´si
boy
a´gaye.
3sg.obj.see.3sg.su.ind
‘The man sees the boy.’ not: ‘The boy sees the man.’
In order to overrule the effects of the animacy hierarchy and word order,
the subject can be marked with the marker -ma (-wama in case of inani-
mates), called delineator by Scott (1978:100-103).14 This is illustrated in
13Following Donohue (1999:14) aegu´ye is a generic transitive verb of violence. The
different English translations ‘kill’ vs. ‘attack’ are probably due to world knowledge.
14-wama is obligatory on inanimate subjects independently of the animacy features
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(36) and (37), the counterparts of (32) and (34) respectively:
Fore (Papuan; Scott 1978:116,115)
(36) Yaga:-wama
pig-dln
wa´
man
aegu´ye.
3sg.obj.hit.3sg.su.ind
‘The pig attacks the man.’
(37) Ma´si
boy
wa´-ma´
man-dln
agaye.
3sg.obj.see.3sg.su.ind
‘The man sees the boy.’
The Fore language thus uses case marking in a way very similar to Awtuw,
with the difference that the former language marks the subjects and the
latter objects to ensure recoverability of grammatical functions. Malay-
alam, Awtuw and Fore all exhibit an economical case system in which
case marking is only used in those situations where otherwise ambiguity
may arise or where the intended meaning is overruled by other interpre-
tive mechanisms. Below, I demonstrate that such case systems can be
analyzed in terms of a bidirectional model in which both the hearer’s and
the speaker’s perspective are taken into account.
3.2.1 Bidirectionality and Avoid Ambiguity
Restricting the use of overt case marking to those situations in which the
intended meaning may not be recoverable implies that the speakers of
the languages discussed above take into account the hearer’s perspective
as well. That is, in order to determine whether or not to use overt case
they have to consider whether the absence of case results in the intended
interpretation. As such, the case systems discussed above are prime can-
didates for an analysis in terms of Bidirectional Optimality Theory, an
extension of regular (unidirectional) Optimality Theory as developed by
Prince and Smolensky (1993/2004).
Optimality Theory (OT) views grammar as an optimization proce-
dure. For a given input the grammar generates a set of possible output
candidates by means of the generation function gen. These potential out-
put candidates are evaluated with respect to a set of constraints, which are
violable, potentially conflicting, and ranked with respect to one another.
of the object. According to Scott (1978), it turns nouns into potential agents, the
only elements allowed as transitive subjects. -wama seems to be composed of the
subject marker ma and the noun wa ‘man’. The latter can be interpreted as a bridge
morpheme (cf. Aristar 1997 discussed in section 3.1), which makes agentive marking
available for an atypical agent. Donohue (1999) reports that, although historically
maybe an ergative case, in the synchronic language the delineator can be best viewed
as a marked nominative case.
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The output candidate with the best constraint violation profile comes out
as the optimal candidate. It is standard practice in OT to visualize the
evaluation of output candidates by means of tableaux in which ‘*’ indi-
cates a violation of a constraint, ‘!’ a fatal violation of a constraint which
deems the candidate suboptimal, and where ‘’ designates the optimal
candidate which the grammar provides as the output.
In standard OT a distinction is made between OT syntax and OT
semantics. The former concerns productive optimization from meaning
to form, and the latter interpretive optimization from form to meaning.
Both OT syntax and OT semantics are complete theories about the re-
lation between form and meaning. However, it has been argued that the
independent combination of the two theories does not yield a model that
assigns a consistent relation between form and meaning (Zeevat 2000;
Beaver and Lee 2004). That is, it is possible that one does not end up
with the meaning one started with when OT syntax and semantics are
applied successively. To overcome this problem different models of bidi-
rectional optimization have been proposed in recent years in which OT
syntax and semantics are dependent on one another, as the outcome of one
direction of optimization constraints the outcome of the other direction
(see Beaver and Lee 2004 for a comparison of these different approaches).
I introduce here an asymmetric version of bidirectional OT (similar
in spirit to that of Zeevat 2000; Smolensky 1996; Donohue 1999) in which
the outcome of the production component is constrained by the inter-
pretational component, but not (necessarily) vice versa. In particular, I
propose that a form f is bidirectionally optimal for a given meaning m
iff the meaning m is uniquely recoverable from that form f and there
is no bidirectionally optimal form f ′ which is less marked than f . This
means, that a form which is optimal from the production perspective can
be rejected as the output candidate when it results in the wrong interpre-
tation. As a result, a candidate which is suboptimal from the production
perspective can become bidirectionally optimal (given that it does express
the intended meaning).
Before showing how this model applies to the data discussed above, let
me first introduce the constraints involved. The first is a general economy
constraint. As noted above, economy considerations are often invoked in
order to explain why in a majority of languages with case marking only
one of the arguments of a transitive sentence is overtly marked. I take
the following constraint to hold:15
15An economy constraint can be found in one formulation or the other in many ap-
proaches of different theoretical persuasions. See Malchukov and de Swart (to appear)
for discussion and references.
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(38) Economy: avoid the use of overt case marking.
This production constraint reflects the idea that case is used economically
in differential object marking languages (cf. Aissen 2003). It is violated
by the use of overt case marking and as such favours unmarked objects
over marked ones.
On the interpretation side there are two general constraints. I follow
Zeevat (2000; see also Zeevat and Ja¨ger 2002) in employing the general
constraint FaithInt which requires hearers to interpret all the speaker
has said. In the presence of overt morphology this constraint guides the
hearer to the right interpretation:
(39) FaithInt: make use of available morphosyntactic information.
This constraint is violated by any interpretation in conflict with the pro-
vided morphosyntactic information. An example of such a violation is as-
signment of the subject function to an argument marked with accusative
case. This constraint is (potentially) in conflict with a constraint which
interprets sentences purely on the basis of semantic information.
In recent years statistical tendencies made their way into formal mod-
eling within the framework of OT. Zeevat and Ja¨ger (2002) hypothesize
that hearers make use of statistical regularities and that they interpret
sentences accordingly. They propose a Bias constraint which is violated
by an interpretation which goes against such statistical regularities (see
also Cable 2002; Aissen 2004; Ja¨ger 2003; Mattausch 2004).16 I adopt a
version of Bias which incorporates the regularities shown in Table 3.1:
(40) Bias: interpret a sentence according to the regularities in Table
3.1.
In the languages under discussion the relevant semantic information is
the animacy feature of an argument. As shown in section 3.1, subjects
tend to be animate, whereas inanimates tend to go in object position.
Thus, when confronted with a sentence with an animate and an inanimate
argument, Bias will interpret the former is the subject and the latter as
the object. In case both arguments are (in)animate, the result is an
ambiguous interpretation.
Animacy is not the only semantic information subsumed under Bias.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the prototypical properties of subjects and
16Statistical approaches to language modeling are widespread outside the paradigm
of generative grammar (see the contributions to Bod et al. 2004 for an overview). In
line with such approaches, Zeevat (2002:174) takes Bias to be “an abstract expression
of the concept of Data Oriented Parsing” as developed by Bod and Scha (1997).
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Transitive subject (A) Direct object (O)
+ animate ± animate
+ definite ± definite
given ± new
pronominal ± nominal
topic comment
Table 3.1: Properties of subjects (A) and objects (O)
objects cross-linguistically. It shows a clear asymmetry between transitive
subjects and objects. The former have a clear profile, they are typically
animate, definite, correspond to given information and are topical. Such a
profile is missing for objects, which can be animate or inanimate, definite
or indefinite, etc. This asymmetry is corroborated by the following quote
from England (1991) concerning subject and object features in Mayan
languages. In these languages, in particular animacy and definiteness
play an important role in the marking of subjects and objects: “subject
nouns are expected to be agents and therefore likely to be animate, and
subject nouns are expected to be old information and therefore are likely
to be definite. Hence basic word order sentences will have animate and
definite subject nouns. No such expectations regarding objects exist.
They are usually patients, which can be animate or inanimate, and they
can be old or new information, so either definite or indefinite” (England
1991:479).
The prototypical properties in Table 3.1 stand in clear contrast to the
analysis presented in Aissen (1999, 2003), who takes prototypical sub-
jects and objects to be mirror images of each other: the former are an-
imate, definite, and discourse prominent (topics); the latter, inanimate,
indefinite, and non-discourse prominent. This contrast is taken to be
an instance of markedness reversal which states that what is unmarked
for subjects is marked for objects and vice versa (Comrie 1989). Næss
(2004b) takes issue with this characterization of prototypical direct ob-
jects and shows that inanimate and indefinite direct objects, which are
considered prototypical direct objects by Aissen, are often not realized
morphosyntactically as objects at all. Instead, they surface in intransi-
tive configurations such as object incorporation constructions. However,
Aissen’s characterization of prototypical objects is meaningful from an
interpretational perspective. As was discussed in section 3.1, corpus stud-
ies have shown inanimates to correlate highly with the object function.
Therefore, when confronted with an inanimate argument, the constraint
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Bias will assign it the function of direct object.
The final constraint on interpretation used in the analysis is Selec-
tion (cf. de Hoop and Lamers 2006):
(41) Selection: obey the selectional restrictions of the verb.
As was shown in section 3.1 above, the argument structure of a given
verb can have a profound effect on interpretation. This is reflected in this
constraint which is violated by any interpretation that goes against such
restrictions.
With the relevant constraints in place, let me show how my bidirec-
tional model can account for the case-marking patterns discussed above.
Tableaux 3.1 and 3.2 show the bidirectional evaluation of the Malayalam
examples (22) and (24), respectively. They should be read in the follow-
ing way. The top parts of the tableaux shows the productive optimization
(Prod) of a given input, specified in the top left cell, and lists the relevant
output candidate forms. These candidates are submitted to interpretive
optimization (Int) in the lower part of the tableaux where again only
the relevant interpretation candidates are shown. Candidates which are
optimal from a unidirectional perspective are preceded by ‘’ and those
which are bidirectionally optimal by ‘,’. Gray shading indicates the can-
didates which are suboptimal from the bidirectional perspective. The
ranking of the constraint FaithInt and Selection over Bias reflects
the observation that morphosyntactic information is a stronger cue than
semantic information in determining grammatical functions of arguments.
In other words, the statistic regularities in Table 3.1 can be seen as a last
resort, only when no other morphosyntactic info is available will a hearer
determine the interpretation on the basis of Bias.
Tableau 3.1 gives the bidirectional optimization of the meaning that
‘the ship split the waves’. The two relevant output candidates are one
with an unmarked object (candidate a) and one with an accusative-
marked object (candidate b). The latter candidate is suboptimal from
the production perspective due to a violation of the constraint Econ-
omy incurred by the use of accusative case. As a result, the candidate
with the caseless object, which does not violate this constraint, is optimal
from the production perspective. However, in order to find out whether
it is also bidirectionally optimal we have to submit the candidates to the
interpretive component as well.
Consider first the interpretive optimization of candidate a (Inta).
Both interpretations violate the interpretation constraint Bias due to
the fact that they have an inanimate subject. Neither violates the other
interpretation constraints FaithInt and Selection, and as a result the
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Prod: split(ship,waves) Econ Faith Sel Bias
 a. ship.nom waves.nom split
, b. ship.nom waves.acc split *!
Inta: ship.nom waves.nom split Econ Faith Sel Bias
 (i) split(ship,waves) *
 (ii) split(waves,ship) *
Intb: ship.nom waves.acc split Econ Faith Sel Bias
 (i) split(ship,waves) *
(ii) split(waves,ship) *! *
Tableau 3.1: Evaluation of example (22)
two interpretations show exactly the same violation pattern. This means
that both the interpretation that the ship split the waves (i) and the in-
terpretation that the waves split the ship (ii) come out as optimal. As a
result, the intended meaning is not uniquely recoverable from candidate
a and hence this candidate is not bidirectionally optimal, as indicated by
the gray shading. Candidate b, by contrast, does make the intended mean-
ing uniquely recoverable, as shown by Intb. Here the intended meaning
(i) comes out as the optimal interpretation due to a violation of the con-
straint FaithInt by the reverse interpretation (ii). This violation results
from the fact that ‘waves’ is interpreted as the subject even though it
is overtly marked with accusative case. Because candidate b makes the
intended meaning uniquely recoverable, and candidate a does not, it is
bidirectionally optimal, indicated by ‘,’ and produced as the output form
for the intended meaning by the grammar. Thus, Tableau 3.1 shows how
a candidate which is suboptimal from the production perspective can be-
come bidirectionally optimal due to the fact that the other candidate is
not uniquely recoverable.
Now consider Tableau 3.2 which shows a situation in which the candi-
date which is optimal from the production perspective is bidirectionally
optimal as well. It visualizes the evaluation of the intended meaning that
‘fire destroyed the hut’. As in the previous tableau, candidate a with the
unmarked object comes out as optimal from the production perspective
due to a violation of Economy by the accusative-marked object of the
b-candidate. This time, however, this candidate is also bidirectionally
optimal as it uniquely recovers the intended meaning. Inta shows that
the intended meaning (i) is the optimal interpretation for candidate a as
it performs better on the interpretation constraints than does the reverse
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Prod: destroy(fire,hut) Econ Faith Sel Bias
,  a. fire.nom hut.nom destroy
b. fire.nom hut.acc destroy *!
Inta: fire.nom hut.nom destroy Econ Faith Sel Bias
 (i) destroy(fire,hut) *
(ii) destroy(hut,fire) *! *
Intb: fire.nom hut.acc destroy Econ Faith Sel Bias
 (i) destroy(fire,hut) *
(ii) destroy(hut,fire) *! * *
Tableau 3.2: Evaluation of example (24)
interpretation (ii). Both interpretations violate Bias as they assign an
inanimate argument the subject function. They differ, however, in their
behaviour with respect to Selection, which is only violated by (ii) as
‘hut’ does not satisfy the selectional restriction the verb ‘destroy’ puts
on its subject argument. Both candidates perform equally well on the
constraint FaithInt due to the absence of morphosyntactic cues which
can be violated. Hence, the violation of Selection by interpretation (ii)
makes this candidate suboptimal with respect to interpretation (i). The
fact that only the intended meaning (i) comes out as optimal makes this
meaning uniquely recoverable and as a result candidate a is bidirection-
ally optimal. The fact that also candidate b makes the intended meaning
uniquely recoverable, as the possible interpretations for this candidate
show a similar constraint violation profile as those of candidate a, does
not withhold candidate a from becoming bidirectionally optimal. Given
that it is optimal from the production perspective, this candidate is the
preferred output candidate.
These tableaux show how my bidirectional approach can model the
flexible use of case marking discussed above. By taking into account the
interpretation perspective, a speaker can determine whether the sentence
he wants to utter is likely to result in an interpretation different from
the one he intended. If this is the case, as in (22)-(23), he will mark the
object with accusative case, otherwise he will refrain from using overt
case marking, cf. (24)-(25).
A clear advantage of this approach is that recoverability results from
the optimization mechanism itself instead of having to be stipulated as a
separate constraint. As a result, I can do without a constraint like Dis-
tinguishability proposed in earlier work (de Swart 2003, 2006), which
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explicitly required the use of overt case marking in case of ambiguity. In
the present model the effect of distinguishability falls out from the bidirec-
tional optimization procedure. As such, I consider it more parsimonious
than my previous account.
3.3 Recoverability: Alternative Strategies
In the introduction of this chapter I have shown that in the absence of
other principles guiding interpretation, head-marking languages can be
confronted with an indeterminacy with respect to grammatical function.
In this section, I discuss strategies employed by head-marking languages
in order to prevent such situations from occurring. In most languages,
this indeterminacy only arises in sentences with two third-person argu-
ments, as the verb agrees with the same person/number combination for
both arguments (cf. Nichols 1986:112). Given that head-marking lan-
guages generally have different sets of subject and object markers, the
assignment of grammatical function is unproblematic in sentences with
asymmetric person and/or number features. This is illustrated with ex-
amples from Fore:
Fore (Papuan; Donohue 1999:12)
(42) Na-ka-a:N-e.
1sg.obj-see-2sg.su-ind
‘You see me.’ not ‘I see you.’
In (42) the marker na uniquely identifies the first person as the object
and the marker a:N uniquely identifies the second person as the subject.
A reverse interpretation is impossible. Indeed, the use of case marking as
discussed in the previous section only occurs in sentences with two third-
person arguments. In other words, case is only needed in those situations
where agreement cannot help to disambiguate the roles of arguments.
Of course, sentences with two full NPs are only ambiguous in lan-
guages without a fixed word order. Consider the following example from
Malagasy:
Malagasy (Austronesian; Maclachlan 2002:161)
(43) Mamono
at.kill
ny
det
akoho
chicken
amin’ny
with’det
antsy
knife
ny
det
mpamboly.
farmer
‘The farmer kills the chicken with a knife.’
In Malagasy, the functions of subject and object are expressed by the
position of the arguments. The final position corresponds to the subject
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function and medial position preceding prepositional phrases is reserved
for direct objects. Due to this positional linking no ambiguity whatsoever
arises. Thus, even though Malagasy does not mark grammatical relations
with overt morphology on the head or the dependents, hearers can still
figure out which NP is the subject and which one the object. This sit-
uation is different in languages which do not observe such a fixed word
order.
In the Salish languages, spoken in British Columbia and adjacent ar-
eas of the US, sentences with two direct nominal arguments are almost
entirely excluded from discourse.17 Even in elicited speech such construc-
tions are dispreferred, according to Jelinek (1996a) because the order of
the direct arguments is completely free. Instead, speakers prefer a pas-
sive construction to express a proposition containing two direct nominal
arguments. Compare the Lummi example in (44) with the one in (45):
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1996a:288)
(44) ?Kw@niN-t-s
help-tr-3sg.su
s@
det
sìeniy’
woman
c@
det
swey’q@’.
man
‘The woman helped the man.’ or ‘The man helped the woman.’
(45) Kw@niN-t-N
help-tr-intr
’@
obl
s@
det
sìeniy’
woman
c@
det
swey’q@’.
man
‘The man was helped by the woman.’ not: ‘The woman was
helped by the man.’
The interaction between word order and recoverability of grammatical
roles is also nicely illustrated by Kuipers (1967:169, section 245) who
argues for the Coast Salish language Squamish that the usual order is
VSO, but that where the context leaves no room for doubt VOS is possible
as well (see Davis 1994b for similar examples from other Salish languages).
Moreover, the passive construction is always an alternative for the active
construction.
Lushootseed, another Coast-Salish language, takes the restriction on
active constructions with two direct nominal arguments even further, as
such sentences are ungrammatical:18
17Kinkade (1983:32) argues that constructions with two direct nominal arguments
are the result of English influence: “Probably no Salishan language allowed two direct
complements aboriginally, but the restriction has been relaxed due to English language
influence.” See Davis (1994b) for a different view.
18The same restriction has been reported by Blake (1997) for the related Salish
language Sliammon (Mainland Comox).
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Lushootseed (Coast Salish; Beck 2000:278)
(46) *Pu-gw@cˇ’-@d
cp-look.for-tr
ti
det
stubsˇ
man
ti
det
sqw@bayP.
dog
‘The man looked for the dog.’
By excluding the active constructions with two overt NPs and ‘replace’
them with a passive construction in which the agent argument is unam-
biguously identified by an oblique marker, these languages find a way of
getting round a possible ambiguity of grammatical relations. They, nev-
ertheless, differ slightly in how much ambiguity remains. Lushootseed
clearly does not tolerate any ambiguity, whereas Lummi has a preference
for excluding it but not to the full extent.
Suttles (2004) reports another mechanism to avoid potential ambigu-
ity for the Salish language Musqueam. In this language, VSO seems to
be the normal order but VOS is possible as well. He shows that in order
to secure one interpretation over the other, speakers can use demonstra-
tives formed with ň’a´ ‘be third person’, which are subject to a ‘subject
anaphoric restriction’.19 As a result, any NP preceded by such a demon-
strative has to be interpreted as the subject (see section 3.3.1 for addi-
tional examples). Consider the following examples:
Musqueam (Coast Salish; Suttles 2004:49)
(47) a. NiP
aux
q’a´y-@t-@s
die-tr-3.su
t@
det
sw@´y’qeP
man
t@wň’a
dem
sm@´y’@T.
deer
b. NiP
aux
q’a´y-@t-@s
die-tr-3.su
t@wň’a
dem
sm@´y’@T
deer
t@
det
sw@´y’qeP.
man
‘The deer killed the man.’
Independently of word order ‘the deer’ has to be interpreted as the subject
due to the presence of the demonstrative.
The exclusion of transitive sentences with two full NP arguments, as
found in Lushootseed, is an effective mechanism to avoid situations of
ambiguity. It also has its drawbacks as it reduces the number of possibili-
ties to express differences in information structure, for which the ordering
of arguments is used. More generally, by restricting the number of pos-
sible output forms, it reduces expressivity. As such, it is not surprising
that this strategy of ambiguity avoidance is not regularly attested in the
languages of the world. A strategy which is commonly found is the use
of argument hierarchies to constrain word order.
19Musqueam has simple and compound demonstratives (see Suttles 2004:351-353 for
discussion). The latter ones are formed on the basis of ň’a´ ‘be third person’ and are
probably relative clauses in origin with the meaning ‘the one who is third person’.
102 Chapter 3. Recovering Grammatical Roles
The latter situation is attested in Haida, a critically endangered lan-
guage spoken in Alaska and northern British Columbia (Enrico 2003).
Like Tohono O’odham, Haida has no agreement or case to mark the
grammatical function of an argument, but in contrast word order plays
a role. Word order in this language is influenced by the animacy of ar-
guments.20 The relative animacy of the two arguments in a transitive
sentence determines which ordering of arguments is possible. In case the
two arguments are equal in animacy, the sentence has to be interpreted
in such a way that the subject precedes the object, i.e., SO order obtains.
This is illustrated in (48):
Haida (Na-Dene; Enrico 2003:74)
(48) 7ada`ahl-.uu
yesterday-foc
Mary
Mary
Bill
Bill
qing-gan.
see-pa
‘Mary saw Bill yesterday/*Bill saw Mary yesterday.’
In this example Mary and Bill are of equal animacy and the only possible
interpretation is for Mary to be the subject. In case of unequal animacy,
the situation is slightly different. When the argument higher in animacy
precedes the argument lower in animacy, again subject before object is
the only possible interpretation. This is demonstrated in (49) where Bill
is higher in animacy than ‘the dog’. However, in case the argument with
lower animacy precedes the argument with higher animacy both an SO
and an OS interpretation are possible. The example in (50) shows that
such an ordering results in ambiguity.
Haida (Na-Dene; Enrico 2003:75)
(49) Yaank’ii.an-.uu
truly-foc
Bill
Bill
x-aay
dog-def
gu’laa-gang.
like-pr
‘Truly Bill likes the dog/*Truly the dog likes Bill.’
(50) Yaank’ii.an-.uu
truly-foc
x-aay
dog-def
Bill
Bill
gu’laa-gang.
like-pr
‘Truly Bill likes the dog/Truly the dog likes Bill.’
These Haida examples show that by ranking arguments on the basis of
their animacy and by connecting this ranking to certain interpretational
principles, the amount of potential ambiguity can be reduced to a cer-
tain extent. Nevertheless, as the example in (50) shows, some ambiguity
remains in this system. However, Enrico notes that such ambiguity is
commonly resolved by context (Enrico 2003:77). Furthermore, he shows
20Enrico (2003) uses the notion potency, which can be seen as an elaboration of
animacy, incorporating other factors such as social rank and acquaintance.
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that the ordering principles above can be overruled by other semantic
information as is illustrated in the following example:
Haida (Na-Dene; Enrico 2003:77)
(51) 7ada`ahl-.uu
yesterday-foc
x-aay
dog-def
sqaw-ee
chicken-def
skayj-an.
peck-pa
‘The chicken pecked the dog yesterday.’
The arguments in (51) are of equal animacy and according to the inter-
pretational rules the only possible interpretation should be SO, i.e., ‘the
dog’ should be the subject and the chicken the object. However, this is
overruled by the selectional restrictions of the verb ‘to peck’, which pro-
vides additional evidence for the constraint Selection introduced in the
previous section. Given that a chicken and not a dog is typically involved
in the act of pecking, the interpretation of (51) shifts from SO to OS.
Thus, again we see that apart from animacy, other semantic information
provided by the verb can assist in arriving at the right interpretation of
a sentence in the absence of morphosyntactic clues.21 The likelihood of
a noun phrase to fulfill a certain role based on the lexical information of
the noun phrase and the verb is sometimes referred to as the thematic
fit of an argument. Enrico shows that this thematic fit takes priority
over the ordering principles. Only when thematic fit fails to determine
an unambiguous interpretation, the relative animacy of arguments comes
into play. In the account developed in the previous section this can be
modelled by ranking Selection over Bias.
Haida only makes limited use of argument hierarchies to guide the
interpretation of transitive sentences. Extensive use of hierarchies can be
found in languages with an obviation and/or inverse system (see Klaiman
1992; Givo´n 1994b; Aissen 1997; Zu´n˜iga 2006). In an obviation system
the nominals in a sentence with two (or more) third person arguments are
ranked according to their (discourse) prominence. The most prominent
NP is coined the proximate argument and outranks the other argument(s)
which are given obviative status. The obviation status interacts with
the linking of arguments to grammatical functions and with the verbal
morphology. In languages with an inverse system, verbs come in two
forms: the direct and the inverse. The obviation status of an argument
and the verbal form used determine the interpretation of a sentence. If the
direct form is used, the higher-ranked, i.e., proximate, argument is linked
to the subject function and the lower-ranked, i.e., obviative, argument
to the object function. Use of the inverse form indicates the reverse
21Other sources of information which can overrule the ordering principles listed by
Enrico (2003:77) are quantification, reflexivity, and the clitic k’udaan ‘of own will’.
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situation, the proximate argument is the object, and the obviative is the
subject.
Let me illustrate this with Kutenai, a language isolate of British
Columbia and adjacent areas of Montana and Idaho, which combines
an obviation system with an inverse system. Consider the following ex-
amples:
Kutenai (isolate; Dryer 1994:65)
(52) Wu.kat-i
see-ind
pałkiy-s
woman-obv
titqat’.
man
‘The man sees the woman.’
(53) Wu.kat-aps-i
see-inv-ind
titqat’-s
man-obv
pałkiy.
woman
‘The man sees the woman.’ (or ‘The woman was seen by the
man.’)
When we compare (52) and (53) we observe two differences. First, in
(52) ‘woman’ is marked with the obviative marker -s, whereas in (53)
it is ‘man’ which carries this marking. Secondly, the verb in (53) is
augmented with the inverse marker (-aps), whereas in (52) this marker is
absent and the verb is in its direct form. The direct verb form makes the
noun marked with the obviative marker the object of the clause (cf. (52)).
However, when the inverse form of the verb is used, the obviative noun is
interpreted as the subject (cf. (53)). Due to these markings a hearer of
a Kutenai sentence with two overt NPs can figure out which one is to be
interpreted as the subject, and which one as the object.
The combination of inverse and obviation marking can be, and has
been seen as a mechanism to reduce potential ambiguity (see, e.g., Nichols
1986; Klaiman 1992; Aissen 1997 for discussion). Indicative of such an
analysis is the fact that obviation only occurs in sentences with two (or
more) third-person arguments, just like overt case marking in Fore. It
should be noted, however, that inverse marking in many languages also
occurs outside such sentences. Historically though it seems to originate in
sentences with two third person arguments (see Zu´n˜iga 2006:248-249 for
discussion of the evolution of inverse systems). Furthermore, it should be
acknowledged that inverse and obviation systems no longer fulfill (solely)
a disambiguation function in present-day languages, but have acquired
other functions primarily related to discourse structuring. Disambigua-
tion can be seen as a welcome side effect of this main function.
Navajo is very similar to languages with obviation, even though it
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lacks obviation morphology.22 Transitive verb forms with a third person
argument can be prefixed either with yi or with bi (see also the discussion
in the next section). The use of these prefixes is partially dependent on
the animacy of the arguments involved (cf. Hale 1973 and Frishberg 1972).
Again the description to follow only holds for sentences with two third
person arguments, showing its relation to disambiguation.
In case the agent and the patient are equal in animacy either yi or bi
can be used, with a concomitant change in word order:
Navajo (Athapaskan; Hale 1973:300)
(54) ì´ı´ı
horse
dzaane´e´z
mule
yi-ztaì.
yi-kicked
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
(55) Dzaane´e´z
mule
ì´ı´ı
horse
bi-ztaì.
bi-kicked
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
These two sentences differ in word order and in the verbal prefix used, but
have the same interpretation. In case the yi prefix is used, the agent pre-
cedes the patient. The opposite holds when the bi prefix is used, in which
case the patient precedes the agent. When the agent and the patient dif-
fer in animacy the use of the two prefixes is constrained. A sentence in
which the agent is higher in animacy than the patient can only occur
with the yi prefix, as illustrated in (56). In the reverse situation, bi is
obligatory, cf. (57):
Navajo (Athapaskan; Hale 1973:302)
(56) Dine´
man
dziì
mountain
yoo´ı˛/*boo’´ı˛.
yi.sees/bi.sees
‘The man sees the mountain.’
(57) Dibe´
sheep
to´
water
‘ab´ı´ıì/*‘ay´ı´ıì
bi.swept/yi.swept
‘e´e´l.
off
‘The water swept the sheep off.’
Navajo provides a prime example of a language in which the relative
animacy of arguments interacts with verbal morphology to reduce ambi-
guity. Moreover, in this system ambiguity is eliminated while a maximum
in freedom of word order is obtained, which can be used to express dif-
ferences in information structure.
22See Aissen (2000) for an analysis of Navajo in terms of obviation.
106 Chapter 3. Recovering Grammatical Roles
3.3.1 One Nominal Interpretation and Bias
In this section I discuss a constraint on the interpretation of transitive
constructions with two third person arguments, of which only one is a
full noun phrase. This constraint is, for instance, found in the Salish
languages, discussed in the previous section. It is often referred to as
the One Nominal Interpretation constraint (ONI) and was formulated by
Gerdts (1988) in the following way:
(58) One Nominal Interpretation:
In the absence of marking for other persons, a single 3rd person
nominal is interpreted as the absolutive.23 (Gerdts 1988:59)
The example from Lushootseed - a Coast Salish language - in (59) illus-
trates this constraint nicely:
Lushootseed (Coast Salish; Hess 1995:22)
(59) Pu-P@y’-dxw
cp-find-lc.tr
ti
det
sqw@bayP.
dog
‘He found the dog.’ not: ‘The dog found him.’
In (59) we see a transitive predicate with two third person arguments,
which are both not marked on the verb, and one full noun phrase. The
only feasible interpretation is one in which the nominal is assigned the
role of the undergoer of the event, i.e., ti sqw@bayP is the direct object. An
interpretation in which the nominal is assigned the grammatical function
of subject is ruled out. In order to express a one nominal sentence in
which the single noun phrase is the agent, a passive construction has to
be used.24
23Gerdts (1988) analyzes Halkomelem as a split ergative language in which third
person transitive subjects (A) are marked with ergative -@s and transitive object (P)
and intransitive subject (S) are unmarked (=absolutive). We can reformulate the
constraint as stating that the single NP has to be interpreted as the direct object (P).
24No general agreement exists in the literature to characterize this construction as
passive (see, e.g., Gerdts 1988; Thompson and Thompson 1992; Thomason and Everett
1993 for discussion). Formally it resembles a passive to a large extent, i.e., the verb
is detransitivized and the agent is marked as an oblique phrase. The patient is how-
ever not always cross-referenced with subject agreement but in many languages with
transitive object agreement (see Wiltschko 2001). Functionally, these constructions do
not always behave as a passive would be expected to (see Jacobs 1994). Bearing these
considerations in mind I will nevertheless use the term passive descriptively to refer
to constructions as the one in (60). See section 4.3 for discussion of active-to-passive
alternations in Salish.
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Lushootseed (Coast Salish; Hess 1995:19)
(60) Pu-P@y’-du-b
cp-find-lc.tr-pass
P@
obl
ti
det
sqw@bayP.
dog
‘He was found by the dog.’
The Salish languages are not the only languages that have an ONI re-
striction that assigns the object function to the single NP. It has also
been reported for Navajo (Athapaskan; Platero 1982; Woolford 1986),
Kutenai (Isolate; Zu´n˜iga 2006:133-134) Chamorro (Austronesian; Chung
1984), and Mam (Mayan; England 1983), all head-marking languages to
a certain extent. An example from Navajo is given in (61):
Navajo (Athapaskan; Platero 1982:287)
(61) Ashkii
boy
yi-yiiìtsa˛´.
3-saw
‘He saw the boy.’ not: ‘The boy saw him.’
Again we find that the single noun phrase has to be interpreted as the
patient argument of the verb. As in Salish, it is possible to make a single
noun phrase the agent of a sentence but a different construction has to
be used. In this case the bi prefix has to be attached to the verb instead
of the yi prefix:
Navajo (Athapaskan; Platero 1982:287)
(62) Ashkii
boy
bi-iìtsa˛´.
3-saw
‘He was seen by the boy.’
The existence of the same interpretation constraint in different (unre-
lated) languages raises two immediate questions: (i) why does this con-
straint exist (in these languages)?; and (ii) why should this constraint
assign the full NP the object function and not that of subject? Let me
start with the first question.
In my view ONI serves as a device to ensure recoverability of gram-
matical relations. In head-marked constructions like the one in (59) the
verb tells that there are two third person arguments involved in the event
denoted by the verb. It does not tell to which third person argument the
full noun phrase has to be linked. In principle it is possible to link it
either to the subject or to the object function. Without a rule like ONI,
such constructions would be ambiguous with respect to the grammatical
function of the nominal, and every time a hearer encounters such a con-
struction he would have to figure out what function has to be assigned
to the nominal. It is much easier for the hearer to assign the same func-
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tion to a nominal whenever he encounters one. That is, to know that
when he encounters a sentence with two third-person arguments of which
only one is a nominal, he has to interpret it as the object. A rule that
determines the interpretation of single NP constructions in a (standard)
straightforward way speeds up the processing of such sentences (see Hale
et al. 1977; Platero 1982; Chung 1984, for a similar explanation).
Evidence for the analysis that ONI is related to recoverability comes
from the fact that this constraint is only active in sentences with two
third-person arguments (3-3 sentences). In sentences in which the noun
phrase occurs with a local person it can be bound to either the subject
or object function depending on the agreement morphology present. As
discussed above, the agreement morphology of first and second persons
uniquely determines the grammatical function. Consider the following
example:
Lushootseed (Coast Salish; Hess 1973:90)
(63) Pu-cˇ’a´xwa-t-s
cp-club-tr-1sg.obj
ti
det
cˇ’acˇ’as.
boy
‘The boy clubbed me.’
The suffix -s is the first-person object marker and due to its presence
the single nominal of the sentence has to be interpreted as the subject.
If we were to replace this object marker with the first-person subject
marker cˇ@d, the nominal would have to be interpreted as the object.
Thus, in these cases agreement morphology makes available only a single
interpretation. This should be interpreted as the result of the constraint
FaithInt introduced in the previous section.
The remaining question is: if we want to have a fixed interpretation
for 3-3 sentences containing a single nominal, how are we going to decide
which interpretation we standardly assign? Put differently, what reason
do we have to link this single noun phrase to the function of direct object?
The constraint Bias, introduced in section 3.2.1 (see also Table 3.1),
provides the answer. Topical arguments tend to go in subject position and
tend to have reduced morphological realization (cf. Chafe 1976; Du Bois
1987; Givo´n 1990). This means that the full noun phrase is not likely to
be associated with the function of subject, and therefore gets interpreted
as the object (see Gerdts and Hukari 2003; Davis 1994a for the same
conclusions on the relation between topics and ONI in Salish).25 In other
25Matthewson (1996:109-110) relates the inability of full NPs to occur in subject
position to the fact that they cannot be presuppositional. Given that the subject
position is reserved for topics, which carry a presupposition, it follows that full NPs
are not allowed as in this position. It is not clear to me how this analysis can account
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words, ONI forms a reflection of what is found most in discourse.
Evidence for an analysis of ONI as a violable constraint Bias comes
from specific cases in which it is overruled. Citing Willie (1991), Aissen
(2000) presents the following examples from Navajo:
Navajo (Athapaskan; Aissen 2000:14)
(64) ‘Ashkii
boy
yiy´ı´ıb`ı˛´ı˛.
yi.picked.round.objects
‘The boy picked them (round objects).’
(65) ‘Ashkii
boy
yo´ldon.
yi.shoot.at
‘The boy is shooting at it.’
As discussed above, the single nominal in Navajo yi -clauses normally has
to be interpreted as the direct object (patient). In the yi -sentences in
(64) and (65) it nevertheless has to be interpreted as the subject (agent).
Following Willie (1991), Aissen (2000) argues that these violations of ONI
are due to the inanimacy of the patient. According to her the ONI effect
in Navajo is due to a violable constraint which prohibits lexical subjects.26
Examples like (64) and (65) are the result of a higher ranked constraint
prohibiting inanimate subjects. When we recast this analysis in terms of
Bias constraints, the Navajo data provide us with evidence for a complex
notion of Bias in which the component features are ranked with respect
to one another (see Aissen 2003, 2004 for a decomposition of Bias). In
Navajo, the bias to have animate subjects is stronger than the bias to have
lexical objects. This means that in Navajo the constraint Biasanimacy is
ranked higher than BiasNPtype.27
Interestingly, Salish shows the opposite pattern, as the following ex-
ample from Halkomelem demonstrates (‘#’ indicates pragmatic oddness):
Halkomelem (Coast Salish; Gerdts 1988:58)
(66) #NiP
aux
q’w@l-@t-@s
bake-tr-3sg.su
ì@
det
sìeniP.
woman
‘He baked the woman.’ not: ‘The woman baked it.’
Here, the single noun phrase still has to be interpreted as the object
even though this results in an unlikely interpretation. Apparently, the
for the fact that full NPs can become the subject of sentences with a first or second
person patient, cf. (63) above.
26In fact, Aissen (2000) develops an analysis of Navajo yi and bi-clauses in terms of
abstract obviation (cf. Aissen 1997), and therefore uses the term proximate for subjects
in yi-clauses.
27Chamorro, discussed in Chung (1984), observes the same ranking.
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ONI-constraint is so strong that even in pragmatically-odd situations it
cannot be overruled. This indicates that in Salish ONI, originally a re-
coverability mechanism, shows a high degree of grammaticalization. One
way of capturing this in terms of Bias is by having BiasNPtype as the
highest-ranking component feature, i.e., the reverse order from Navajo.
Further cross-linguistic evidence for a treatment of ONI in terms of
Bias comes from Takelma, a language which was spoken in southern
Oregon, and is discussed in Aissen (2004, who based herself on Culy 2000,
who in turn based himself on Sapir 1922). Takelma has two third person
object markers. One marker is morphologically zero and unrestricted in
its reference and use. The second marker -khwa is restricted in its use,
and is of interest to the present discussion. This marker can only be
used in sentences with two third person arguments, but obeys certain
restrictions. First, it is always used when the object is higher in animacy
than the subject. Second, when the subject and object are equal in
animacy, it is used when the object is topic, i.e., outranks the subject
in topicality. Thus, -khwa is limited to situations which go against the
statistical tendencies of the constraint Bias. In other words, this marker
signals a violation of this constraint.
Moreover, its use lends strong support for an analysis in terms of re-
coverability of grammatical functions and for a model which takes into
account both the hearer’s and the speaker’s perspective. This becomes
clear from the following two examples:
Takelma (possibly Oregon Penutian; Aissen 2004:6)
(67) T’ipisi:
ants
t’aya´kh.
found
‘He found the ants.’
(68) T’ipisi:
ants
t’aya´:-khwa.
found-obj
‘The ants found him.’
Sapir (1922) analyzed the occurrence of -khwa in terms of recoverability.
The example in (67) without the object marker can only be interpreted
in such a way that the full NP functions as the object, i.e., in accordance
with Bias. When the reverse interpretation is intended -khwa has to be
used, cf. the yi/bi -alternation discussed above.
So far, I have established that ONI functions as a recoverability mech-
anism which determines the interpretation of a single noun phrase by
means of the violable constraint Bias. As such, it fits in perfectly with
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Int: (63) Pucˇ’a´xwat-s ti cˇ’acˇ’as
clubbed-1sg.obj the boy
FaithInt Bias
a. I clubbed the boy *!
 b. The boy clubbed me *
Tableau 3.3: Interpretive optimization of example (63)
Int: (59) PuP@y’dxw ti sqw@bayP
found the dog
FaithInt Bias
 a. He found the dog
b. The dog found him *!
Tableau 3.4: Interpretive optimization of example (59)
the bidirectional model I proposed in 3.2.1 (see also Aissen 2004).28 Above
I have shown that ONI only applies in sentences with two third-person
arguments. In sentences with a first or second person argument the oblig-
atory assignment of the full NP to the object function can be overruled
by agreement morphology. The fact that morphosyntactic information
is a stronger cue than semantic information follows from the ranking of
FaithInt over Bias. Tableaux 3.3 and 3.4 illustrates how this analysis
works by only focusing on interpretive optimization.
Tableau 3.3, corresponding to example (63), illustrates that in the
presence of unambiguous agreement morphology the higher-ranked con-
straint FaithInt correctly rules out an interpretation in which the single
nominal is taken as the object. Due to the fact that only candidate a
violates FaithInt candidate b is the optimal interpretation even though
it violates Bias. In the absence of unambiguous agreement morphol-
ogy both candidates satisfy the highest-ranked constraint, cf. Tableau
3.4. Candidate b violates Bias because it interprets the nominal as the
subject. As a result candidate a comes out as the winner. This is in
accordance with example (59) above.
Tableaux 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrate that the interpretation of single full
NPs can be analyzed as an interaction between two violable constraints
on interpretation. Let me now show how the bidirectional analysis can
model which construction a speaker will use in order to express a given
meaning. For instance, the obligatory use of a passive construction in
28Aissen (2004) develops an analysis for Takelma within Blutner’s 2000 Weak Bidi-
rectional OT using Bias.
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Prod: find(dog,him) FaithInt Bias
 a. Active (59)
,  b. Passive (60)
Inta: Active (59) FaithInt Bias
(i) find(dog,him) *!
 (ii) find(he,dog)
Intb: Passive (60) FaithInt Bias
 (i) find(dog,him) *
(ii) find(he,dog) *!
Tableau 3.5: Bidirectional optimization of a nominal agent
case the speaker wants to express the agent as a full NP.
Suppose a Salish speaker wants to utter a sentence with a nominal
agent and a pronominal patient, as illustrated in Tableau 3.5.29 From a
production perspective both the active and the passive construction come
out as optimal, indicated by ‘’. However, when the speaker takes into
account the hearer’s perspective, i.e., the constraints FaithInt and Bias,
he will opt for the latter construction. For, if he were to use an active
construction, it would be interpreted in a wrong way. Tableau 3.5 (Inta)
shows that the optimal interpretation for this construction is such that
‘the dog’ is the patient, cf. also Tableau 3.4. The intended interpretation
(i) is suboptimal due to a violation of Bias. For the passive construction,
by contrast, the intended meaning (i) comes out as optimal. The tableau
shows that the reverse interpretation (ii) in which ‘the dog’ is interpreted
as the patient violates the constraint FaithInt and hence is subopti-
mal. This is due to the fact that this interpretation can only result from
the misinterpretation of the overt oblique marking of the NP, signalling
that it is the agent, cf. (60) above. Thus, although both the active and
the passive are optimal from a production perspective, only the latter is
bidirectionally optimal as it recovers the intended meaning. Its bidirec-
tional optimality is indicated with the symbol ‘,’ and the bidirectionally
suboptimal status of the active is indicated by the shading.
29Here and in the tableaux to come I focus mainly on interpretational constraints.
This does not mean that there are no production constraints involved. Rather, unless
crucial for the analysis, they are left out in order to simplify the tableaux. When no
production constraints are mentioned, I take the grammar to be able to generate the
candidates evaluated.
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Prod: find(he,dog) FaithInt Bias
,  a. Active
,  b. Passive
Inta: Active FaithInt Bias
 (i) find(he,dog)
(ii) find(dog,him) *!
Intb: Passive FaithInt Bias
 (i) find(he,dog)
(ii) find(dog,him) *! *
Tableau 3.6: Bidirectional optimization of a nominal patient
By taking into account both the hearer’s and the speaker’s perspective
the analysis developed here can straightforwardly explain the obligatori-
ness of a passive construction in case of an agent nominal. Moreover, it
rightly predicts that both an active and a passive construction are possi-
ble in case a Salish speaker wants to produce a sentence with two third
person arguments of which only the patient is a nominal. This is illus-
trated in Tableau 3.6. As in the previous example, both the active and
the passive are optimal from a production perspective. This time, how-
ever, both are bidirectionally optimal because both recover the intended
meaning. For the active construction (Inta) the intended meaning (i) is
optimal due to a violation of Bias by the reverse interpretation (ii). For
the passive construction (Intb) the reverse interpretation (ii) not only
violates Bias but also FaithInt, as it misinterprets the overt oblique
marking of the pronoun, signalling its agenthood. Given that both con-
structions are bidirectionally optimal, they are both possible expressions
of the intended meaning. Following, for instance, Aissen (1999) we can
assume that active in these cases is preferred because it is generally less-
marked than passive. Passive then is used only in those cases where it
is preferred for other reasons. For instance, when the patient is more
(discourse) prominent than the agent.
The above discussion shows how the bidirectional model I have pro-
posed in 3.2.1 to account for the flexible use of case marking can be
extended to account for ONI as well. As stated above, evidence for this
bidirectional analysis of ONI in terms of violable constraints comes from
specific cases in which ONI is overruled, cf. the Navajo examples in (64)
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and (64). Suttles (2004) shows for Musqueam, a variant of Downriver
Halkomelem Salish, that there is one condition under which single full
NPs in clauses with two third person participants have to be interpreted
as the subject, contra ONI. This is the case when the full NP occurs with
a demonstrative formed with ň’a´ ‘be third person’. As was shown in the
previous section, NPs occurring with such demonstratives have to be in-
terpreted as the subject, cf. (69):
Musqueam (Coast Salish; Suttles 2004:49)
(69) Kw@´n-@t-@s
get.taken-tr-3.su
t@wň’a
dem
sw´ıw’l@s.
young.man
‘The young man took it.’
Gerdts and Hukari (2003) report similar violations of ONI for Island
Halkomelem:
Halkomelem (Coast Salish; Gerdts and Hukari 2003:105)
(70) s-@w’-xˇìas-t-s
nmz-con-dine-tr-3sg.su
tT@w’niì
dem
spa:l’
raven
‘And the raven fed them.’
Following Hukari (1979), and on a par with Suttles (2004), they claim
that ONI is systematically violated when the single NP contains a third
person demonstrative. They provide textual examples of such violations
and argue that these are due to a pressure to refresh or re-establish the
topic. In their view, this need is strong enough to override the ONI
constraint. Let me follow their analysis and implement this pressure to
refresh or re-establish the topic as a production constraint:
(71) Topic: re-establish the topic by means of a full NP.
It should be added that in Salish the topic is associated with the subject
function. As such, this constraint is satisfied when the topic is realized as
the subject and violated otherwise (for the marked association between
topic and object see Kinkade 1990; Davis 1994a). If we again take into
account both the hearer’s and the speaker’s perspective, a violation of
ONI indeed comes out as the optimal expression in case a Musqueam
speaker wants to refresh the topic. This is shown in Tableau 3.7.
From a production perspective both a regular active and an active
construction in which the agent is preceded by a demonstrative withň’a´
are optimal candidates. The passive construction is ruled out because
it links the patient and not the agent argument to the topical subject
position and hence violates the constraint Topic. If we now submit the
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Prod: take(mani,it), i=topic, refresh topic Topic FaithInt Bias
 a. Active
,  b. Active with ň’a´
c. Passive *!
Inta: Active Topic FaithInt Bias
(i) take(man,it) *!
 (ii) take(it,man)
Intb: Active with ň’a´ Topic FaithInt Bias
 (i) take(man,it) *
(ii) take(it,man) *!
Intc: Passive Topic FaithInt Bias
 (i) take(man,it)
(ii) take(it,man) *!
Tableau 3.7: Production of a sentence with topic refreshment
two active constructions to the interpretation component, only the ac-
tive with ň’a´ comes out bidirectionally optimal. This is due to the fact
that the regular active construction results in the wrong interpretation,
cf. also Tableau 3.4 above. Inta shows that the intended meaning (i)
violates Bias and therefore becomes suboptimal. As a result, candidate
a does not make the intended meaning recoverable and is not bidirection-
ally optimal. The intended meaning (i) is the optimal interpretation for
candidate b even though it violates Bias. This results from the fact that
the alternative interpretation (ii) violates FaithInt, as it assigns the ň’a´-
marked NP the function of direct object. Candidate b therefore makes the
intended meaning recoverable and hence is bidirectionally optimal. The
fact that the passive candidate c also results in the intended interpreta-
tion does not affect the outcome of the bidirectional optimization, as it is
suboptimal from the production perspective with respect to to candidate
b. Tableau 3.7 shows that by taking into account both the hearer’s and
the speaker’s perspective, the speaker has no other choice but to use an
active construction with a full NP preceded by a demonstrative in case
he wants to refresh an agent topic.
In this section I have shown that the one nominal interpretation (ONI)
constraint found in several languages can be analyzed as a strategy to en-
sure recoverability of grammatical relations. I have shown that ONI can
be interpreted as a violable constraint which incorporates the statistical
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tendencies associated with grammatical functions. Moreover, the anal-
ysis of ONI requires a model in which the speaker takes into account
the hearer’s perspective. This lends further support to the bidirectional
model I introduced in 3.2.1.
3.4 Word Order and Exceptional Case Marking
Up to now we have seen that languages develop strategies to avoid am-
biguity of grammatical relations. One may expect that such ambiguities
do not appear in languages which have overt case marking, as here the
grammatical function can be directly read off a noun phrase. This is,
however, not necessarily the case. Compare the following examples from
German:
German (Germanic; adapted from de Hoop and Lamers 2006:272,273,276)
(72) Der
[the
Junge
boy].nom
hat
has
den
[the
Zaun
fence].acc
zerbrochen.
broken
‘The boy broke the fence.’
(73) Den
[the
Zaun
fence].acc
hat
has
der
[the
Junge
boy].nom
zerbrochen.
broken
‘The boy broke the fence.’
(74) Die
[the
Professorin
professor].nom/acc
hat
has
die
[the
Studentin
student].nom/acc
geschlagen.
hit
‘The professor hit the student.’
In examples (72) and (73) the two noun phrases surface with different
overt case marking. Due to this difference in case marking the gram-
matical function of each noun phrase can be easily identified, and as a
result their order can be reversed, shown by the contrast between (72)
and (73). The situation is different for the example in (74) where the two
arguments are not unambiguously case marked. It is a general property
of German singular nouns with feminine (and neuter) gender to show
case syncretism, i.e., the same case form, in the nominative and the ac-
cusative. Given that German allows subject-object reversal as shown by
(72) and (73), and that case in (74) cannot be used as a cue in interpreta-
tion, this sentence should be ambiguous. Nevertheless, provided that no
additional contextual or intonational information intervenes, in practice
this sentence can only be interpreted in such a way that the first argu-
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ment is the agent and the second one the patient. That is, when case
information can no longer be used as a cue, word order takes over and
secures one interpretation over the other. The phenomenon that word
order determines the linking of arguments in situations in which case or
other morphological information cannot help out, is observed in many
languages with overt case marking, and is known as word order freezing.
Korean is another language that exhibits word order freezing (Lee
2001a). In informal colloquial speech nominative and accusative case
markers are often dropped. Such sentences are always interpreted as
SOV, whereas different word orders are permitted when the case markers
are present. Thus, (75) can only have an interpretation in which Mary is
chased by a dog, and not the other way round:
Korean (isolate; Lee 2001a)
(75) Ku
that
kay
dog
Mary
Mary
ccoch-nun-ta.
chase-pres-decl
‘That dog is chasing Mary.’, not: ‘Mary is chasing that dog.’
The same freezing effects are found with psychological predicates which
are lexically specified in taking both their arguments in the nominative
case. By fixing word order, only one interpretation is possible for other-
wise (potentially) ambiguous sentences.
The above discussion shows that even in languages with overt case
marking situations can arise in which the grammatical functions of argu-
ments are not uniquely recoverable. In such situations many languages
use fixed word order as a mechanism to avoid potential ambiguity. In-
deed, this connection between recoverability and word order freezing is
well-established in the linguistic literature (cf. Jakobson 1984; but see
also Lee 2001a,b; Flack 2005 for discussion). In the remainder of this
section I investigate how recoverability can explain restrictions found on
word order in Dutch exceptional case marking (ECM) constructions, also
called Accusativus cum Infinitivo (AcI) constructions.
In an ECM construction the subject of the embedded clause receives
its semantic role from the verb in the embedded clause but is marked with
accusative case by the verb in the matrix clause. Thus, in the sentence
the FBI believed [him to have murdered his neighbour] the pronoun him
receives accusative case from the verb believe, but is assigned a semantic
role by the embedded predicate murder. In contrast to English, in which
the ECM subject and the ECM object occur on different sides of the
embedded transitive verb, in Dutch they both occur to the left of the
verb, i.e. embedded clauses are verb final. Under certain conditions the
ECM object can even precede the ECM subject.
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Full object NPs cannot precede the exceptionally case marked subject
in Dutch ECM constructions (cf. Zwart 1993, 1997). Relevant examples
are given in (76) and (77), again ‘#’ indicates pragmatic oddness:
Dutch (Germanic)
(76) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
de
the
vrouw
woman
Jan
Jan
zien
see
kussen.
kiss
‘Piet saw the woman kiss Jan.’ not: ‘Piet saw Jan kiss the
woman.’
(77) #Piet
Piet
heeft
has
de
the
taart
cake
Jan
Jan
zien
see
opeten.
up.eat
‘Piet saw the cake eat Jan.’ not: ‘Piet saw Jan eat the cake.’
The example in (76) can only have an interpretation in which the first
argument of the ECM construction is interpreted as the subject of the em-
bedded clause. The reverse interpretation in which de vrouw ‘the woman’
is interpreted as the ECM object preceding the ECM subject is not pos-
sible. The same holds for the example in (77) even though the result is
pragmatically strange.30
Shifting attention from full object NPs to embedded object (clitic)
pronouns, the same situation obtains when both the embedded subject
and object are animate. In all examples below the first element has to be
interpreted as the subject (contra Zwart 1993, 1997 who argues that the
clitics are interpreted as the object).
Dutch (Germanic)
(78) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
haar
her
Jan
Jan
zien
see
kussen.
kiss
‘Piet saw her kiss Jan.’ not: ‘Piet saw Jan kiss her.’
(79) Piet
Piet
heeft=’r
has=her.ocl
Jan
Jan
zien
see
kussen.
kiss
‘Piet saw her kiss Jan.’ not: ‘Piet saw Jan kiss her.’
(80) Piet
Piet
heeft=’r=’m
has=her.ocl=him.ocl
zien
see
kussen.
kiss
‘Piet saw her kiss him.’ not: ‘Piet saw him kiss her.’
(81) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
haar
her
hem
hem
zien
see
kussen.
kiss
‘Piet saw her kiss him.’ not: ‘Piet saw him kiss her.’
30Contrastive stress on de taart ‘the cake’ seems to improve the object-initial reading
of (77).
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(82) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
haar
her
hem
him
zien
see
kussen.
kiss
‘Piet saw her kiss him.’ not: ‘Piet saw him kiss her.’
However, as also observed by Toebosch (2001), the pattern changes
when the object is inanimate and the subject animate. The following ex-
amples demonstrates that the ECM object can precede the ECM subject
when the former is realized as the inanimate pronoun het or the inani-
mate clitic ’t :31
Dutch (Germanic)
(83) Piet
Piet
heeft=’t
has=it.ocl
Jan
Jan
zien
see
opeten.
up.eat
‘Piet saw Jan eat it.’
(84) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
het
it
Jan
Jan
zien
see
opeten.
up.eat
‘Piet saw Jan eat it.’
The reverse order in which the object follows the ECM subject is also
possible:
Dutch (Germanic)
(85) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
Jan=’t
Jan=it.ocl
zien
see
opeten.
up.eat
‘Piet saw Jan eat it.’
(86) Piet
Piet
heeft
has
Jan
Jan
het
it
zien
see
opeten.
up.eat
‘Piet saw Jan eat it.’
In line with the discussion throughout this chapter I want to put
forward an analysis of the animacy-related restrictions on word order in
Dutch ECM constructions in terms of recoverability. In short, the analysis
captures the observation that reversal of word order is only possible in case
the grammatical functions remain recoverable. The observed restrictions
on word order can be compared to the freezing phenomena discussed for
German and Korean above (see Morimoto 2000; Morimoto to appear for
31It should be noted that the feminine clitic can also be used to refer to inanimate
entities such as, for instance, boats and mountains in which case the clitic can precede
the ECM subject (see Toebosch 2001:589 for further discussion). Such uses of the
feminine clitic are, however, rather infrequent. Nevertheless, they show that it is not
the lexical animacy of a pronoun which determines its ability to move over the ECM
subject but rather its referential animacy, i.e., the animacy feature of the referent
picked out by the pronoun.
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very similar facts in Bantu). The subject and the object of the ECM
construction cannot be distinguished from one another on morphological
grounds as both are marked with accusative case, which is visible on the
surface only for pronouns. Moreover, unlike matrix clauses in which the
verb separates the subject from the object, in embedded clauses, which
are verb final, they both precede the verb. This means that in ECM
constructions there are no morphosyntactic cues as to which argument is
the subject and which the object other than word order. Allowing the two
arguments to rearrange freely would result in many cases of ambiguity,
in particular in sentences where they are equal in animacy.
An analysis in terms of recoverability readily explains the contrast
between animate pronouns, which cannot precede the ECM subject, and
inanimate pronouns, which can precede the subject. In example (79)
above, for instance, the feminine pronoun ’r and the proper name Jan
are equally likely to perform the act of kissing. The reversability of the
relation expressed by the predicate results in a fixed word order. In
example (83), by contrast, the only available interpretation is one in which
Jan is the agent of the eating event and ’t refers to what is eaten.32
The availability of only one interpretation means that both possible word
orders are grammatical.
The present analysis argues that reversal of the ECM subject and
object is possible in those cases in which ambiguity is unlikely to occur.
Therefore, this analysis predicts that reversal is not necessarily excluded
for full NPs. This is indeed borne out when we consider verbs other than
the agentive ones discussed up to now. Compare the following two exam-
ples:
Dutch (Germanic)
(87) De
the
toeschouwers
spectators
hebben
have.pl
de
the
autocoureur
racecar.driver
het
the
ongeluk
accident
zien
see
overkomen.
happen.to
‘The spectators saw the accident happen to the racecar driver.’
(88) De
the
toeschouwers
spectators
hebben
have.pl
het
the
ongeluk
accident
de
the
autocoureur
racecar.driver
zien
see
overkomen.
happen.to
‘The spectators saw the accident happen to the racecar driver.’
32In a cartoonlike context, one could think of the situation in which ’t refers to a
monster which has eaten Jan.
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The embedded verb overkomen ‘happen to’ in these examples is a psych
verb which selects an inanimate subject and an animate object. Given
these selectional restrictions, no ambiguity of grammatical relations can
occur, and as expected both word orders are possible. Word order re-
strictions are found with psych verbs which select an animate object and
either an animate or an inanimate subject. In sentences with two ani-
mate arguments we again find the by now familiar restriction that the
first argument has to be interpreted as the subject:
Dutch (Germanic)
(89) De
the
journalist
journalist
zag
saw
het
the
fotomodel
model
de
the
fotograaf
photographer
bevallen.
please
‘The journalist saw that the photographer liked the model.’ not:
‘The journalist saw that the model liked the photographer.’
(90) De
the
journalist
journalist
zag
saw
de
the
fotograaf
photographer
het
the
fotomodel
model
bevallen.
please
‘The journalist saw that the model liked the photographer.’ not:
‘The journalist saw that the photographer liked the model.’
The contrasts between (87)-(88), on the one hand, and (89)-(90), on the
other, fit in nicely with an analysis in terms of recoverability.
The account sketched above can be straightforwardly implemented in
the bidirectional model introduced in section 3.3.1. This is illustrated in
Tableaux 3.8-3.10 in which two relevant constraints are shown. One is
Selection, which was introduced in section 3.2 and which is violated
by interpretations that go against the selectional restrictions of the verb.
The second constraint is CanonGF , an interpretation constraint on word
order, which can be seen as specific instance (subconstraint) of FaithInt:
(91) CanonGF : the subject precedes the object.
This constraint is violated by interpretations that go against the default
word order subject before object.33 The interaction of these constraints in
a bidirectional model results in the situation that both orders come out as
optimal when one of the arguments is an inanimate pronoun. Tableau 3.8
shows that both the order in which the object follows the ECM subject
and the one in which it precedes the subject make the intended interpre-
tation recoverable. With both output forms the reverse interpretation (ii)
violates the constraint Selection as it assigns the inanimate argument
33Choi (1996) uses CanonGF as a production constraint, which is violated by object-
before-subject ordering. As such, it can be seen as a specific version of the general
economy constraint on movement Stay.
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Prod: saw(Piet,eat.up(Jan,it)) Sel CanonGF
,  a. Piet heeft Jan ’t zien opeten
Piet has Jan it.ocl see eat.up
,  b. Piet heeft ’t Jan zien opeten
Piet has it.ocl Jan see eat.up
Inta: Candidate a Sel CanonGF
 (i) saw(Piet,eat.up(Jan,it))
(ii) saw(Piet,eat.up(it,Jan)) *! *
Intb: Candidate b Sel CanonGF
 (i) saw(Piet,eat.up(Jan,it)) *
(ii) saw(Piet,eat.up(it,Jan)) *!
Tableau 3.8: Evaluation of example (85)
the subject function, which goes against the selection restrictions of the
verb opeten ‘eat up’. Moreover, in case of candidate a the reverse inter-
pretation also violates the word order constraint as it assigns the second
argument the subject function. In case of candidate b this constraint is
violated by the intended interpretation (i), but because it is lower ranked
than Selection the intended interpretation still comes out as optimal.
Due to the fact that both candidates make the intended meaning recov-
erable, they are both considered bidirectionally optimal by the grammar,
and can both be used as forms for the intended meaning. Exactly the
same situation applies with experiencer object verbs when the arguments
are unequal in animacy, cf. Tableau 3.9.
SO order comes out as bidirectionally optimal with psych verbs when
both arguments are equal in animacy, cf. Tableau 3.10. Due to the equal
animacy of the two arguments, the constraint Selection does not favour
one interpretation over the other. As a result, the optimal status in the
interpretational component is determined by the word order constraint.
Given that this constraint favours the interpretation in which the first
argument is the subject, the intended meaning (i) become suboptimal
for candidate b. As a result, only candidate a makes the intended in-
terpretation recoverable and hence becomes bidirectionally optimal. The
model thus rightly predicts a freezing effect in case of equal animacy of
the arguments.
The tableaux have shown that the need to ensure recoverability of
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Prod: saw(John,happen.to(accident,driver)) Sel CanonGF
,  a. Jan heeft het ongeluk de coureur zien
overkomen
John has the accident the driver see
happen.to
,  b. Jan heeft de coureur het ongeluk zien
overkomen
John has the driver the accident see
happen.to
Inta: SO order Sel CanonGF
 (i) saw(John,happen.to(accident,driver))
(ii) saw(John,happen.to(driver,accident)) *! *
Intb: OS order Sel CanonGF
 (i) saw(John,happen.to(accident,driver)) *
(ii) saw(John,happen.to(driver,accident)) *!
Tableau 3.9: Evaluation of examples (87) and (88)
grammatical functions rightly predicts restrictions on word order in ECM
to occur. My analysis predicts that subject-object reversal should be pos-
sible when it does not result in ambiguity. But let us return to the initial
examples discussed above. We have seen above in example (77) that re-
versal is sometimes blocked with an agentive verb such as opeten ‘eat’.
A similar example is presented in (92) with the agentive verb opruimen
‘clean’:
Dutch (Germanic)
(92) #De
the
moeder
mother
heeft
has
de
the
rommel
mess
haar
her
zoon
son
zien
see
opruimen.
clean.up
‘The mother saw the mess clean up her son.’, *?‘The mother saw
her son clean up the mess.’
Even though the combination of arguments and the verb in this example
only allows for one interpretation in which haar zoon ‘her son’ is the agent
and de rommel ‘the mess’ the patient, the reversal of object and subject
results in a very marked sentence. This is unexpected under my recov-
erability analysis which would predict object reversal in this situation to
result in a well-formed sentence. There is independent evidence, however,
which shows that subject-object reversal of two full NPs is generally bad
with agentive verbs.
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Prod: saw(manager,please(model,photographer)) Sel CanonGF
,  a. De manager heeft het model de fotograaf
zien bevallen
the manager has the model the photogra-
pher see please
 b. De manager heeft de fotograaf het model
zien bevallen
the manager has the photographer the
model see please
Inta: SO order Sel CanonGF
 (i) saw(manager,please(model,photographer))
(ii) saw(manager,please(photographer,model)) *!
Intb: OS order Sel CanonGF
(i) saw(manager,please(model,photographer)) *!
 (ii) saw(manager,please(photographer,model))
Tableau 3.10: Evaluation of example (89)
Verb type S<O O<S
agentive 6.9 1.4
causative 6.3 3.1
unaccusative 6.0 4.8
Table 3.2: Mean ratings of subject-initial and object-initial embedded
clauses in Dutch (1=very difficult to comprehend, 7=very easy to com-
prehend; Lamers 2001:154)
Independent of clause type, subject-object reversal with agentive tran-
sitive verbs results in very marked, close to ungrammatical, configurations
(see Broekhuis 1992, 2003 for discussion). Lamers (2001) performed an
off-line rating study in which subjects had to rate embedded transitive
sentences in Dutch with and without reversal for ease of understand-
ing on a seven-point scale. Lamers included three types of verbs in her
study: agentive verbs, causative psych verbs (e.g., deprimeren ‘depress’),
and unaccusative psych verbs (e.g., bevallen ‘please’). All test sentences
contained an animate subject and an inanimate object. Table 3.2 pro-
vides the results of her rating study. They show that in general subject-
before-object order is better to comprehend than object-before-subject
structures, the former order being the easiest to understand with agen-
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tive verbs. Object-before-subject order, by contrast, is most difficult to
understand with agentive verbs and much easier with psych verbs. The
latter order is the easiest to understand for unaccusative psych verbs in
comparison to the other two types. From these results we can conclude
that agentive verbs show a general dispreference for object-before-subject
order. The strong preference of these verbs to occur in a subject-initial
sentence overrules the possibility of forming an object-initial construc-
tion even when there is no ambiguity. Moreover, it indicates that the
constraint CanonGF is sensitive to verb class. This can be modeled in
the present account by having it reranked in the interpretational com-
ponent with respect to Selection in the context of agentive verbs. As
a result, pragmatically strange interpretations, as observed in (77) and
(92), will become optimal for these verbs. Note that this is similar to
the ONI restriction discussed in the previous section. Here, we also find
that application of this constraint can result in pragmatically strange
interpretations, cf. example (66).
It should, however, be noted that the restriction on subject-object re-
versal with agentive verbs only holds for sentences with two full NPs. In
case one or both of the arguments are pronouns such reversal is possible.
This was already illustrated above with example (83) and can be shown
with the following example which is a counterpart of (92) in which the
inanimate direct object is replaced by the inanimate pronoun het :
Dutch (Germanic)
(93) De
the
moeder
mother
heeft
has
het
it
haar
her
zoon
son
zien
see
opruimen.
clean.up
‘The mother saw her son clean it up.’
Together with (83) above, this example shows that pronouns behave dif-
ferently from full NPs with respect to the possibility to precede the ECM
subject. This is in line with a general difference between full NPs and
pronouns. In contrast to full NPs, pronouns are preferred early in the
surface linear order. This can be nicely illustrated with scrambling facts
in Dutch. (Definite) full NPs can occur either to the right of a sentential
adverb, i.e., in the unscrambled position, or to the left of such an adverb,
i.e., the scrambled position:
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Dutch (Germanic)
(94) a. Hij
he
moest
had.to
eerst
first
zijn
his
vader
father
bellen.
call
b. Hij
he
moest
had.to
zijn
his
vader
father
eerst
first
bellen.
call
‘He first had to call his father.’
This example shows that scrambling is optional with definite full NPs (see
de Hoop 2003 for discussion). Pronouns, on the other hand, scramble al-
most obligatorily, and can only stay in the unscrambled position when
they receive contrastive stress (but see Bouma and de Hoop 2006). This
is illustrated in (95):
Dutch (Germanic)
(95) a. Hij
he
moest
had.to
eerst
first
*’m/*hem/HEM
him.ocl/him/him
bellen.
call
b. Hij
he
moest
had.to
’m/hem/HEM
him.ocl/him/him
eerst
first
bellen.
call.’
‘He first had to call him.’
Given this difference in scrambling behaviour between pronouns and full
NPs, the fact that only pronouns can precede ECM subjects is not un-
expected. It should be noted that, in contrast to the scrambling data,
pronouns do not obligatorily move across the subject in ECM construc-
tions, cf. (84)-(86).
The above discussion has shown that the animacy-related restrictions
on word order in Dutch ECM constructions can be straightforwardly an-
alyzed as a mechanism to ensure recoverability of grammatical roles. As
such, it fits in with the other mechanisms discussed throughout this chap-
ter.
3.5 Recoverability vs. Prominence
In section 3.2, I have shown how in Malayalam case marking can be
used on inanimate objects to avoid potential ambiguity.34 This analysis,
however, does not carry over to animate objects which are case marked
independently of ambiguity:
34This section is partially based on joint work with Yukiko Morimoto (Morimoto and
de Swart 2006).
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Malayalam (Dravidian; Asher and Kumari 1997:203)
(96) Avan
he
kuúúiy-e
child-acc
aúiccu.
beat.pst
He beat the child.
(97) Avan
he
oru
a
paSuvin-e
cow-acc
vaññi.
buy.pst
‘He bought a cow.’
Whereas one can claim for (96) that use of accusative case is due to a
potential ambiguity, this is highly unlikely for (97) in which a reverse
interpretation is (virtually) impossible. It should be noted, however, that
due to the fact that Malayalam is a verb-final language, there may be a
temporal ambiguity with respect to which of the two preverbal NPs is
the subject and which one the object. Accusative case helps to overcome
this temporal ambiguity.
A similar situation is found in Hindi, which has a differential ob-
ject marking system, but case marks human objects obligatorily, as (98)
shows:
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Mohanan 1990:103)
(98) ilaa-ne
Ila-erg
bacce-*(ko)
child-obj
uthayaa
lift.pf
‘Ila lifted the/a child.’
The obligatory use of case marking irrespective of potential ambiguity
does not fit in with the bidirectional model defended throughout this
chapter. This becomes even more apparent when one considers languages
with differential object marking in which the occurrence of overt case
is determined by features other than animacy. As discussed in chapter
1, in Turkish the occurrence of overt case marking correlates with the
specificity of the object: only specific objects are marked with accusative
case. Unlike animacy, specificity cannot be related to recoverability, as
it does not provide information about an argument’s role in the event
described by the predicate (see 4.4 for further discussion). Instead, the
obligatory marking of specific and animate direct objects is independently
required by the grammar of these languages. In particular, it follows
from a constraint which requires the marking of prominent objects, i.e.,
animate, definite, specific ones (cf. Aissen 2003).
By incorporating this constraint into my bidirectional model, I can
explain the obligatory use of case on animates irrespective of ambigu-
ity, as in example (97) above. In Tableau 3.11 the production con-
straint Anim→Acc requires accusative marking of animate objects. It
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Prod: buy(he,cow) Anim→Acc Econ Faith Bias
a. he.nom cow buy *!
,  b. he.nom cow.acc buy *
Inta: he.nom cow buy Anim→Acc Econ Faith Bias
 (i) buy(he,cow)
(ii) buy(cow,him) *!
Intb: he.nom cow.acc buy Anim→Acc Econ Faith Bias
 (i) buy(he,cow)
(ii) buy(cow,him) *! *
Tableau 3.11: Evaluation of example (97)
shows that candidate b, even though it violates Economy, is optimal
from the production perspective because candidate a violates the higher-
ranked Anim→Acc. Intb shows that it also makes the intended meaning
(i) uniquely recoverable, which violates none of the interpretation con-
straints, whereas the reverse interpretation (ii) violates both FaithInt
by assigning the accusative-marked NP the function of subject, and Bias
by assigning the argument lower in animacy the subject function. More-
over, it could be said to violate the constraint Selection, which is not
shown in the tableau due to reasons of space, as it is unlikely that a cow
functions as a proper buyer. Because candidate b is optimal from the pro-
duction perspective and makes the intended interpretation recoverable, it
comes out as bidirectionally optimal. The importance of Anim→Acc in
this analysis can be seen from the fact that candidate a, even though it
makes the intended meaning recoverable, is not bidirectionally optimal,
due to a violation of this constraint, which makes it suboptimal from the
production perspective.
Tableau 3.11 shows how the requirement to mark prominent objects
can be integrated in the bidirectional model based on recoverability. In
the next chapter, I provide a further discussion of prominence-based
marking of arguments. Now, I want to show how a strategy of marking
all and only prominent objects can develop out of a strategy of recov-
erability. I illustrate this with the historical development of differential
object marking in Spanish.
The use of the preposition a to mark some, but not other, objects is a
widely discussed feature of Spanish, and is sometimes also referred to as
the prepositional or personal accusative (cf. Torrego 1999; Leonetti 2004;
and the papers in Pensado 1995 for an overview). The use of a depends
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on the animacy and definiteness/specificity of the object. It is obligatory
with personal pronouns and proper names. With other noun phrases its
occurrence is restricted to animates:35
Spanish (Romance; Bleam 2005:3-4)
(99) Mari
Mari
vio´
saw
a
a
la
the
mujer.
woman
‘Mari saw the woman.’
(100) Mari
Mari
vio´
saw
al
a.the
gato.
cat
‘Mari saw the cat.’
(101) Mari
Mari
vio´
saw
(*a)
a
la
the
mesa.
table
‘Mari saw the table.’
The human and animate direct objects in (99) and (100) are marked with
the prepositional object marker. This in contrast to the inanimate direct
object in (101), for which this marker is prohibited. But also in the class
of animate direct objects some objects can occur without it, as shown by
(102):
Spanish (Romance; Bleam 2005 :5)
(102) Mari
Mari
vio´
saw
(a)
a
una
a
mujer.
woman
‘Mari saw a woman.’
The presence or absence of the object marker with an indefinite animate
direct object depends on the specificity of the object. Only in case of a
specific object a is used (see section 4.4 for further discussion).
From the above examples it would seem that the distribution of the
object marker is regular and clearly defined, i.e., only objects that are
both animate and specific are marked with a. This regular behaviour
fits in with the prominence strategy introduced above (see Aissen 2003
for such an analysis). However, DOM in Spanish also exhibits a certain
amount of variation. For instance, inanimate objects can be marked with
a under certain circumstances (cf. Company 2002; Garc´ıa Garc´ıa 2007),
in particular when there is potential ambiguity. This is supported by the
35Spanish differs in this respect from other Romance languages with differential
object marking, such as Sardinian and Neapolitan, which restrict a-marking mainly
to human, i.e., personal, objects (cf. Jones 1993, 1995; Fiorentino 2003; Mensching
2005). Note that also in Spanish there may exist dialectal variation with respect to
the distribution of a.
130 Chapter 3. Recovering Grammatical Roles
reference grammar of Spanish compiled by the Real Academia (1973),
which states that “inanimate nouns can sometimes carry the preposition
a, whenever ambiguity with the subject of the sentence could possibly
arise” (translation from de Jong 1996:73). Such a use of a is illustrated
in (103):
Spanish (Romance; de Jong 1996:70)
(103) El
the
entusiasmo
enthusiasm
vence
conquers
(a)
(a)
la
the
difficultad.
difficulty
‘Enthusiasm conquers difficulties.’
Given the existence of OVS (topicalization) structures, the above exam-
ple is potentially ambiguous. The use of the object marker eliminates
any such ambiguity. Thus, the distribution of a in modern Spanish is
partially conditioned by recoverability (see also Torrego 1999:1748, for
discussion). Further evidence for this claim comes from the observation
that its use is suspended in ditransitive constructions, where the indirect
object is also marked with a (Company 2003):
Spanish (Romance; Company 2003:234)
(104) El
the
maestro
teacher
presento´
introduced
su
his
mujer
wife
a
to
sus
his
alumnos.
pupils
‘The teacher introduced his wife to his pupils.’
In a regular transitive sentence the object su mujer ‘his wife’ would be
obligatorily marked with a, cf. (99) above. In a ditransitive sentence this
use would result in ambiguity between the direct and the indirect ob-
ject, as both are preceded by a. By omitting the marker on the direct
object this ambiguity is resolved. In fact, this strategy is frequently at-
tested in ditransitive constructions cross-linguistically (see Kittila¨ 2006
and Malchukov 2007 for various examples).
The above discussion has established that both prominence-based
marking and recoverability play a role in differential object marking in
modern Spanish. I will now argue that the historical development of dif-
ferential object marking in Spanish shows the recoverability strategy to
be prior to the prominence-based one.
A is historically related to the Latin preposition ad and made its way
into Spanish as an object marker through the pronominal system (cf.
Mu¨ller 1971; Garc´ıa and Van Putte 1987; Pensado 1995). Mu¨ller (1971)
argues that the old dative tonic pronouns occurred with this prepositional
marker from very early on (already in the 8th century) and at some point
replaced the original accusative forms me, te, and se. This replacement
explains the fact that the prepositional accusative is obligatory with (tonic
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forms of) object pronouns in Spanish. Moreover, it caused the preposition
to become associated with the domain of object marking and opened
the possibility to extend its use throughout this domain. The next step
involves the marking of proper nouns.
As shown in the previous chapter, in Classical Latin grammatical func-
tions were indicated by case marking. Subjects were generally marked
with nominative case and objects with accusative:
Latin
(105) Paulu-s
Paul-nom
vide-t
see-3sg
Petru-m.
Peter-acc
‘Paul sees Peter.’
In the above example it is Paul who does the seeing and Peter who is seen.
Given this case-marking pattern no other interpretation of the sentence is
possible. However, at some point in time in the development from Latin
to Romance, the case marking on noun phrases was lost in the daughter
languages (see Bossong 2003; Kulikov 2006 for discussion). Furthermore,
according to De Dardel (1994), word order in Proto-Romance was pre-
dominantly, but not exclusively, VSO. As a result a sentence like (106)
was truly ambiguous with respect to grammatical function assignment
(cf. De Dardel 1994; de Jong 1996).
Vulgar Latin (Indo-European; de Jong 1996:77)
(106) Videt
sees
Paulu
Paul
Petru.
Peter
‘Paul sees Peter.’ or ‘Peter sees Paul.’
However, as De Dardel (1994) notes, only for proper nouns did such ambi-
guity exist; other nouns were preceded by articles and other determiners
still showing a nominative-accusative contrast, cf. ille ‘the.nom’ vs. illu
‘the.acc’ (see also Mu¨ller 1971). This is demonstrated in (107):
Vulgar Latin (Indo-European; de Jong 1996:77)
(107) Videt
sees
Paulu
Paul
illu
the.acc
libru.
book
‘Paul sees the book.’
In contrast to example (106) with proper names, this example with an
object containing a determiner is unambiguous. This means that only
with proper names an additional device was needed to guide the interpre-
tation of a sentence into one direction or the other. In order to achieve
this, the marking domain of a was extended from personal pronouns to
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proper nouns. This extension is a natural one as “after personal pro-
nouns, proper names are the clearest indicators of person-ness” (Garc´ıa
and Van Putte 1987:375). This means that after its introduction in the
object domain a first acquired a function of recoverability.36
The marker a started to spread to common nouns as soon as the
morphological distinction within the determiner system disappeared and
hence took over the distinguishing function previously fulfilled by the
determiners. De Dardel (1994) states that at this point, the system
in which the prepositional marking was regulated along the distinction
proper noun-common noun was restructured into a system which marked
objects based on the distinction animate-inanimate. From this moment
onwards, the marker spread through the object system. It seems that
in this period a reinterpretation of a took place from a disambiguation
mechanism to an animacy (humanness) marker which resulted from the
high frequency of marked objects referring to humans, i.e., pronouns,
proper names. Together with the fact that human objects are more of-
ten in need of disambiguation in comparison to inanimates, the marker a
became more and more associated with human direct objects. From here
the marker could also extend to other objects. In the words of Garc´ıa
and Van Putte (1987:375): “the model that more and more could and did
inspire recourse to a was other a-introduced Accusative objects.” From
a distinguishability marker the preposition became grammaticalized as
a marker of animate direct objects. Moreover, the marker not only ex-
tended along the animacy dimension to include humans and animates,
but also along the definiteness dimension. For instance, as Garc´ıa and
Van Putte (1987) show, the marking of definites increased from 46% in
the 13th-century poem el Cantar de Mio Cid to 73% in the 17th-century
novel Quijote. For indefinites they observed a shift from 22% (Cid) to
38% (Quijote).
There exist several text studies like the one from Garc´ıa and Van Putte
(1987) which support a gradual extension of object marking as outlined
above. Such quantitative data, however, should be taken with caution,
as different authors examine different features in different texts and the
overall numbers are often very low. Table 3.3, from a corpus study by
Company (2002), gives an overview of the general trends in the spread of a
along the animacy dimension in the history of the Spanish language. This
table shows that pronouns and proper nouns were marked (close to) 100%
36A similar process has been reported for Khamti, a Tai language spoken in Myanmar
(formerly Burma). When this language changed its word order from SVO to SOV
(probably due to language contact), its definite marking particles were reanalyzed as
object markers (cf. Sinnema¨ki 2006). By moving the verb to the end of the sentence,
it lost its disambiguation function which subsequently was taken over by the particles.
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XIII XIV XV XVI XX
Pronouns 100% 100% 99% 99% 100%
Proper nouns 99% 99% 96% 88% 100%
Humans 42% 35% 35% 50% 57%
Animates 3% 3% 6% 7% —
Inanimates 1% 0% 3% 8% 17%
Table 3.3: The historical development of ‘a’-marking on direct objects in
Spanish (Company 2002:207)
of the time already in the earliest written data. Human nouns started at
a more modest rate, but they clearly show increase in marking, as do the
inanimates, though at a later stage. Unfortunately, comprehensive data
for animate NPs are missing from this source. The observation that DOM
spreads through the language starting with objects high in prominence
and extending to lower-prominent ones has been confirmed by several
historical studies both on Romance and languages from other families
(see Aissen 2003 for references). Moreover, it is quite common that the
marker of indirect objects is extended to cover animate direct objects as
well. This may be attributed to the fact that indirect objects are typically
animate (see also section 3.1 above). The use of the indirect object marker
on animate direct objects can be interpreted as an analogical extension
into this domain, which at the same time serves a distinguishing function.
The above discussion shows that there is some evidence for the claim
that the prominence-based strategy developed from the recoverability
strategy in the history of Spanish. Although further historical research
is needed, I believe that the proposed historical connection is a promis-
ing one. Further evidence for such a general historical connection comes
from the languages with direction marking discussed in 3.3. As was stated
there, direction marking seems always to originate in sentences with two
third person arguments which are, as demonstrated throughout this chap-
ter, most in need of disambiguation, and only later extends to sentences
with first and second persons.37
37In a similar vein, Stiebels (2006:550) discusses the use of agent focus in Mayan
languages as a disambiguation mechanism and she hypothesizes that it became gram-
maticalized, leading to an extension of agent focus to contexts in which it was not
needed.
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3.6 Conclusions
I have shown that the need to ensure the recoverability of grammati-
cal roles is a strong factor in grammar. Recoverability closely interacts
with animacy, as the latter provides important information about the
grammatical role of an argument. Hence, when the two arguments of a
transitive construction are equal in animacy, ambiguity may arise. This
holds in particular for languages without morphosyntactic mechanisms
to determine the grammatical function of an argument. Where some
languages leave it to the hearer to resolve such ambiguities by means of
contextual information, others develop mechanisms to eliminate them.
The force to keep the grammatical function of arguments recoverable
can be naturally modelled in a bidirectional grammar which takes into
account both the speaker’s and hearer’s perspective. I have proposed
a model in which a speaker will only use a certain form if it makes the
intended meaning uniquely recoverable. In this model, recoverability falls
out from the way the grammar is organized and does not have to be
stipulated as a separate constraint.
I have identified a number of recoverability mechanisms, which re-
ceive a straightforward analysis in the proposed model. Differential ob-
ject marking is one of them. It is a particularly economical mechanism,
as it restricts case marking to those situations in which recoverability
would otherwise not be guaranteed. Other mechanisms are the one nomi-
nal interpretation constraint found in head-marking languages, which re-
quires single full NPs to be interpreted as the direct object, and word
order restrictions on exceptional case marking constructions found in
Dutch. These phenomena also showed that strict application of mech-
anisms which ensure recoverability can sometimes result in pragmatically
strange interpretations.
Though a strong factor, I also showed that recoverability cannot ac-
count for all the morphosyntactic marking which depends on the animacy
of an argument. In particular, the obligatory case marking of animate
objects in the absence of ambiguity attested in differential object marking
languages is left unexplained, even though there is evidence which shows
that this marking has historically developed from recoverability. In the
next chapter I will provide a discussion of this kind of prominence-based
marking.
Chapter 4
The Prominence Factor
The prominence of an argument can have a significant effect on its mor-
phosyntactic realization. Prominence itself is determined by a range of
different factors. I argue that an argument can be prominent due to its
inherent properties or because of its status in the discourse. Animacy is
an inherent property of noun phrases, whereas definiteness/specificity is
a function of their status in the discourse. While prominence categories
are often conceptualized in terms of prominence hierarchies, I show that
they cannot be properly grounded in independently motivated theoreti-
cal constructs or as general cognitive patterns. Therefore, they cannot be
considered universal primitives. I will show how some apparent promi-
nence effects can in fact be reduced to general grammatical principles.
Moreover, I argue that prominence can be the cause but also the effect
of morphosyntactic phenomena such as case marking. This will be illus-
trated with the difference between the prominence features animacy and
definiteness/specificity. In the case of differential object marking, I show
that animacy clearly can be the cause of overt case marking, whereas a
definite or specific reading is often the effect of it. My claim is that in dif-
ferential object marking animacy as an inherent property of noun phrases
takes priority over a contextual property like definiteness/specificity.
4.1 Introduction
Apart from the need to ensure recoverability of grammatical functions,
I have shown in the previous chapter that differential case marking can
also be influenced by the prominence of an argument. Moreover, it was
shown that within a single language the occurrence of overt case mark-
ing can be determined by both factors. Animacy was singled out as a
category related to both recoverability-based and prominence-based case
marking. In this chapter, I further investigate the influence of prominence
of arguments on their morphosyntactic realization. I will show that apart
from animacy many other features can determine the prominence status
of an argument. Among them we can identify semantic features such as
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definiteness, specificity, and person, but also lexical features such as NP
type. Furthermore, I will show that prominence does not only affect case
marking, but can also influence word order and voice alternations. In
the second part of this chapter, I conduct two case studies on the (ap-
parent) influence of prominence on morphosyntactic alternations. They
provide us with two conditions which have to be met before prominence
can be entertained as an explanation for a given phenomenon. First,
it has to be assured that the prominence effects under discussion are
real and not mere surface phenomena. That is, they should not be re-
ducible to independently motivated principles of grammar. Second, the
direction of causation between prominence and the phenomenon under
discussion should be established. That is, in order to label something as
a prominence-based phenomenon it should be the case that prominence
features influence the occurrence of the phenomenon and not vice versa.
The chapter is organized in the following way: in the next section I
provide an overview of the features which contribute to the prominence of
an argument and in what ways prominence can affect the morphosyntac-
tic realization of an argument. The second part of the section is devoted
to the representation of prominence features in terms of hierarchies and
the primitive status of such hierarchies. I will show that they cannot be
straightforwardly reduced to independently motivated theoretical con-
structs such as constituent hierarchies. Moreover, I will show that it is
problematic to treat them as general universal patterns. As a result, I
conclude that they cannot be considered universal primitives. Section 4.3
illustrates that even though prominence may seem to play a role on the
surface, it may not be responsible for a given phenomenon. This is demon-
strated with the obligatory voice alternations attested in Coast Salish lan-
guages which on the surface seem to be determined by the person features
of arguments. That is, certain person combinations cannot be expressed
by means of an active construction and have to be rendered as a passive.
Under closer scrutiny these obligatory alternations nevertheless can be
shown to fall out from general formal requirements which are needed in-
dependently in the grammar of these languages. More specifically, I argue
that these voice alternations should be analyzed as a cross modular con-
straint conflict. In section 4.4 I investigate how the prominence features
animacy and definiteness/specificity influence the occurrence of overt ob-
ject marking. I will argue that, although they may seem to do so in a
similar way at first sight, they are in fact radically different. Whereas ani-
macy cannot be influenced by overt case-marking, definiteness/specificity
can. Animacy itself can influence overt case-marking, while this is not
always true for definiteness/specificity. Hence, the same phenomenon
(namely, overt case-marking) can be caused by one prominence feature
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(animacy), while it influences another (definiteness/specificity). I will
show that animacy takes priority over definiteness/specificity in the do-
main of differential object marking. This will be argued to be an instan-
tiation of a general principle that lexically inherent features take priority
over contextually derived features.
4.2 Prominence Categories
Prominence is probably best known from the functional-typological liter-
ature on voice alternations (see, e.g., Givo´n 1994a for an overview). An
active/passive alternation, for instance, is often characterized in terms of
a demotion in prominence of the agent argument. In passive construc-
tions, the patient argument is high in prominence, whereas the agent
argument is low in prominence. Similar observations can be made for
other voice constructions. Legendre et al. (1993) exploit these promi-
nence distinctions to arrive at a formal typology of case and grammatical
voice systems. Their account is couched in the framework of Optimality
Theory, and in fact is the first study in OT syntax. Their aim is to regu-
late the mapping from a semantic input to a syntactic output by means
of violable constraints. The exact nature of the constraints proposed is
not important for the present study, and will therefore not be discussed.
What is of importance is which input is argued to correspond to what
output. The correspondences put forward by Legendre et al. (1993) are
given in (1).
(1) input output
A/P intransitive
AP transitive
aP passive
Ap antipassive
In the left column the input is indicated by means of the symbols A for
agent and P for patient. The different sizes of the symbols reflect “an ab-
stract ‘prominence’ level” (Legendre et al. 1993:2) using {a,p} to denote
low-prominent agents and patients, respectively, and {A,P} to denote
high-prominent ones. As such, their account is limited to sentences con-
taining an agent and a patient. When we consider intransitive sentences,
we see that they are the output corresponding to an input containing ei-
ther a high-prominent agent A or a high-prominent patient P. This means
that a semantically intransitive input corresponds to a formally intransi-
tive construction. Moving on to inputs containing two arguments, that
is, semantically transitive inputs, we find that they can be realized for-
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mally in a number of different ways, depending on the prominence of the
arguments involved. In case both are high-prominent the input is realized
as a simple transitive construction. That is, we find a nom-acc or erg-
abs case frame. A change in prominence of one of them leads to a voice
alternation resulting in a formally detransitivized passive construction in
the case of a low-prominent agent, and a formally detransitivized antipas-
sive construction in the case of a low-prominent patient. Thus, in this
approach a semantically transitive input can result either in a formally
transitive or a formally intransitive construction.
The account by Legendre et al. (1993) provides us with an initial
formalization of the relation between the prominence of arguments and
their encoding, but leaves open certain questions. Two of them will be
presented here, but see de Hoop (1999) and Sells (2001) for further dis-
cussion. The first concerns the definition of the notion of prominence.
Legendre et al. (1993) speak of an “abstract ‘prominence’ level”, which
seems to be equated with discourse prominence. Indeed, prominence is
a widely used albeit vague notion and in some way similar to that of
topicality. Prominence is concerned with the centrality of an entity in
the discourse or with the readiness with which an entity presents itself to
the speaker as a topic of conversation. I will use prominence here as an
umbrella term for properties of arguments, such as animacy, definiteness,
and person, which can have an effect on their encoding such that they
stand out morphosyntactically, e.g., because they are realized as subjects
or appear with overt case marking. In this section I want to identify
some of the features which contribute to the prominence of arguments
cross-linguistically.
The second question concerns the output and its relation to the in-
put. Prominence distinctions are not only reflected by means of voice
alternations, but can also surface in a variety of other morphosyntactic
phenomena such as case marking and word order. Furthermore, lan-
guages may differ in the morphosyntactic means they have available to
overtly show prominence differences of the input in the output. Let me
continue with a discussion of this second problem. In chapter 2 I have
shown how languages can differ in the semantic domain they associate
with their transitive construction, i.e., the nom-acc or erg-abs case
frame. Following Drossard (1991) languages can be ordered on a scale of
fundamental transitivity, with those languages extending their transitive
construction to a wide semantic domain ranking high (see section 2.4.4).
In this way, English can be classified as being higher in fundamental tran-
sitivity than German, which in turn scores higher than Russian. Relating
this distinction between languages to the framework of Legendre et al.,
we may find cases in which distinctions in input prominence are conflated
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in the output, as more than one distinct input configuration is mapped to
the same output. Let me illustrate this with two examples from English
(see also de Hoop 1999):
(2) Robert is hitting John.
(3) Robert is drinking wine.
The examples in (2) and (3) both represent transitive constructions in
English. Nevertheless, they correspond to different inputs in terms of
prominence of the arguments involved. In (2) we are dealing with a
prominent agent A and a prominent patient P, giving the input [AP]. Ex-
ample (3), on the other hand, seems to correspond to an input [Ap] with
a high-prominent agent and a low-prominent patient. This difference in
prominence can be related to a difference in specificity or countability be-
tween the two nouns. In other words, in English both the input [AP] and
the input [Ap] can be mapped onto the same output, i.e., a transitive con-
struction. Now consider the following examples from West-Greenlandic:
West-Greenlandic (Inuit; Van Geenhoven 1998a:232)
(4) Nuka-p
N.-erg
iipili
apple.abs
neri-v-a-a.
eat-ind-3sg-3sg
‘Nuka ate the/a particular apple.’
(5) Nuka
N.abs
iipili-mik
apple-instr
neri-v-u-q.
eat-ind-intr-3sg
‘Nuka ate an apple.’
The two examples in (4) and (5) can again be argued to correspond to
two different input configurations, where (4) is the realization of an input
[AP] and (5) of an input [Ap]. This time however the different inputs cor-
respond to distinct output forms. The input [AP] is realized as a regular
transitive erg-abs construction (4), whereas the input [Ap] is realized
as an antipassive construction (5). In the latter construction the sub-
ject shows up with absolutive case, the verb stops agreeing with the pa-
tient argument in contrast to the transitive construction, and the patient
is formally demoted from absolutive to instrumental case. In this way
West-Greenlandic is a perfect illustration of the input-output relations
defended by Legendre et al. (1993). Nevertheless, also in this language
we can find examples which complicate matters. Take the example in (6)
(familiar from chapter 2):
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West-Greenlandic (Inuit; Van Geenhoven 1998a:232)
(6) Nuka
N.abs
iipili-tur-p-u-q.
apple-eat-ind-intr-3sg
’Nuka ate an apple/apples.’
Here we find another construction which can be said to correspond to
the input configuration [Ap] (see section 2.1.3 and Van Geenhoven 1998b
for discussion of the meaning of either construction; see also Fortescue
1984; Bittner 1988). This time the input is however not realized as an
antipassive construction but as a noun-incorporation construction. The
object is not expressed as an independent noun phrase but rather as a
part of the predicate. The existence of both the antipassive and the noun-
incorporation construction in West-Greenlandic as the realization of an
[Ap] input presents a problem to the approach of Legendre et al. (1993),
which advocates a one-to-one correspondence between input and output.
In sum, the English and West-Greenlandic data show a reduction in the
mapping from meaning to form in two directions. This is illustrated in
(7):
(7)
Legendre et al. (1993) English West-Greenlandic
one-to-one many-to-one one-to-many
inputx → outputa inputx outputa
> outputa inputx <
inputy → outputb inputy outputb
Whereas in the system developed by Legendre et al. (1993) the mapping
from meaning to form is treated as one-to-one, English shows how dif-
ferent inputs can be realized by the same output, and Inuit shows how
one and the same input can be realized by different output forms. These
deviations from the one-to-one relationship between meaning and form
cannot be accounted for in the present model. In order to account for the
existence of one-to-many mappings between meaning and form, the level
of the input should be enriched with features which differentiate between
the two output forms. Subsequently, the constraints which regulate the
mapping from meaning to form have to be adjusted in such a way that
they make reference to these features.
The observation that in West-Greenlandic not all verbs can participate
in the noun-incorporation construction (cf. the different verbal stems in
the examples above; see Sadock 1980; Van Geenhoven 1998a; see Mithun
1984:859-863 for a more general discussion) indicates that apart from
prominence features of arguments also verbal features have to be taken
into account. The nature of the input is discussed further below. The ex-
istence of many-to-one mappings requires that constraints regulating the
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input-output mapping are made sensitive to the morphosyntactic makeup
of a given language. The fact that English lacks antipassive and noun in-
corporation and therefore cannot faithfully map an input [Ap] to such
constructions should be taken into account (cf. Sells 2001:357). Subse-
quently this may also require modifications of the features in the input.
It should be noted that in English not all three distinctions in input
prominence distinguished by Legendre et al. (1993) are neutralized to
one single output expression, i.e., not every input is realized as the same
transitive construction. For instance, an input [aP] can perfectly well be
realized both as a transitive construction and as a passive one (cf. de Hoop
1999). Therefore, English cannot simply be characterized as a language
with only many-to-one mappings, it also shows one-to-many mappings.
The fact that there exist patterns in languages in which different in-
puts are mapped to the same output and in which the same input is
mapped to different outputs raises the question of typological variation
in this input-output mapping. A consistent one-to-one mapping language
would use a different (voice) construction for each input: an active tran-
sitive construction for [AP], a passive construction for [aP], and an an-
tipassive construction for [Ap]. West-Greenlandic seems to be of this
type. Legendre et al. (1993) provide examples of other languages which
belong to this type, as well as of languages conflating two inputs be-
cause of the lack of either an antipassive or passive construction. A
language which would express all three different inputs by means of the
same voice construction would exemplify extreme neutralization of the
input-output mapping. Sells (2001) provides Sinhala as an example and
furthermore mentions that the same holds for many Australian languages
and polysynthetic languages. Languages lacking voice morphology must
express prominence distinctions by other means, such as word order and
case marking (Sells 2001:388, fn1). This brings us to the general obser-
vation that voice oppositions are not the only means languages have to
express prominence distinctions. Indeed, as Sells points out, word order,
case marking, and agreement are often influenced by the prominence of
arguments as well, cf. also the previous chapter. The fact that prominence
distinctions in the input not only influence voice oppositions but other
morphosyntactic phenomena as well falls outside the scope of Legendre
et al.’s model.
Let me now turn to the first question posed above concerning the no-
tion of prominence. Legendre et al. (1993) are not very explicit about
this notion. It seems equated with discourse prominence, which in itself
is a rather vague notion as well. Givo´n (1994a) provides a discussion of
how the discourse prominence of an argument can be assessed in terms
of scalar topicality. The latter is determined by the referential distance
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of an argument, i.e., how far back in previous discourse is the last men-
tion of the referent, and its topic persistence, i.e., how many times the
referent is mentioned in the following discourse. Mithun (1984) shows
that, apart from the voice alternations, noun incorporation also repre-
sents a device which can be used to background arguments, that is, to
make them less prominent in the discourse. Above we have already seen
how West-Greenlandic makes use of this construction in order to express
an input with a low-prominent patient. Although noun incorporation in
this language is not necessarily related to backgrounding, incorporated
objects clearly have a different semantic profile from non-incorporated
ones. Whereas the latter can be shown to be specific, the former can be
shown to have non-specific referents (cf. Van Geenhoven 1998b). In other
words, in this language low-prominence of an object can be equated with
non-specificity or, in more general terms, specificity is a feature which
contributes to the prominence of an argument.
Specificity has been shown to play a role in several morphosyntactic
phenomena. One such phenomenon is the use of object case marking in
Turkish, as was demonstrated in chapter 1. Compare again the following
two examples:
Turkish (Turkic; Kornfilt 2003:127)
(8) Ahmet
Ahmet
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
pasta-yıye-di.
cake-acc eat-pst
‘Yesterday evening, Ahmet ate the cake.’
(9) Ahmet
Ahmet
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
pasta
cake
ye-di.
eat-pst
‘Yesterday evening, Ahmet ate cake.’
The object pasta ‘cake’ occurs with the accusative case marker in example
(8) and without it in (9). Apart from showing a difference in form the
two examples also show a difference in meaning. The case-marked object
receives a specific interpretation whereas the one without case has to be
interpreted as non-specific. As such, they mirror the noun-incorporation
examples from Inuit.
Specificity can be shown to influence the ordering of arguments. Con-
sider the following scrambling examples from Dutch:
Dutch (Germanic; de Hoop and Kra¨mer 2006)
(10) Je
you
mag
may
twee
two
keer
times
een
a
potje
pot
omdraaien.
around.turn
‘You may turn a pot twice.’
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(11) Je
you
mag
may
een
a
potje
pot
twee
two
keer
times
omdraaien.
around.turn
‘You may turn a pot twice.’
Like the use of case marking in Turkish, the positioning of the direct
object before or after an adverb in Dutch results in a difference in inter-
pretation. In the unscrambled order in (10), the direct object een potje ‘a
pot’ receives a non-referential or non-specific reading. In the scrambled
order in (11), by contrast, it gets interpreted as referential or specific.
These case marking and word order facts tell us two things about
the relation between the prominence of arguments and surface output
forms. On the one hand, they make clear that apart from voice opposi-
tions prominence distinctions can also surface as case marking or word
order alternations (cf. Sells 2001; see also Kiss 1995 on discourse config-
urational languages). On the other hand, they provide us with a more
tangible feature contributing to the prominence of an argument, namely
its specificity. When we concentrate on case-marking patterns, we find
that cross-linguistically these are also influenced by semantic features of
arguments other than specificity.
As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, animacy is one of
these recurrent features. In Malayalam, animate, but not inanimate, ob-
jects are obligatory marked with accusative case. If we take case marking
to be a device which can mark differences in prominence, these exam-
ples indicate that animacy is yet another feature which can influence the
prominence of arguments. Given that the presence of case marking corre-
lates with high prominence of an argument and the absence of case with
low prominence, animate arguments can be considered high-prominent
arguments and inanimate ones low-prominent. This raises whether there
is evidence for this distinction in terms of prominence.
It should be noted that animacy is fundamentally different from speci-
ficity. Whereas specificity is a feature which gets ascribed to an argument
in a given context, animacy is an inherent feature of arguments which is
independent of discourse. This, however, does not mean that animacy
has no effect on the discourse status of arguments. There is good linguis-
tic evidence to associate animacy with high discourse prominence and
inanimacy with low discourse prominence.
Mithun (1984) provides a discussion of the relation between noun in-
corporation and discourse structure showing that incorporation can be
used for the backgrounding of arguments that are less salient in the dis-
course. Mithun notes that animate nouns are often not incorporated at
all in contrast to inanimate ones (the same observation is voiced by Baker
1996:316). She attributes this observation to the fact that “speakers are
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usually more interested in human beings (and perhaps animals) than in
inanimate objects” (Mithun 1984:863) and given that the primary pur-
pose of noun incorporation is to background an argument, speakers will
generally not incorporate animate nouns.
The observation that speakers tend to speak about other human be-
ings has influenced many psycholinguistic studies investigating the role
of animacy in language production. In a typical experiment subjects de-
scribing pictures produce significantly more passive constructions in case
the picture shows an inanimate entity acting on an animate one compared
to the reverse situation. Such experiments show that speakers have a pref-
erence to produce constructions in which the animate argument surfaces
as the first argument. This effect has been dubbed the animate first
effect, and is often attributed to the fact that animate entities exhibit
higher conceptual accessibility, i.e., they are activated prior to inanimate
entities (see van Nice and Dietrich 2003; Branigan et al. 2007 for discus-
sion). In the terminology employed here we could say that animates are
more prominent than inanimates. The preference for animate arguments
to come first in a sentence has been grammaticalized in some languages,
as shown by Tomlin (1986).
Another linguistic phenomenon which shows the interaction between
animacy and discourse prominence is described by Broadwell (2006).
Broadwell provides an in-depth discussion of the use of the so-called ki -
passive in the Mayan language Kaqchikel. This passive construction puts
a number of restrictions on its subject argument explicitly related to the
discourse status of arguments. In particular, the subject has to express
given information and has to be discourse prominent. Non-specific ar-
guments are excluded from the subject position, as are inanimate ones.
In other words, only animate subjects are allowed in the ki -passive. Fol-
lowing Legendre et al.’s characterization of the passive as a realization of
an input with a low-prominent agent and a high-prominent patient, for
which independent evidence exists in the case of the Kaqchikel ki -passive,
these data show that there is a connection between animate arguments
and discourse prominent arguments.
A final linguistic phenomenon which links animacy to high discourse
prominence and inanimacy to low discourse prominence is provided by
the obviation systems found in Algonquian languages. In these languages
in sentences with two third-person arguments one argument is assigned
the status of proximate, whereas the other one is assigned the status of
obviative (see also 3.3 above). In case both arguments are animate the
assignment of proximate and obviative status is dependent on discourse
prominence of the arguments, where the proximate argument corresponds
to a discourse prominent argument and the obviative argument to a back-
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grounded argument. In case one of the arguments is inanimate, it is
automatically assigned obviative status. In other words, inanimate ar-
guments do not qualify as discourse prominent proximate arguments. It
has been reported for the Algonquin language Passamaquoddy (Bruening
2001, cited in Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2006) that it is impossible
for two inanimate arguments to co-occur as the subject and object of a
transitive verb. This restriction is due to the fact that every transitive
sentence containing two third person arguments requires one argument to
be the proximate argument, a function unavailable for inanimates. Such
obviation systems clearly indicate that animacy is related to discourse
prominence.
The above examples illustrate how prominence distinctions in the in-
put can affect voice but also word order and case marking. I have shown
how two features, specificity and animacy, contribute to the prominence
of an argument and how they can be linked to the broader notion of
discourse prominence. Thus, two levels of prominence should be dis-
tinguished (cf. Givo´n 1994a): (i) semantic prominence, which depends
on semantic features of an argument, such as its animacy; (ii) discourse
prominence, which reflects the status of an argument in discourse, such as
its specificity. These two levels resemble the distinction between inherent
accessibility and derived accessibility, proposed by Prat-Sala and Brani-
gan (2000) as measures for the (neural) activation of lexical concepts.
Dalrymple and Nikolaeva (2006) show that differential object marking
(DOM) can be sensitive to either or both levels of prominence. They
argue that DOM languages can be divided into three types with respect
to what kind of factor the object case alternation is sensitive to:
(12) Three types of DOM languages (Dalrymple and Nikolaeva 2006):
Type 1 Languages where DOM is regulated solely by informa-
tion structure; correlations with semantic features are only
tendencies.
Type 2 Languages where DOM is regulated solely by semantic
features; correlations with information structure are only
tendencies.
Type 3 Languages where DOM is regulated both by information
structure and semantic features.
Here, information structure can be equated with the discourse prominence
of an argument, and the semantic features with semantic prominence. It
should be noted that both kinds of prominence can be determined by
similar semantic features (see also de Hoop 2005). An argument which is
both animate and specific may be considered semantically prominent, in-
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dependent of its discourse status, and due to this high prominence it may
receive overt case marking. At the same time, the fact that an argument
is both animate and specific may influence its discourse status, making it
highly discourse prominent, which in turn results in overt marking of the
argument. In the remainder of this chapter I will focus on the influence
the semantic prominence of an argument has on its morphosyntactic re-
alization, but incidentally a link to discourse prominence will be made as
well.
Above I have illustrated that the prominence of an argument can be
influenced by its animacy and specificity and that this may have conse-
quences for its case marking. Animacy and specificity are, however, not
the only (semantic) features influencing overt case marking on arguments.
Several other features can be identified, such as definiteness.1 In chapter
2 I have shown that in Hebrew only definite objects are preceded by the
object marker.2 The two features influence case marking in many other
languages, such as Persian (Karimi 1996), Gujarati (Mistry 1998), and
Amharic (Amberber 2005). The recurrent pattern in these languages is
that only definite/specific objects are overtly case marked. Indefinite/-
non-specific objects, on the other hand, are left unmarked.
Another semantic feature known to influence case marking is that of
person. This feature is especially well-studied in relation to the split-
ergativity patterns found in many indigenous languages of Australia (cf.
Silverstein 1976). The classic example is that of Dyirbal (Dixon 1972)
illustrated in (13).
(13) The split-ergative pattern of Dyirbal:
Grammatical Function Person
1,2 3
Transitive subject nom erg
Transitive object acc abs
In Dyirbal, first and second person arguments follow an alignment pat-
tern different from that of third person arguments. The former show a
nominative-accusative case pattern, whereas the latter are ordered on an
ergative-absolutive basis. This clearly shows the influence of person on
case-marking patterns.
1The notion of definiteness is closely related to, but cannot be equated with, speci-
ficity. See von Heusinger (2002) for a discussion of the relation between the two features.
2See section 4.4.2 below for further discussion.
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Yet another semantic feature influencing case marking (discussed in
chapter 2) is volitionality of the agent:
Bats (Caucasian; Holisky 1987:105)
(14) a. As
I.erg
wozˇe.
fell
‘I fell.’ (It was my own fault that I fell down)
b. So
I.abs
wozˇe.
fell
‘I fell.’ (No implic ation that it was my fault)
The above examples show how in the Caucasian language Bats the case
marking of subject arguments of intransitive verbs depends on the voli-
tionality of the subject in performing the action described by the pred-
icate. In case the subject is volitional, it is marked with ergative case.
Non-volitionality of the subject is marked with absolutive case. More-
over, these examples show that the approach by Legendre et al. (1993)
in which intransitive constructions are the realization of an input with
either a prominent agent or a prominent patient cannot be right. Also
for intransitive constructions a distinction has to be made between inputs
with a high-prominent argument ([A/P]) and ones with a low-prominent
argument ([a/p]).
In the above discussion, I have identified several features which can be
taken to influence the prominence of an argument and (indirectly) case-
marking patterns, including animacy, specificity, definiteness, person, and
volitionality. There are also argument features which are not directly
semantic in nature, but which do influence case marking and hence can
be considered to be related to the prominence of an argument. One
feature that comes to mind immediately is the type of NP an argument
represents. Particularly relevant is the distinction between pronouns and
full NPs, which can be shown to influence not only case marking but
also other morphosyntactic phenomena, such as word order, in different
languages (as was also demonstrated in section 3.4).
Returning to the split-ergative case-marking patterns found in many
Australian languages we do not only find languages in which the split is
determined by person but also languages in which it depends on NP type.
For instance, in Pitjantjatjara (Bowe 1990) pronouns and proper nouns
follow a nominative-accusative pattern, and common nouns an ergative-
absolutive one. Although NP type does not seem to directly represent a
semantic feature of NPs, it can be related to the semantic/discourse status
of noun phrases. As shown in 3.3.1 the distinction between pronouns and
full NPs can be related to the discourse status of arguments. Arguments
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that represent given or old information are often realized as pronouns,
whereas new arguments are often realized as full NPs. Alternatively,
one can also interpret the link between the prominence of an argument
and its NP type in terms of definiteness. Where pronouns and proper
names typically represent definite arguments, no such correlation holds
for common nouns. Either way NP type can be seen as a reflection of the
prominence of an argument
Apart from semantic features related to an argument itself, there are
also certain verbal features which may influence case marking, such as
tense and aspect (see, for instance, Dixon 1994). In Finnish the alterna-
tion between accusative and partitive case on direct objects is influenced
not only by certain semantic characteristics of the object argument, but
also by the aspectual features of the predicate (see Kiparsky 1998; Ack-
erman and Moore 2001; see also Verkuyl 1972; Krifka 1989, 1998 a.o. for
the correlation between telicity and the referential status of the object in
general). The alternation between accusative and partitive results in a
telic versus an atelic interpretation of the predicate:
Finnish (Finno-Ugric; Hopper and Thompson 1980:262)
(15) Liikemies
businessman
kirjoitti
wrote
kirjeen
letter.acc
valiokunnalle.
committee.to
‘The businessman wrote a letter to the committee.’
(16) Liikemies
businessman
kirjoitti
wrote
kirjetta¨
letter.part
valiokunnalle.
committee.to
‘The businessman was writing a letter to the committee.’
A relation between tense/aspect and subject case-marking is found in
Hindi. In this language, the subject of a large class of transitive verbs
has to be marked with ergative case when the verb is in the perfective
tense and with nominative when it is in non-perfective tense (cf. Mo-
hanan 1990; de Hoop and Narasimhan 2005, among many others). In
other words, Hindi shows a split-ergative system on the basis of tense, cf.
(17) and (18).
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Mohanan 1990:91)
(17) Raam-ne
Ram-erg
Ravii-ko
Ravi-ko
piitaa.
beat.pst
‘Ram beat Ravi.’
(18) Raam
Ram.nom
Ravii-ko
Ravii-ko
piitegaa.
beat.fut
‘Ram will beat Ravi.’
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I started this section with a discussion of the approach to voice alter-
nations developed by Legendre et al. (1993). Their approach is crucially
based on the notion of prominence, although this notion is not clearly
defined. I have identified a number of features which can influence the
prominence of an argument and consequently its morphosyntactic real-
ization. Moreover, I have argued that the two levels of semantic and
discourse prominence should be distinguished. There are nevertheless
many additional semantic factors which have their bearings on (variation
in) the morphosyntactic realization of arguments. In fact, most of the
transitivity parameters proposed by Hopper and Thompson (1980) and
discussed in chapter 2 have a certain effect on case-marking patterns (cf.
also Tsunoda 1981; see Malchukov 2006; Malchukov and de Swart, to ap-
pear for discussion). Furthermore, the thematic role of an argument can
also influence the case-marking patterns it can participate in (see chapter
3; see also Primus 1999; Ackerman and Moore 2001).
Acknowledgment of the influence of Hopper and Thompson’s transi-
tivity parameters on case alternations and related morphosyntactic phe-
nomena has severe repercussions for a model in the spirit of Legendre
et al. (1993), which tries to explain such alternations in terms of promi-
nence distinctions in the input. Recall the discussion of Malchukov’s
(2006) proposal to group Hopper and Thompson’s transitivity parame-
ters into A-related, O-related, and V-related parameters (see section 2.3).
This distinction fits the general approach of Legendre et al. (1993) and
actually provides an explication of the contrast between high-prominent
([A,P]) and low-prominent ([a,p]) arguments in the input. The V-related
parameters, however, do not have a place in the model as it is. There-
fore, in order to analyze case alternations induced by verbal parameters
one has to incorporate them into the model, and let them determine the
prominence of the input together with the argument-related features.
4.2.1 Prominence Hierarchies
Above I have identified a number of prominence categories. Throughout
the discussion, I have assumed that within each category a distinction
can be made between high-prominent and low-prominent elements. For
instance, within the category of animacy, animates were considered high-
prominent and inanimates low-prominent. These differences are often
based on prominence scales or hierarchies, as the ones in (19)-(21) (cf.
Aissen 1999, 2003, among many others):
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(19) Animacy : Human > Animate > Inanimate
(20) Definiteness: Pronoun > Proper Noun > Definite NP > Indefi-
nite Specific NP > Indefinite Non-specific NP
(21) Person: 1,2 (local) > 3
These hierarchies are taken to visualize the internal structure of a promi-
nence category. Thus, within the category of animacy, humans are the
most prominent elements, followed by animates, which in turn are fol-
lowed by inanimates. Moreover, these hierarchies can be used to assess the
markedness of subjects and object. This is made explicit in the approach
by Aissen (1999, 2003), who relies crucially on the notion of markedness
reversal ‘what is marked for a subject is unmarked for an object and vice
versa’ (cf. Comrie 1989). Translated to the hierarchies in (19)-(21), the
features high in the hierarchies are taken to be unmarked for subjects and
marked for objects and the reverse holds for features low in the hierar-
chies. Thus, unmarked subjects are human, pronoun, and first or second
person, whereas unmarked objects are inanimate, indefinite, and third
person (see also section 3.2.1 for discussion).
Aissen (1999, 2003) argues that deviations from these unmarked pro-
totypes result in a marked form, i.e., the use of overt case morphology or
a voice alternation. The different cut-off points in the hierarchies can be
shown to correlate with the extensions of certain morphosyntactic phe-
nomena in different languages. Thus, for instance, overt case marking of
objects (DOM) in one language may apply only to humans, whereas in
another language it may apply to both humans and animates. The first
language can be said to expand the phenomenon to the first cut-off point
in the hierarchy and the second language to the second cut-off point.
The observation that deviations from an unmarked prototype results in
a marked form is in accordance with the iconicity principle, which states
that markedness of form goes hand in hand with markedness of mean-
ing. An illustration of this is provided by obligatory voice alternations
attested in Southern Tiwa. In this language the use of active and passive
constructions is dependent on the person features of the subjects involved.
This pattern is summarized in the table in (22):
(22) The use of passive in Southern Tiwa:
Agent Patient Passivization
1st/2nd person 1st, 2nd, 3rd person prohibited
3rd person 1st/2nd person obligatory
3rd person 3rd person optional
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Constructions with a first or second person agent can only be expressed
by means of an active construction. Passive constructions in which the
agent is expressed as an oblique phrase are ungrammatical, cf. the con-
trast in grammaticality between (23) and (24).
Southern Tiwa (Tanoan; Allen and Frantz 1983:304-5)
(23) bey-mu-ban.
2sg:1sg-see-pst
‘You saw me.’
(24) *Te-mu-che-ban
1sg-see-pass-pst
’˜ı-ba.
2-instr
‘I was seen by you.’
In contrast, passive constructions are possible when the agent is third
person. More precisely, the passive is obligatory for third person agents
when the patient is first or second person (25)-(26), and optional when
the patient is third person as well, cf. (27)-(28).
Southern Tiwa (Tanoan; Allen and Frantz 1983:305)
(25) Seuanide-ba
man-instr
te-mu-che-ban.
1sg-see-pass-pst
‘The man saw me.’ (litt. ‘I was seen by the man’)
(26) Seuanide-ba
man-instr
a-mu-che-ban.
2sg-see-pass-pst
‘The man saw you.’ (litt. ‘You were seen by the man’)
(27) Seuanide
man
∅-liora-mu-ban.
3:3sg-lady-see-pst
‘The man saw the lady.’
(28) Liorade
lady
∅-mu-che-ban
3-see-pass-pst
seuanide-ba.
man-instr
‘The lady was seen by the man.’
Under Aissen’s approach first and second person are unmarked fea-
tures and third person a marked feature for transitive subjects. Fur-
thermore, the passive is a marked construction in comparison to the ac-
tive. The Southern Tiwa data nicely illustrate Aissen’s observation that
marked subjects tend to occur in marked constructions: the unmarked
first and second person agents occur only in the unmarked active con-
struction and the marked third person agent shows preference for the
marked passive construction.
The idea to use a hierarchy to determine the markedness of grammat-
ical functions and the variation in a given morphosyntactic phenomenon
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in different languages can be traced back to Silverstein (1976; see also
Filimonova 2005:78-81) who used the hierarchy in (29) to explain the
variation in split-ergativity in Australian languages.
(29) Silverstein’s Hierarchy (Silverstein 1976):
1,2 pron. > 3 pron. > 3 PN > 3 hum. CN > anim CN > inan
CN
accusative → ← ergative
The hierarchy in (29) can be seen as a conflation of person, animacy,
and NP type hierarchies (cf. Croft 1990). Again we can argue that the
semantic features on the higher end of the hierarchy are unmarked subject
features and marked object features and the reverse holds for the lower
end of the hierarchy. Silverstein shows how many Australian languages
restrict the use of accusative case to arguments with features high in the
hierarchy and the use of ergative case to arguments with features low in
the hierarchy. In other words, accusative case is used to mark atypical
objects and ergative case is used to mark atypical subjects. Furthermore,
Silverstein shows that languages differ in how far they extend the use of
case marking from the edge of the hierarchy.
Although it was already acknowledged in the literature that promi-
nence hierarchies can be taken to express the marked and unmarked fea-
tures of subjects and objects, the account of Aissen (1999, 2003) is the
first to formally incorporate them into a theoretical framework. Aissen
derives Optimality-Theoretic constraints from these hierarchies by means
of Harmonic Alignment (Prince and Smolensky 1993/2004). With her
analysis she overcomes the long-standing problem of the formal integra-
tion of hierarchies into generative syntax.3
However, not everyone working within generative syntax agrees with
Aissen that an account of phenomena, such as DOM and the voice al-
ternations discussed above, should make reference to prominence hierar-
chies. Carnie (2006), in a critique, rejects such hierarchies as primitives.
Apart from empirical problems, he has conceptual problems with an ap-
proach like Aissen’s which relies crucially on prominence hierarchies. In
particular he doubts their grammatical status as “they are merely de-
scriptive statements. I’m not at all convinced that grammatical con-
3This problem is echoed in the following quote from Carnie (2006): “[f]rom the
standpoint of a generative grammar, it isn’t at all clear what the grammatical status
of the hierarchies is. They aren’t constraints, procedures or rules. How the restrictions
are imposed on the grammar isn’t at all clear. These hierarchies tend to be merely post-
factum descriptive statements of grammatical tendencies . . . the lack of formalizability
is a problem for linguists who would like to accommodate such robust descriptive
generalizations in their generative grammar.” (Carnie 2006:4).
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structs “derived from” non-grammatical descriptions provide solid basis
for grammatical theory” (Carnie 2006:8). As a result, he rejects the use of
such hierarchies as primitives “unless properly grounded either in the real
world or in theoretical constructs that themselves have some grammatical
status” (Carnie 2006:9).
Indeed, there has been much interest in recent years to reduce the
prominence hierarchies and their effects to other grammatical factors (see,
e.g., Jelinek 1993a; Halle and Marantz 1993; Nichols 2001; Jelinek and
Carnie 2003; Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2006; Carnie 2006; Mer-
chant 2006; Trommer 2006 for proposals and discussion). In the present
discussion I will focus mainly on what one may call ‘tree-geometric’ ap-
proaches (Jelinek 1993a; Jelinek and Carnie 2003; Carnie 2006; Carnie
and Cash Cash 2006), which try to derive relational hierarchies from
constituent hierarchies by means of the mapping principle proposed in
Diesing (1992; cf. also Diesing and Jelinek 1995). These approaches start
from the observation that not only case and agreement patterns, but also
word order is sometimes influenced by prominence hierarchies. Given that
such word order patterns can be described in terms of phrase structure
geometry by means of the mapping principle, it is reasoned that the case
and agreement patterns can be treated in those terms as well.
The similarity between case marking and word order patterns has
been often observed in the domain of differential object marking based
on the definiteness of the object. Apart from languages in which defi-
nite and indefinite objects behave differently with respect to object case
marking, there are also languages in which such objects behave differently
with respect to word order. In particular, this is argued for scrambling or
object shift in the Germanic languages (already shortly discussed above).
Consider the following examples from German (representing the gram-
maticality judgments of Diesing and Jelinek 1995):
German (Germanic; Diesing and Jelinek 1995)
(30) . . . weil
since
ich
I
nicht
not
eine
a
einzige
single
Katze
cat
gestreichelt
petted
habe.
have
‘. . . since I have not petted a single cat.’
(31) *?. . . weil
since
ich
I
nicht
not
die
the
Katze
cat
streichle.
pet
‘. . . since I do not pet the cat.’
(32) . . . weil
since
ich
I
die
the
Katze
cat
nicht
not
streichle.
pet
‘. . . since I do not pet the cat.’
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These data show that indefinite objects are allowed to the right of the
adverb nicht, which is taken to mark the left edge of the VP. Definite
objects, on the other hand, must shift to the left of the adverb, a position
outside of the VP. Thus, where in some languages definite objects receive
case marking, but indefinites do not, in German definite objects have to
move out of the VP, whereas indefinites do not.
The word order pattern in German can be explained by means of the
mapping principle in the following way. Following Diesing (1992) a sen-
tence can be divided into three parts: (i) an operator, often a quantifier,
which asserts the number of participants of the event described in the sen-
tence; (ii) a restrictor, which asserts the presupposed information about
the participants and restricts the scope of the operator; (iii) a nuclear
scope, which asserts what is true of the participants and provides the
new information to the sentence. This is illustrated graphically in (33):
(33) [Operator [restrictor][nuclear scope]]
These three parts of the sentence are taken to correspond to three portions
of the tree structure underlying the sentence. The partition in (33) can
be derived directly from the syntax by means of the mapping principle
given in (34):
(34) The Mapping Principle (Diesing 1992):
1.The material from IP/TP and above maps into the restric-
tor.
2.The material from VP maps into the nuclear scope.
Moreover, the mapping principle has certain semantic correlates. Diesing
(1992) argues that the VP forms the domain for default existential clo-
sure, an assumption which puts clear semantic restrictions on the types
of NPs allowed inside the VP. Due to existential closure, only variables
are allowed in the nuclear scope which can be either (i) traces of NPs that
have moved out of the VP; (ii) non-quantificational/non-presuppositional
NPs (of type 〈e,t〉). In other words, quantificational/presuppositional
NPs have to move out of the VP to create a trace variable, whereas
predicative/non-presuppositional NPs can remain within the VP. The as-
sociation between positions within the VP and non-presuppositional NPs,
on the one hand, and between positions outside of the VP and presupposi-
tional NPs can explain the German scrambling facts discussed in (30)-(32)
above. The definite object is ungrammatical inside the VP because it rep-
resents presuppositional information. The indefinite object, by contrast,
is grammatical inside the VP as it can receive a non-quantificational read-
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ing. In fact, it also explains why indefinites which move outside of the
VP get a quantificational reading.
The above discussion shows how DOM based on definiteness and re-
alized as word order variation can be explained in terms of a phrase
structure hierarchy. This raises the question whether differential argu-
ment marking patterns based on prominence hierarchies which do not
surface as word order variation can also be explained in tree-geometric
terms. Jelinek (1993a) uses an analysis in terms of the mapping principle
to account for person-based split-ergativity found in the Salish language
Lummi, a phenomenon discussed in depth in the next section. In this lan-
guage, first and second person subjects receive nominative case and third
person subjects ergative case, which Jelinek assumes to be a VP-internal
case. Jelinek analyzes this pattern on the basis of the presupposition-
ality of person. She argues that first and second person are inherently
presuppositional and therefore have to move out of the VP, where they
are assigned nominative case. The third person subjects which can take
ergative case remain inside the VP.
As correctly pointed out by Carnie and Cash Cash (2006), the corre-
lation between third person and a position inside the VP assumed by
Jelinek is problematic as it predicts third persons to be always non-
presuppositional. This prediction clearly is not borne out as there are
many contexts in which they are in fact presuppositional. The falsity
of this prediction can also be deduced from the following two generaliza-
tions, taken to be universal by Jelinek (1993a): (i) all local arguments are
definite; (ii) all indefinite arguments are non-local. From the statements
one can conclude two things about the presuppositionality of person: (i)
local persons are inherently presuppositional; (ii) third persons can ei-
ther be indefinite or definite and thus can be either presuppositional or
non-presuppositional. The fact that third persons can be presupposi-
tional is in direct conflict with Jelinek’s claim that they must occupy a
VP-internal position. By Diesing’s mapping hypothesis presuppositional
NPs are excluded from the VP. In conclusion, one can state that a re-
duction of the person hierarchy to the mapping principle and hence to a
phrase-structure hierarchy is problematic.
Moreover, this points to a wider problem for any account that tries
to reduce prominence hierarchies to constituent hierarchies by means of
the mapping principle. Many semantic prominence features, in fact apart
from definiteness and specificity probably all, are not easily reduced to
presuppositionality. Take animacy as an example. Although it shows
clear correlations with discourse prominence and in this way perhaps also
with presuppositionality, it is certainly not the case that animate noun
phrases are inherently presuppositional and inanimate ones inherently
156 Chapter 4. The Prominence Factor
non-presuppositional. In fact, both animate and inanimate noun phrases
can receive both a presuppositional and a non-presuppositional reading.
Furthermore, the animacy hierarchy presents an additional problem as,
in contrast to the definiteness and person hierarchy discussed above in re-
lation to the mapping principle, it presents a three-way contrast between
human, and animate, and inanimate nouns. This three-way contrast is
hard to reconcile with the two-way distinction between restrictor and nu-
clear scope.4 Overall, I think we can safely conclude that any attempt
to reduce prominence hierarchies to constituent hierarchies by means of
the mapping principle is faced with severe conceptual problems (inde-
pendently of any problems one could raise against Diesing’s mapping
principle; cf. Van Geenhoven 1998b, de Hoop 2003).
Consider the other option raised by Carnie (2006) in order to use the
hierarchies as primitives: grounding them in the real world. This option
should be seen against the light of a discussion concerning the grounding
of Optimality-Theoretic constraints. Whereas in phonology constraints
can generally be motivated on laboratory phonological grounds, in syntax
the grounding of constraints is still a matter of debate as not everyone
accepts functional motivations (see, for instance, the discussion between
Newmeyer 2002 and Bresnan and Aissen 2002). The grounding of promi-
nence hierarchies in the real world is not a trivial task but attempts have
been undertaken. In particular, Dahl (2007) has argued for a psycholog-
ical basis of the animacy (and to some extent the person) hierarchy (see
also Haspelmath 1999).
Cognitive grounding is especially problematic for the person hierarchy
due to the fact that there is not one universal person hierarchy to which
every language makes reference. In particular, the ranking of first per-
son with respect to second person is not stable cross-linguistically. That
is, some languages assign first and second person an equal rank, others
rank first person above second person, and yet other languages use the
reverse ordering with second person ranked above first person. Moreover,
as Zu´n˜iga (2006) points out for Algonquian languages, there may even be
more than one person hierarchy active in a single language to regulate dif-
ferent phenomena. On the basis of a typological investigation Filimonova
(2005) comes to the conclusion that “the relative ranking of 1st and 2nd
person is not uniquely determined by universal grammar” (Filimonova
4In fact, if we were able to reduce the notion of animacy to a notion of presupposi-
tionality, which can be related to restrictor and nuclear scope, one would expect to find
interesting cross-linguistic differences. On the one hand, there would be languages in
which humans are inherently presuppositional, but animates and inanimates are not.
On the other hand, there would be languages in which both humans and animates are
inherently presuppositional, but inanimates are not.
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2005:99). This conclusion posits a challenge to every account which tries
to incorporate a person hierarchy into a formal universal grammar or
directly root it in universal cognitive patterns.
Carnie (2006) requires prominence hierarchies to be properly grounded
in the real world or in theoretical constructs that themselves have some
grammatical status in order to use them as primitives. The above discus-
sion has shown that grounding prominence hierarchies in the real world or
in theoretical constructs such as constituent hierarchies and the mapping
principle is not easily achieved. Does this mean that we should abandon
them as primitives? I believe this to be true if we want to treat them
as universal entities. This holds in particular for the person hierarchy,
but less so for the animacy hierarchy, which does not show a universal
ranking-indeterminacy.5 However, it may be possible to ground the hier-
archies on a language-individual basis. There is clear evidence that the
members of the categories in the animacy hierarchy may differ from one
language to the next. This seems to be based on empathy considerations
on behalf of the speaker or general cultural significance of certain entities
(cf. Yamamoto 1999). Perhaps, a similar effect can be observed for the
person categories. Alternatively, the person hierarchy may be grounded in
the grammatical principles of an individual language. In the next section,
I provide an example of the latter scenario.
4.3 Cross-Modularity in Active to Passive Al-
ternations
In this section I discuss a pattern of obligatory voice alternations found
in the Coast Salish languages spoken on the Northwest coast of North
America.6 The data involved look very similar to the pattern discussed
above for Southern Tiwa. As in that language, the voice alternations seem
to be driven by the semantic feature of person and as such can be taken
as the reflexes of a person hierarchy which is active in these languages.
However, I will argue that these data form a prime example of person
hierarchy effects which can be reduced to other factors.
Alternations from active to passive are often characterized as an op-
tional process driven by discourse considerations such as agent demotion
5I am not aware of a language in which the animacy hierarchy as presented in (19) is
reversed, either partially or totally (resulting for instance in a hiearchy inan > anim).
It may, nevertheless, be the case that a language collapses two of the categories in the
hierarchy with respect to a given phenomenon. As was discussed above, a language
may oppose humans against non-humans by only overtly case marking the former.
6The analysis presented in this section is loosely based on de Swart (2005).
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or agent focus. In the Coast Salish languages we sometimes find an oblig-
atory alternation to passive however. In Lummi, for instance, active
constructions with a third person subject and a first person object are
ungrammatical, irrespective of the order in which the agreement suffixes
occur, cf. (35a) vs. (35b). Instead, a passive construction as in (36) has
to be used.
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1993a:27)
(35) a. *LeN-t-oN@s-@s.
see-tr-1/2.obj-3.su
‘He saw you/me.’
b. *LeN-t-@s-oN@s.
see-tr-1/2.obj-3.su
‘He saw you/me.’
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1993a:27)
(36) a. LeN-t-N=s@n.
see-tr-pass-1sg.su
‘I was seen (by someone).’
b. LeN-t-N=sxw.
see-tr-pass-2sg.su
‘You were seen (by someone).’
At the same time, certain person combinations also result in ungrammati-
calities in passive constructions. In particular, passive constructions with
a first or second person agent realized as an oblique are ungrammatical.
This is illustrated in (37).
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1993b:167-168)
(37) *LeN-t-N=sxw
see-tr-pass-2sg.su
’@-oN@s/’@=s@n.
obl-1sg.obj/obl=1sg.su
‘You were seen by me.’
Different authors (Jelinek and Demers 1983; Jelinek 1993a, 1994) have ar-
gued in favour of a so-called person hierarchy in order to account for the
restrictions described above. In their view, the ungrammaticalities result
from a violation of a constraint which states that “the element highest in
rank in the agent hierarchy in a sentence should be the subject of that
sentence” (Jelinek and Demers 1983:169). In case of an active sentence
with a third person agent this constraint is only satisfied when the patient
is also a third person, but violated when it is a first or second person. In
case of a passive construction, this constraint is violated when a first or
second person agent is realized as an oblique (under the assumption that
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Person Subject Object
1 clitic suffix
2 clitic suffix
3 suffix zero
Table 4.1: Agreement markers in Coast-Salish
first and second person are equally ranked in the person hierarchy; see
below for discussion). In contrast to such an analysis, I argue in favour of
a morphological account of the data (in a similar vein to Wiltschko and
Burton 2004). Using Optimality Theory, I propose that the obligatory
alternation can best be viewed as the result of a conflict between con-
straints coming from different modules of the grammar. But let me first
discuss the data. In the discussion I will focus on the ungrammaticality
of active constructions –the so-called paradigm gaps– and the obligatory
voice alternation resulting from them.
The Coast Salish languages are so-called radical head-marking lan-
guages (Davis 1995). This means that all grammatical functions are
marked on the predicate by means of affixes and clitics. The agreement
pattern generally found in the languages under discussion is shown in Ta-
ble 4.1. As we can see, first and second person subjects are represented
by clitics and the other agreement markers are suffixes with third per-
son object agreement being zero.7 The object suffixes attach to the verb
immediately after the transitive suffix, whereas agreement clitics come
in second position right after the first predicate of the clause following
agreement suffixes and tense, aspect, mood markers, if present (Jelinek
1996b).
Three types of languages can be distinguished with respect to para-
digm gaps. When examining the three types, the reader should bear in
mind that the main point of the analysis outlined later on in this section
is the observation that the ungrammaticality of these constructions is the
result of the existence of only one position for agreement suffixes on the
verb. Consequently, we will see that (most) constructions with two suf-
fixes are ruled out.
Type 1: Excluding both 3-1 and 3-2 sentences8
Lummi falls within the first type under discussion. Its agreement mark-
7In intransitive sentences third person subject is also zero.
8 In the remainder of this section I refer to person combinations by means of the
number features of the subject followed by the number feature of the object. Thus, 3-1
indicates a combination of a third person subject and a first person object, etc.
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Person Subject Object
1sg =s@n -oN@s
2sg =sxw -oN@s
3sg -@s -∅
1pl =ì -oN@ì
2pl =sxwhel@ -oN@s
3pl -@s -∅
Table 4.2: Agreement markers in Lummi (Jelinek 1993a)
Person Subject Object
1sg =chen -s
2sg =chexw -umi
3sg -as -∅
1pl =chet -umulh
2pl =chap umiyap
3pl -as-wit -∅-wit
Table 4.3: Agreement markers in Squamish (Jacobs 1994)
ers are given in Table 4.2, which shows that Lummi follows the general
pattern of agreement markers given in Table 4.1. As we have seen in (35)
above, the combinations 3-1 and 3-2 are the paradigm gaps found in Type
1. Well-formed expressions are any combination of clitic and suffix (1-2,
2-3, etc.) or of suffix and zero agreement (3-3). In subordinate clauses all
combinations are grammatical. Interestingly, third person subject agree-
ment is zero in subordinate clauses, and under these circumstances the
restrictions on direct objects found in main clauses are lifted. This means
that even 3-1 and 3-2 sentences are well-formed, as can be seen from (38).
Lummi (Coast Salish: Jelinek and Demers 1994:720)
(38) Ye’=∅
go=3sg.su
[c@
det
[leN-t-oN@s-∅]]
see-tr-1/2.sg.obj-3sg.su
‘He left, the (one that) saw you/me.’
Type 2: Excluding only 3-2 sentences
Table 4.3 shows that the agreement markers used in Squamish, a Type
2 language, again follow the general pattern. A difference with Lummi
is that Squamish has different forms for first and second person objects.
Type 2 languages are less restrictive as they only exclude the 3-2 combi-
nation. 3-1, on the other hand, is well-formed as can be seen from the
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contrast between (39a) and (39b).
Squamish (Coast Salish; Jacobs 1994:124)
(39) a. Ch’a´w-at-s-as.
help-tr-1sg.obj-3sg.su
‘He helped me.’
b. *Ch’a´w-at-umi-as.
help-tr-2sg.obj-3sg.su
‘He helped you.’
Again combinations of clitic and suffix and of suffix and zero agreement
are well-formed. Furthermore, as Kuipers (1967) reports, 3-2 sentences
are ruled out only in three of the four verbal paradigms. That is, we do
not find 3-2 sentences in the finite, factual, and hypothetical paradigm,
but such sentences are present in the nominal paradigm, which lacks a
third person marker. Consider the example in (40) and compare it to
(38) from Lummi, in which the third person subject is also zero.
Squamish (Coast Salish; Kuipers 1967:213)
(40) Na
rl
ch’a´w-at-umi-∅
help-tr-2sg.obj-3sg.su
‘the one who helped you’
Interestingly, Wiltschko (2003) reports similar facts for Halkomelem, a
language which also prohibits 3-2 sentences. In this language the ban
on 3-2 constructions is lifted when the third person subject agreement
is absent. One such environment are SVO sentences. In VSO sentences
3-2 combinations are ungrammatical. This combination is perfectly well-
formed, however, when the subject precedes the predicate, in which case
third person subject agreement is absent. This can be seen by comparing
(41a) with (41b):
Upriver Halkomelem (Coast Salish; Wiltschko 2003)
(41) a. *Kw’e´ts-l-o´me-s
see-tr-2sg.obj-3sg.su
te
det
sw´ıyeqe.
man
‘The man saw you.’
b. Te
det
sw´ıyeqe
man
kw’e´ts-l-o´me.
see-tr-2sg.obj
‘The man saw you.’
Type 3: No exclusion of any sentence with pronominal arguments
The third type of language is exemplified by Lushootseed. Let us first
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Person Subject Object
1sg =cˇad -s (-bsˇ)
2sg =cˇaxw -sid (-bicid)
3sg =∅ -∅
1pl =cˇaì -ubuì(-buì)
2pl =cˇal@p -ubuì@d (-buì@d)
3pl =∅ -∅
Table 4.4: Agreement markers in Lushootseed (Hukari 1976)
consider the various subject and object markers of this language, listed
in Table 4.4.9 In contrast with the two types discussed so far, in this
language both the third person subject and object marker are zero. In-
terestingly, in the absence of a third person subject marker, this languages
puts no restrictions on any combination of pronominal arguments. Con-
sider the examples in (42):
Lushootseed (Coast Salish; Hukari 1976:307, Hess 1973:92)
(42) a. Pu
cp
kwaxwa-cid=cˇad.
help-tr.2sg.obj=1sg.su
‘I helped you.’
b. Pu
cp
cˇ’a´xwa-t-s.
club-tr-1sg.obj
‘He clubbed me.’
Also in contrast to the languages we have seen earlier, Lushootseed has
an overt third person subject marker -@s in subordinate clauses. Instead
of treating this marker as a suffix, in analogy with the main clause marker
in other Coast Salish languages, Davis (1999) argues on the basis of dis-
tributional data that “[i]n Lushootseed, transitive subjects suffixes have
been replaced in all clause types by indicative, possessive and conjunc-
tive clitics.” The example in (43) shows that also in subordinate clauses a
combination of a third person subject with a first person object is gram-
matical. This holds for all possible combinations of pronominal arguments
in all clause types.
9Hukari (1976:307):“..., goal [=object] suffixes have two allomorphs, one after the
/-t/ transitive suffix and the other elsewhere. The elsewhere is listed in parentheses...”
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Lushootseed (Coast Salish; Bates 1997:327)
(43) P@s-xˇ@c=cˇ@d
st-fear=1sg.su
gw@-laxˇ-du-bsˇ=@s.
sbj-remember-tr-1sg.obj=3sg.su.sbj
‘I’m afraid he might remember me.’
In the introduction to this section I noted that the data discussed have
often been taken as a prime example of a person hierarchy at work. These
person hierarchy accounts were partially informed by ungrammatical pas-
sives already discussed above in (37), and repeated below for convenience:
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1993b:27)
(44) *LeN-t-N=sxw
see-tr-pass-2sg.su
’@-oN@s/’@=s@n.
obl-1sg.obj/obl=1sg.su
‘You were seen by me.’
The example in (44) shows that a passive construction with a first person
agent results in an ungrammatical structure. This also holds for passives
with a second person agent. These restrictions are shared by all three
types of Coast Salish languages identified above in relation to the active
paradigm gaps. The occurrence of restrictions related to person both
in the active and in the passive voice has led researchers to the idea to
propose a uniform analysis of the two phenomena in terms of a person
hierarchy (Jelinek and Demers 1983; Jelinek 1993a, 1994). Given this
hierarchy, the element ranked highest has to become the subject of the
sentence. Under an equal ranking of first and second person in the hier-
archy, this constraint readily explains the ungrammaticality of passives
with a first or second person agent. In such constructions, there is al-
ways a highest-ranked element, which is not realized as the subject but
as an oblique. Given the uniformity of this restriction across the Coast
Salish languages this analysis can be based on one single hierarchy for all
languages. This nevertheless does not hold for restrictions found in the
active (see also Aissen 1999; Brown et al. 2004; Wiltschko and Burton
2004). As shown above, languages differ in which combinations they rule
out and even within one language the ungrammaticality of a different
combination may depend on the clause type it occurs in. This means
that in order to account for the pattern found in the active voice different
hierarchies have to be stipulated for the different types of languages, and
crucially these hierarchies are sometimes different from the ones needed to
account for the restrictions on the passive. This is summarized in Table
4.5, which is meant to illustrate three points.
First, as mentioned above, all three language types use the same
person hierarchy to account for the ungrammaticalities in the passive.
Second, different person hierarchies have to be stipulated in order to ac-
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Language Gaps Hierarchies
Active Passive Active Passive
Main Subordinate Main Subordinate
Type 1 3-1,3-2 ∅ 1,2 1,2>3 ∅ 1,2>3
Type 2 3-2 ∅ 1,2 2>3 ∅ 1,2>3
Type 3 ∅ ∅ 1,2 ∅ ∅ 1,2>3
Table 4.5: Person hierarchies across voices and language types
count for the variation found across the languages. That is, every type
of language corresponds with a different person hierarchy for active main
clauses. Third, different person hierarchies have to be stipulated in order
to account for the variation within languages. To take the extreme case,
in Type 2 languages three different hierarchies are at work, one in active
main clauses, another in active subordinate clauses, and yet another in
passive constructions. This set of facts makes an account in terms of
person hierarchies implausible.
Aissen (1999) acknowledges the fact that different hierarchies are ac-
tive and develops an account in terms of person without making direct
reference to a person hierarchy. Instead she derives constraints which ban
certain combinations of person and grammatical functions. By reordering
these constraints the different types of languages fall out of her system.
An account in terms of person hierarchies or in terms of preferred
associations between person and grammatical functions are problematic
in the light of examples like the following:
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1993b:168)
(45) LeN-t-N=sxw
see-tr-pass-2sg.su
’@
obl
c@
det
’@s.
1sg.emph
‘You were seen by ME.’
This example shows that, in contrast to (44) above, passive constructions
are grammatical with a first person agent when it is expressed as an
independent pronoun. The same holds for second persons. The crucial
difference between these independent pronouns and the agreement suffixes
and clitics discussed above is that, whereas they both refer to first and
second person, the independent pronouns syntactically are third person
nominals (see Jelinek 1993b). The existence of examples like (45) are
problematic for any account based on the semantic feature of person.
According to such accounts these independent pronouns, as they make
reference to first or second person, should be ungrammatical as non-
subject agents in passive constructions.
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In sum, a uniform account of the ungrammaticalities found in active
and passive constructions in Coast Salish in terms of a person hierarchy
is problematic in two respects. On the one hand, it is uneconomical as it
has to stipulate multiple person hierarchies within and across languages.
On the other hand, it makes the wrong predictions with respect to the
ungrammaticality of passive constructions involving first or second person
agents. In my view, these problematic aspects make an account in terms
of (a) person (hierarchy) undesirable.
Not all authors make use of (a) person (hierarchy) to account for the
data discussed above. Wiltschko and Burton (2004) argue at length for an
account based on a morphological co-occurrence restriction: the ungram-
maticalities follow from the co-occurrence of two agreement morphemes
in one position (an insight already implicit in the work of Jelinek 1993a,
1994). In this section, I develop an OT account that shares this main
idea but is different in many respects, especially in the way in which it
is implemented (see below for discussion of the contrasts). Moreover, my
account has a wider empirical coverage as it can also explain the ungram-
maticalities found in passive constructions.
In line with earlier work on voice alternations in OT (Aissen 1999;
Bresnan et al. 2001), I assume active and passive constructions to be
elements of the same candidate set. Active and passive constructions are
considered to be equal alternatives, the choice dependent on the discourse
status of the participants. A given input can be realized either by an
active or a passive construction, and the actual choice is dependent on
the evaluation of the output candidates against the constraints involved.
The input is considered to be a simple predicate-argument structure in
which the semantic roles and the number features of the arguments are
specified.
In my analysis I make use of three types of constraints. The starting
point is the constraint on argument linking in (46):
(46) SubAg: the agent argument is assigned the function of subject.
The linking of the agent argument to the subject function is not specific
to the Salish language family but seems to be a universal tendency (Za-
enen et al. 1985; Jelinek 1993a; Aissen 1999; cf. also section 3.1). The
constraint SubAg is satisfied when the agent in the input is linked to
the subject function. It is violated when the agent is linked to any non-
subject function, e.g., direct object or oblique phrase. It thus favours
active constructions over passive ones: the latter are more marked than
the former. We will see that this constraint may be overruled by two
other types of constraints.
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Above we have seen that if two agreement suffixes co-occur the result-
ing active construction is deemed ungrammatical. The question arises
why this should be the case. As said above, I assume that the two agree-
ment suffixes are competing for one single position (as also noted by Je-
linek 1994, 1996b and Wiltschko and Burton 2004): both want to occupy
the position immediately following the transitivizer. This observation is
captured by the two constraints formulated in (47):
(47) a. Align-P: align the left edge of an object suffix to the right
edge of the stem.10
b. Align-A: align the left edge of a subject suffix to the right
edge of the stem.
These constraints are so-called alignment constraints (McCarthy and
Prince 1993), which state the placement preference for a morphological
category. They are also used by Woolford (2003) to account for person
and clitic clustering restrictions in different languages. In the present
case, a suffix violates one of them if it does not immediately follow the
stem. Thus, in a construction with two suffixes, one of them will al-
ways violate either of the constraints in (47). In case the object suffix
immediately follows the stem, the subject suffix violates its alignment
constraint, and if the subject suffix is positioned immediately after the
stem, the object suffix violates its alignment constraint. In case we have
only one agreement suffix and either a clitic or zero agreement, the align-
ment constraint is not violated and the corresponding active construction
is grammatical.11
As Tableaux 4.1 and 4.2 show, the three constraints formulated so far
can describe Type 1 and Type 2 languages with the constraint ranking
in (48):
(48) Constraint Ranking for Type 1 and Type 3 languages:
Align-P>>Align-A >> SubAg
Tableau 4.1 shows the evaluation of a 3-2 sentence in Lummi. In
accordance with the examples in (35) and (36a) above, in this language
such combinations are only possible in a passive construction. The active
construction would contain two agreement suffixes and therefore always
violates one of the high-ranked alignment constraints. The passive con-
struction does not violate either alignment constraint, but only the lowest
10 I use the term stem to refer to the combination of verb root and transitivizer.
11 As discussed above, the agreement clitics come in second position right after
the first predicate of the clause following agreement suffixes and tense, aspect, mood
markers (Jelinek 1996b). As such, they do not compete with the suffixes for a position.
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V(Agt/3, Pat/2) Align-P Align-A SubAg
a. Act(Su/3/suf - Oj/2/suf) *!
v-tr-@s-oN@s
b. Act(Oj/2/suf - Su/3/suf) *!
v-tr-oN@s-@s
 c. Pas(Su/2 - NSu/3) *
su/2 v-tr-pass obl/3
Tableau 4.1: Evaluation of a 3-2 sentence in Lummi (Type 1)
V(Agt/3, Pat/2) Align-P Align-A SubAg
 a. Act(Oj/2/suf-Su/3/∅)
v-tr-sid-∅
b. Pas(Su/2 - NSu/3) *!
Su/2 v-tr-pass Obl/3
Tableau 4.2: Evaluation of a 3-2 sentence in Lushootseed (Type 3)
ranked argument-linking constraint and therefore is considered the opti-
mal expression for this input.
In case of the Type 3 language Lushootseed (Tableau 4.2), the active
comes out as the optimal candidate as it violates none of the constraints.
In this language, third person subject agreement is zero and therefore
competition between suffixes will never take place. Consequently, the ac-
tive does not violate a single constraint. The passive, on the other hand,
violates the argument linking constraint and is deemed suboptimal. Nev-
ertheless, both active and passive are grammatical options in this lan-
guage and we do find an optional voice alternation.12 This optionality
can be easily incorporated into the analysis by integrating discourse con-
straints, e.g. link the most discourse prominent argument to the subject
function, which outrank the constraint SubAg (see Aissen 1999 for such
an approach).
So far I cannot account for the languages of Type 2, however. In
these languages 3-2 constructions are ruled out, but 3-1 constructions are
perfectly grammatical even though both constructions contain two overt
agreement suffixes (cf. ((39)) above). Apparently, another constraint in-
terferes which leads to this type of language. But what constraint should
12As discussed in the previous chapter the data are more complicated though. In
Lushootseed active sentences with two third person arguments are ungrammatical, but
for different reasons than the one discussed here. See section 3.3 for more discussion.
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this be?
Wiltschko and Burton (2004:53), who develop a morphological ac-
count for Halkomelem (Type 2; see also Wiltschko 2003; Brown et al.
2004), state that in this language the following *3-2 constraint holds:
“3rd person [subject] morphology cannot co-occur with 2nd person ob-
ject agreement morphology.” This constraint accounts for the fact that
both types of agreement are in complementary distribution: both occupy
the head position of vP (Brown et al. 2003:12). This analysis immedi-
ately raises the question why we only find a *3-2 constraint and not a *3-1
constraint, since first person object agreement is also assumed to hold the
same position as third person subject agreement. The answer given in
Brown et al. (2004:12) is that the 3-1 combination is well-formed because
it is “lexicalized” as a single agreement morpheme (-o`xes; -o`xwes);13 i.e.
it constitutes a kind of “portmanteau” morpheme. In contrast, the 3-2
combination is not lexicalized and thus the agreement endings compete
for the same position (cf. also Wiltschko and Burton 2004).
This account raises several questions. Why, for instance, is the 3-1
combination lexicalized but not the 3-2 combination? What is this so-
called ‘portmanteau’ morpheme assumed for Halkomelem? In order to
describe the other Type 2 languages we would have to assume that they
all have lexicalized the 3-1 combination as a portmanteau morpheme. In
other words, we would have to assume for all these languages that they
(independently) have developed a different portmanteau morpheme, given
that they have different agreement suffixes (as shown in Table 4.6 below).
Given that all these languages can develop the same strategy (develop-
ing a 3-1 portmanteau) on the basis of different agreement morphemes,
one wonders why no language has deviated from it and developed a 3-2
portmanteau morpheme. If language after language lexicalizes the 3-1
combination, but not the 3-2 combination, one would expect a principled
explanation for this pattern.
Related to this is the question why the 3-1 combination is not lexi-
calized in a Type 1 language like Lummi, or more in general why does
Lummi exclude both 3-1 and 3-2 sentences? Interestingly, in discussing
variation across Coast Salish, Wiltschko and Burton (2004) argue that al-
though Type 2 Halkomelem has no *3-1 constraint we do find it in Type
1 Lummi. Following the authors, the “crucial” reason for this is that in
Lummi first and second person are homophonous and thus share the same
paradigmatic cell. Therefore, the *3-1 and the *3-2 constraint affect the
combination of the same morphemes and in effect can be reduced to one
13These morphemes are composed of the third person subject suffix –es and the first
person object suffix –o`x or the second person object suffix –o`xw respectively.
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single constraint.14 This homophony, however, only exists in the singu-
lar, but not in the plural, as can be seen from Table 4.2 and thus cannot
be taken as a reason for the existence of the *3-1 constraint in Lummi,
which instead has to be stipulated separately. In order to account for
different language types this account thus has to stipulate different con-
straints for each: Type 1 has both *3-1 and *3-2, Type 2 has only *3-2
(plus lexicalization of 3-1) and Type 3 has no such constraints.
On a more general note, the motivation of the co-occurrence con-
straint (*3-2), based on the fact that third person subject agreement
and all object agreement morphemes are in complementary distribution
because both occupy the same position (v0) is problematic in itself. It
would namely predict that even in Lushootseed (Type 3) and in subor-
dinate clauses in Type 1 and Type 2, i.e., all contexts in which the third
person subject marker is phonologically zero, combinations with a third
person subject would be ruled out. Third person, even though phonolog-
ically zero, would still occupy its syntactic position in v0, i.e., its position
in the syntax is independent of its phonological realization (one of the
hallmarks of generative grammar). It thus shares this position with ob-
ject agreement and therefore such constructions should be ruled out. As
discussed above, this is not the case as in the absence of a phonological
third person subject marker the ungrammaticality of person combinations
disappears. Overall, this account is faced with a number of problems.
Instead of stipulating that only 3-2 morphemes are conflicting by as-
suming a lexicalization of the 3-1 combination, I argue that the difference
in well-formedness between 3-1 and 3-2 in Type 2 languages is due to a
third constraint, well-known from phonology (cf. Kager 1999):
(49) Onset[*vv]: avoid sequences of two adjacent vowels.
When we apply this constraint to Squamish, it correctly rules out the
combination 3-2 because the second person object suffix ends in a vowel
and the third person subject suffix starts with one. By contrast, the 3-1
combination is well-formed with respect to this constraint because the
first person object suffix ends in a consonant, cf. (39) above. This is
shown in Tableau 4.3.15
The fact that phonology is partly responsible for a voice alternation
may come as a surprise. There are two pieces of evidence in favour of this
analysis. First, there is diachronic evidence that vowel sequences are not
14This homophony is probably also taken as the explanation why neither the 3-2
combination nor the 3-1 combination is lexicalized in Lummi.
15Tableau 4.3 only shows the order in which the object suffix preceeds the subject
suffix. In Tableaux 4.4 and 4.5 I also discuss the reverse order.
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*vv
3-1 v-tr-s-as
3-2 v-tr-umi-as *
Tableau 4.3: The exclusion of adjacent vowels
Type Language Object Subject Gaps
1st 2nd 3rd
1 Lummi -oN@s -oN@s -@s 3-1, 3-2
2 Squamish -s -umi -as 3-2
2 Sechelt -ts -tsi -as 3-2
2 Saanich -s/-aN@s -s@/-aN@ -@s 3-2
2 Halkomelem -samPs -sam@ -@s 3-2
3 Lushootseed -s -sid ∅ -
Table 4.6: Suffix inventory and paradigm gaps
preferred when combining agreement suffixes. In Table 4.3 we have seen
that Jacobs (1994) analyzes the first and second person subject clitics as
chen and chexw. Kuipers (1967) notes in his Squamish grammar written
almost thirty years earlier that these clitics are actually composed of the
clitic ch meaning ‘to be, to act as’ and the subject suffixes -an (1.sg) and
-axw (2.sg). He states that the language at his time of writing still had
free occurrences of these subject markers, which are absent today due
to the merger with ch. Crucially, the first person subject markers -an
(1.sg), -at (1.pl) were never combined with the second person object
suffix -umi in the same word. Instead speakers would either attach the
markers to the clitic ch or take recourse to possessive prefixes. The second
person subject markers -axw (2.sg), -ap (2.pl) were nevertheless used as
free forms and could be attached to the first person object markers -s
and -umulh, which both end in a consonant. This clearly shows that the
language avoids sequences of vowels in its agreement paradigms.
Secondly, there is cross-linguistic evidence within the Coast Salish
branch. Consider the overview presented in Table 4.6.16 It shows that
all languages with a restriction only on 3-2 sentences have a first person
16This table only shows the singular markers. The plural markers follow the same
pattern as (or are identical to) the singular ones: if the singular marker ends in a
vowel/consonant the plural will also end in a vowel/consonant. The third subject
person marker is identical in singular and plural. The data in this table come from
the following sources: Squamish (Jacobs 1994), Sechelt (Beaumont 1985), Saanich
(Montler 1986, 1996), Halkomelem (Galloway 1993), Lummi (Jelinek 1993a), Lushoot-
seed (Hukari 1976).
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V(Agt/3-Pat/1) *vv Align-P SubAg Align-A
a. Act(Su/3/suf-Oj/1/suf) *!
v-tr-as-s
 b. Act(Oj/1/suf-Su/3/suf) *
v-tr-s-as
c. Pas(Su/1-NSu/3) *!
su/1 v-tr-pass obl/3
Tableau 4.4: Evaluation of a 3-1 sentence in Squamish (Type 2)
object suffix ending in a consonant, a second person object suffix ending
in a vowel, and a third person subject suffix starting with a vowel. This
neatly shows the correlation between the phonological shape of the suffixes
and the exclusion of certain suffix combinations. The other two languages
listed in the table for comparison do not show this pattern and more
importantly show different paradigm gaps. Thus, instead of stipulating
the lexicalization of the 3-1 combination in language after language even
though the languages differ from each other in the morphophonological
make up of their agreement markers, this constraint gives a principled
explanation why we find exclusion of 3-2 only in these languages.
We have already seen above that Type 1 and 3 languages can be
captured by means of the two constraint types on argument linking and
suffix alignment. With this third constraint on syllable shape Type 2
languages can be modeled as well. Consider the constraint ranking in (50),
which deviates from the previous ranking with respect to the position of
SubAg:
(50) Constraint Ranking for Type 2 languages:
*vv >> Align-P >> SubAg >> Align-A
With this constraint ranking we correctly predict that in this language
type only 3-2 active constructions are ruled out, whereas 3-1 is fine. This
can be seen by comparing Tableaux 4.4 and 4.5.
Tableau 4.4 shows that in the case of a 3-1 input the active with
the subject suffix following the object suffix correctly comes out as the
optimal output (cf. example (39)[a]). The active with the reverse order
is ruled out because it violates the constraint on object alignment. The
passive comes out as a suboptimal candidate but again, if we would to take
discourse constraints into account which are higher ranked, then SubAg
the passive may come out as an optimal candidate.17 In the case of a 3-2
17It may be possible to reduce the constraint SubAg to such discourse constraints,
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V(Agt/3-Pat/2) *vv Align-P SubAg Align-A
a. Act(Su/3/suf-Oj/2/suf) *!
v-tr-as-umi
b. Act(Oj/2/suf-Su/3/suf) *! *
v-tr-umi-as
 c. Pas(Su/2-NSu/3) *
su/2 v-tr-pass obl/3
Tableau 4.5: Evaluation of a 3-2 sentence in Squamish (Type 2)
input both active constructions are ruled out (Tableau 4.5), the subject-
object order because it violates the constraint on object alignment and
the object-subject order because it violates the highest-ranked constraint
on vowel sequences. The passive therefore comes out as the winning
candidate since it only violates the lower ranked constraint on argument
linking.
So far I have shown that the obligatory voice alternation from active
to passive found in Coast Salish languages can be accounted for by a
cross-modular model in which three types of constraints are in conflict
with one another. In this approach the different paradigm gaps observed
in different languages do not fall out from constraints stipulated for each
language only in relation to this single phenomenon (see the discussion of
Wiltschko and Burton’s 2004 approach above), but rather fall out from
the conflict between constraints present in the grammar for independent
reasons, that is, to account for other facts such as suffix placement and
syllable shape.
Moreover, my account can also explain the ungrammaticalities found
in the passive voice. Consider again the contrast between the two exam-
ples below:
Lummi (Coast Salish; Jelinek 1993b:167-168)
(51) *LeN-t-N=sxw
see-tr-intr-2sg.su
’@-oN@s/’@=s@n.
obl-1sg.obj/obl=1sg.su
‘You were seen by me.’
(52) LeN-t-N=sxw
see-tr-intr-2sg.su
’@
obl
c@
det
’@s.
1sg.emph
‘You were seen by ME.’
in this way providing a more natural account of the choice of one voice construction
over the other in case both are grammatical. However, in order to pursue this we first
need a better understanding of the motivations behind this free voice alternation (see
Jacobs 1994 for discussion of the use of active and passive constructions in Squamish).
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The difference in grammaticality between the passive construction in (51)
and the one in (52) in my account can be explained by the alignment
constraints also involved in explaining the gaps in the active paradigm.
They require an agreement suffix to align with a verb stem and, following
footnote 11, agreement clitics to align with a predicate. In the ungram-
matical example (51) the suffix or clitic is not aligned with either a stem
or a predicate but with the oblique prepositional marker ’@. This means
that in this example either alignment constraint would be violated, which
demotes such constructions to a suboptimal status. Given that there ex-
ists no such alignment constraint for independent pronouns, (52) can
come out as the optimal candidate. This shows how with the same set of
constraints, which are independently motivated, we can account for the
ungrammaticalities observed in the Coast Salish active and passive voice.
I take this to be convincing evidence to consider the account presented
in this section superior to an account in terms of person (hierarchies).
4.4 Differential Object Marking: Animacy vs.
Definiteness
In the present section I discuss the influence of two distinct prominence
features on differential object marking (DOM), a phenomenon which was
already scrutinized in the previous chapter and earlier on in this chapter.18
In the previous chapter I have made a distinction between DOM based
on recoverability and that based on prominence. Here prominence-based
DOM will be central. In particular, I focus on animacy and definite-
ness/specificity.
Recall that the recurrent DOM pattern is that animates receive overt
marking whereas inanimates generally stay unmarked. A similar pat-
tern can be observed for DOM based on definiteness or specificity: only
definite/specific objects tend to be overtly case marked (cf. the discussion
of Turkish and Hebrew in 4.1). Indeed, many authors have proposed a
systematic correlation between case and semantic interpretation (cf. Enc¸
1991; de Hoop 1992; Butt 1993; Ramchand 1997; Aissen 2003; Bleam
2005; Danon 2006). This correlation always seems to fall out in the fol-
lowing way that overt/accusative case corresponds with a strong interpre-
tation, i.e., a definite, specific, de re, or presuppositional interpretation,
and absence of case or oblique case with a weak interpretation, i.e., an in-
definite, non-specific, de dicto, or non-presuppositional interpretation.19
18This section is partially based on de Swart and de Hoop (2007).
19In type-theoretical terms weak objects are often equated with the property de-
noting type 〈e,t〉 or the type 〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉 of a predicate modifier. Strong objects are
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It thus seems that DOM based on definiteness/specificity follows exactly
the same pattern as does animacy-based DOM.
Nevertheless, I will argue that this similarity between animacy and
definiteness/specificity with respect to DOM cannot be maintained. I
will show that the influence of the one can counteract the influence of
the other. That is, the association between case and a definite/specific
interpretation can be counteracted by the association of this case with
an animate argument. Furthermore, I argue that in the cases discussed,
definiteness/specificity does not drive DOM but rather should be viewed
as the interpretational result of the use of case marking. Animacy and
definiteness thus play different roles with respect to differential object
marking. These different roles are argued to be the consequence of a fun-
damental difference between the two semantic features: whereas animacy
is an inherent feature of noun phrases, this is not the case for definiteness
or specificity.
The relevant domain of investigation which I will use to tease apart
the different roles played by animacy and definiteness/specificity is that
of two-dimensional DOM. Whereas in one-dimensional languages, DOM
is related to a single prominence feature, in two-dimensional systems it
is determined by a combination of two features (cf. Aissen 2003). An
example of such a two-dimensional system was discussed in the previous
chapter (section 3.5): in Spanish DOM is determined by an interplay
between animacy and definiteness/specificity . Below, I will focus on the
two-dimensional DOM systems of two South Asian languages, Hindi and
Kannada.
Starting with Hindi, in which direct objects can be marked with ko,
the same marker that is used for indirect objects.20 In the present discus-
sion I limit myself to the use of ko on direct objects that occur without a
determiner. The differential use of ko on direct objects has received much
attention in the literature (see Mohanan 1990; Butt 1993; Singh 1994; Mc-
Gregor 1995; Aissen 2003; de Hoop and Narasimhan 2005; Kachru 2006;
de Hoop and Narasimhan to appear, a.o.) and two factors can be dis-
tinguished that influence it. On the one hand, there is animacy as ko is
equated with type e or the generalized quantifier type 〈〈e,t〉,t〉 (cf. de Hoop 1992; Van
Geenhoven 1998b). See also section 2.1.3.
20In the interlinear gloss I label the use of ko on indirect objects as dative (dat) and
the use on direct objects as ko. In this chapter I remain agnostic as to the theoretical
case status of ko on direct objects. Some authors identify it with accusative case (e.g.,
Mohanan 1990) and label the unmarked object with nominative case. Others reject
this analysis and label the unmarked object nominative in presence of a non-nominative
subject, but accusative in the presence of a nominative subject (e.g., Anand and Nevins
2006; Woolford, to appear). The status of ko is unclear under the latter account and
is sometimes simply referred to as objective case.
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obligatory for objects that are human, but not for objects that are ani-
mate or inanimate. On the other hand, the occurrence of ko is related to
the definiteness or specificity of the direct object. Regarding the latter
factor authors differ as to whether they take definiteness or specificity
to be the primary factor. Mohanan (1990), for instance, seems to relate
DOM in Hindi mainly to definiteness, with specificity playing a secondary
role. Butt (1993), on the other hand, takes specificity to be the relevant
notion but acknowledges that it interacts with definiteness. I will not
make a principled choice for one or the other factor but instead I follow
the respective authors providing the data. Whether we call the interpre-
tation given to a ko-marked direct object definite or specific, and that of
an unmarked direct object indefinite or non-specific, does not affect my
claim that animacy takes priority over definiteness/specificity in the use
of ko.21
Following Mohanan (1990), human objects have to be obligatorily
marked with ko. When a human object is marked, it can be interpreted
as definite or indefinite. When such an object occurs without ko this
results in an ungrammatical sentence. This contrast is shown in (53) and
(54) for the noun ‘child’:
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Mohanan 1990:103)
(53) Ilaa-ne
Ila-erg
bacce-ko
child-ko
uthayaa.
lift.pf
‘Ila lifted the/a child.’
(54) *Ilaa-ne
Ila-erg
baccaa
child
uthayaa.
lift.pf
In the absence of a determiner, inanimate nouns, on the other hand, can
either be marked with ko or be left unmarked. The use of ko does have
repercussions for the interpretation associated with the direct object. An
unmarked inanimate can be interpreted as definite or indefinite, as is
shown in (55):
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Mohanan 1990:103)
(55) Ilaa-ne
Ila-erg
haar
necklace
uthaayaa.
lift.pf
‘Ila lifted a/the necklace.’
Definiteness of an inanimate noun is expressed by using ko. This is shown
for the noun ‘necklace’ in (56) below:
21The distinction between definiteness and specificity is notoriously difficult (see
von Heusinger 2002 for a discussion).
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Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Mohanan 1990:104)
(56) Ilaa-ne
Ila-erg
haar-ko
necklace-ko
uthayaa.
lift.pf
‘Ila lifted the necklace.’
The above examples show that both animacy and definiteness play a role
in differential object marking in Hindi. Their roles are, nevertheless,
clearly differentiated. Consider the table in (57):
(57) human -human
ko def/indef def
∅ * def/indef
From this table we can conclude two things: (i) the use of ko on direct
objects is primarily triggered by the humanness of the direct object; (ii)
definiteness does not trigger the use of ko but rather is an effect of the
use of this marker. Let me start with the second claim. If we were to
claim that definiteness triggers case marking on Hindi direct objects we
would have trouble explaining why indefinite human objects are marked
with ko as well. Furthermore, it is left unexplained why in the absence
of case marking both a definite and an indefinite reading are possible for
non-human objects. If definiteness triggers case marking we would expect
a definite reading always to co-occur with ko. The fact that both a def-
inite and an indefinite reading are possible for an unmarked non-human
object is well established (cf. Butt 1993), and either reading can be fil-
tered out in a specific linguistic context. The indefinite reading can be
assessed with the following example provided by Butt (1993; who labels
it the non-specific reading) in which the context of (58a) assures that the
object in (58b) has to be interpreted as indefinite/non-specific:
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Butt 1993:90-91)
(58) a. Adnaan
Adnan.nom
aaj
today
raat=kii
night=gen
salen
curry
ke-liye
for
murvii
chicken
cah-taa
want-imp
thaa.
be.pst
‘Adnan wanted chicken for tonight’s curry.’
b. Us=ke
he=gen
xansaame-ne
cook-erg
bazaar=se
market=from
murvii
chicken
xariid-ii.
buy-pf
‘His cook bought a chicken from the market.’
The definite interpretation of an unmarked direct object, by contrast,
becomes obligatory in certain contexts involving movement of the direct
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object. Consider the following two examples:
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Mohanan and Mohanan 1994:169)
(59) Sunaar-ne
goldsmith-erg
lad. kii-ko
girl-dat
haar
necklace
bhejaa.
sent
‘The/?a goldsmith sent the/a necklace to the/a girl.’
(60) Sunaar-ne
goldsmith-erg
haar
necklace
lad. kii-ko
girl-dat
bhejaa.
sent
‘The/?a goldsmith sent the/*a necklace to the/*a girl.’
The two examples in (59) and (60) show how word order influences the
possible interpretations of an unmarked direct object. In (59) the di-
rect object follows the indirect object and can be interpreted as either
indefinite or definite. In (60), in which the direct object precedes the
indirect object, the only possible reading is a definite one. This exam-
ple clearly shows that a definite reading is perfectly possible without the
occurrence of overt case marking, in this way providing counterevidence
to an analysis in which the occurrence of the case marker is triggered by
the definiteness of the object. In order to establish that the occurrence
of ko is not prohibited by the fact that it already occurs on the indirect
object (a restriction which was discussed for Spanish in 3.5), which would
save an analysis in which definiteness triggers case marking, consider the
following example:
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Bhatt and Anagnostopoulou 1996:13)
(61) Ram-ne
Ram-erg
chitthii-ko
letter-ko
Anita-ko
Anita-dat
bhej-aa.
send-pf
‘Ram send the letter to Anita.’
In (61), the case marker ko appears on the direct object ‘letter’ irre-
spective of its occurrence on the indirect object. Clearly, if definiteness
triggers the occurrence of ko in (61), we would have expected it to occur
in (60) as well.22
Definiteness plays a role in differential object marking in Hindi, but I
have argued that it does not trigger the occurrence of the object marker.
The other possibility is that the case marker itself triggers a definite in-
terpretation. This is in accordance with the conclusion reached in Butt
(1993) who argues that ko is a marker of specificity. The fact that ko-
marked non-human objects have to be interpreted as definite was already
22The double occurrence of ko does have repercussions for the possible word orders.
In case both the direct and indirect object are ko-marked, the direct object has to
precede the indirect object (cf. Bhatt and Anagnostopoulou 1996).
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established in example (56) and is also demonstrated in (62). The di-
rect object ‘chicken’ in (62) has to be interpreted as definite (specific in
Butt’s terminology) and as such it is infelicitous in the context requiring
indefinite/non-specific elements in (58).
Hindi (Indo-Aryan; Butt 1993:91)
(62) Xansaame-ne
cook-erg
bazaar=se
market=from
murvii-ko
chicken-ko
xariid-aa.
buy-pf
‘The cook bought a particular/the chicken from the market.’
The characterization of ko as a definiteness/specificity marker (as ar-
gued for in Butt 1993) however does not hold across-the-board, but only
within the domain of non-human objects. This brings me to the first
claim I made above with respect to the table in (57), i.e., ko is primarily
triggered by animacy. If we characterize ko as a definiteness/specificity
marker we leave unexplained the fact that its occurrence on human direct
objects is compatible with both a definite and an indefinite reading, cf.
(53) above. In my view the absence of an unambiguous reading for such
objects is due to the fact that they require overt case marking because
of their animacy feature, i.e., high animacy triggers the case marking.
Therefore, case can no longer trigger an alternation in definiteness. This
in contrast to less animate nouns, where the case alternation clearly in-
fluences definiteness/specificity. In other words, the marking of direct
objects with ko due to animacy takes priority over the function of ko
as a definiteness/specificity marker. Only in contexts in which the case
marker is not required by the animacy of the direct object can it be used
to encode definiteness/specificity.
Further evidence for my claim that animacy takes priority over definite-
ness/specificity in DOM can be found in Kannada, a Dravidian language
with a differential object marking system very similar to that of Hindi
(cf. Lidz 1999, 2006). As in Hindi the occurrence of accusative case on
direct objects interacts with the animacy and specificity of the object.
In Kannada, human and animate direct objects are obligatorily marked
with accusative case. This is shown for human objects by the contrast in
grammaticality between (63) and (64):
Kannada (Dravidian; Lidz 2006:11)
(63) *Naanu
I.nom
sekretari
secretary
huDuk-utt-idd-eene.
look.for-npst-be-1sg
‘I am looking for a secretary.’
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(64) Naanu
I.nom
sekretari-yannu
secretary-acc
huDuk-utt-idd-eene.
look.for-npst-be-1sg
‘I am looking for a secretary.’23
Inanimate objects, on the other hand, can occur with or without ac-
cusative case:
Kannada (Dravidian; Lidz 2006:11)
(65) Naanu
I.nom
pustaka
book
huDuk-utt-idd-eene.
look.for-npst-be-1sg
‘I am looking for a book.’
(66) Naanu
I.nom
pustaka-vannu
book-acc
huDuk-utt-idd-eene.
look.for-npst-be-1sg
‘I am looking for a book.’
As for the interpretation of the direct objects, Lidz notes that an ani-
mate direct object marked with accusative case can either be interpreted
as non-specific or specific (de dicto or de re in the terminology used by
Lidz). The same holds for inanimate objects without accusative case.
Inanimate objects which occur with accusative case have to be inter-
preted as specific (de re). The pattern is summarized in the table in (67):
(67) animate inanimate
acc de dicto/de re de re
∅ * de dicto/de re
This pattern looks very similar to that of Hindi, as again we find that
an analysis of the accusative case as a specificity marker breaks down in
the domain of animate direct objects. It cannot be used as a specificity
marker when it is required by the animacy of the direct object. In other
words, animacy takes priority over definiteness/specificity. As a result,
the correlation between accusative case and a strong interpretation does
exist, but not across-the-board. That is, it only holds in the domain of
non-humans (Hindi) or inanimates (Kannada).
The analysis presented here differs from the account provided by Ais-
sen (2003). Whereas Aissen treats animacy and definiteness on a par,
taking both features to be triggers for overt case, in my view only ani-
macy acts in this way. Definiteness, by contrast, is viewed as the result
of case marking as case can trigger the semantic interpretation associated
with an object. Concentrating on Hindi, this difference between both
23The occurrence of the glide v ([w]) or y ([j]) in the initial position of the accusative
ending is determined by the preceding vowel.
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approaches emerges most clearly in the domain of non-human definite
objects. As shown in the table in (57) above such objects can occur with
or without ko. From a perspective in which the definiteness of an object
functions as a trigger for the occurrence of the object marker this option-
ality is unexpected. In order to model this optionality Aissen assumes
that the constraint that forces overt case on definite non-human objects
can rerank with respect to a constraint which penalizes the use of overt
case marking. When the former constraint outranks the latter the defi-
nite object will be marked with ko but not when the constraint ranking
is reversed.
In my account, in which definiteness does not trigger the use of case
marking but rather is a result of the use of this case marker, I do not
have to take recourse to such optionality to explain this pattern. Instead,
I can analyze the pattern in terms of the speaker taking into account the
perspective of the hearer. In case of a human direct object the speaker is
forced to use ko due to the animacy feature of the object. In the case of
a non-human direct object the animacy feature does not require ko and
the marker can be used to express the definiteness of the object. In this
case the speaker has a choice: if he wants to be sure that the hearer will
interpret the direct object as definite he uses ko. If he, on the other hand,
does not want to force a particular interpretation on the direct object,
he can leave it unmarked. Thus, although on the surface the pattern
may look like one involving true optionality, i.e., the speaker can choose
whether or not to use ko on a definite inanimate direct object, it rather
seems to be the result of a principled choice on behalf of the speaker to
mark the direct object explicitly as definite or not.
The account sketched above, in which animacy takes priority over
definiteness, can be reinterpreted as a conflict between the violable con-
straints given in (68):
(68) a. Hum → object case.
b. object case → Def.
The constraint in (68a) is a production constraint, which requires human
objects to be marked with case (as was introduced in section 3.5 above).
The constraint in (68b), by contrast, is an interpretation constraint which
assigns a definite interpretation to case marked objects. The fact that
animacy takes priority over definiteness can be modeled by ranking the
production constraint above the interpretation constraint. Furthermore,
both constraints must be available to the hearer as well as to the speaker.
That is, we need a bidirectional model like the one proposed in the pre-
vious chapter. This model would have to be modified in such a way that
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the speaker not only takes into account the hearer’s perspective but the
hearer also takes into account the speaker’s perspective.24
4.4.1 Animacy vs. Definiteness/Specificity
Above, I have shown that animacy takes priority over definiteness. But
why should this be the case? The answer to this question lies in a fun-
damental difference between the semantic feature of animacy and that of
definiteness/specificity. Animacy is an inherent feature of noun phrases
(see Comrie 1989; Dahl 2007). Every noun is lexically specified for an
animacy feature and this feature cannot be altered by linguistic struc-
ture. That is, if we for instance would remove the case ending from the
Latin animate noun hominem ‘man.acc’ this would not change it from
an animate referring noun into an inanimate referring noun. Indeed, on
a more general note, one would be hard pressed to find in the languages
of the world something that can be truly labelled an animacy marker, a
piece of morphology that marks and can change the animacy feature of a
noun.
The opposite holds for definiteness and specificity. Nouns are not in-
herently specified for definiteness or specificity, but in many languages
linguistic devices exist which can make a given noun phrase definite or
specific. In English, for instance, the same noun man can be turned
into a definite noun phrase by addition of the article the and likewise be
made indefinite by means of the article a. English lacks a pure speci-
ficity marker, although the content words certain and particular come
close. Instead, this feature is attributed to nouns, and can be changed,
in context. There are also languages which do have dedicated pieces of
morphology to mark the specificity of nouns and case marking is an of-
ten cited example. Recall the use of accusative case on direct objects
in Turkish to mark them as specific. Other languages for which it has
been argued that case marking indicates the specificity of a noun include
24I will not develop the details of such a model. It should be noted that the weak
version of Bidirectional Optimality Theory as formulated by Blutner (2000) cannot be
applied to the data discussed, even though it may seem an ideal model to formalize
the intuition expressed, as it explicitly integrates both the hearer’s and the speaker’s
perspective by means of Gricean reasoning. This is due to the rigid pairing of forms
and meanings in this approach, i.e., each form corresponds to exactly one meaning and
vice versa. In the data discussed, however, we find that a single form, e.g., a ko-marked
human object, can occur with two meanings, i.e., it can be both definite and indefinite.
The Gricean reasoning employed by weak Bidirectional Optimality Theory, never-
theless, is on the right track but it seems that in order to formalize the account sketched
here we need the stronger form of ‘mutual knowledge’ on behalf of the speaker (S) and
hearer (H) such the “S knows that H knows that S knows that H knows (and so on ad
infinitum) that S has [a] particular intention” (Levinson 1983:16).
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Persian (Karimi 1996, a.o.) and Gujarati (Mistry 1998).
Due to the fact that animacy is an inherent feature of nouns, a case
system in which animacy takes priority over definiteness/specificity is the
only possible way in which one case morpheme can make reference to both
features. The reverse situation is hard to think of: a system in which case
is first assigned on the basis of definiteness and for nouns which do not
have the required definiteness feature case can be used to indicate the
animacy of a noun.
The difference in inherence is not the only difference between ani-
macy and definiteness. As shown in the previous chapter, animacy but
not definiteness may be related to disambiguation mechanisms. Animacy
provides information about the semantic role of an argument. However,
when two arguments have the same animacy value, ambiguity may arise
with respect to semantic roles. As a result the animacy of arguments
can be a reason to use overt case marking in order to explicate its se-
mantic role. Given that the definiteness of an argument does not provide
information about its semantic role, this feature cannot be linked to the
disambiguating function of case marking in the same way. A nice example
of a language which teases apart animacy and definiteness with respect
to this distinguishing function of case is Mandarin Chinese. The present
discussion is based on Yang and van Bergen (2007; see also van Bergen
2006, 2007).
The basic word order of Mandarin is SVO. Sometimes, however, po-
sitioning of the object in preverbal position is allowed or even obligatory.
The latter situation is due to the fact that only one constituent is allowed
to appear in postverbal position. In case the object appears in prever-
bal position it can or sometimes even has to be marked with the marker
ba, originally a lexical verb meaning ‘to hold, to take’. Its status in the
present-day language is a hotly debated issue in Chinese linguistics. In the
present discussion, I follow Yang and van Bergen (2007) who treat ba as a
case marker. Much of the discussion concerning the ba-construction has
concentrated on identifying which elements can enter this construction.
Yang and van Bergen (2007) take a slightly different angle by looking at
which factors influence whether ba is obligatory or not with the elements
which can enter the construction.
Yang and van Bergen show that the use of ba depends on both an-
imacy and definiteness, thus making Mandarin a language with a two-
dimensional DOM system.25 The examples in (69)-(71) show that ba is
25In fact, Yang and van Bergen (2007) argue that Mandarin has a three-dimensional
DOM system as apart from animacy and definiteness also the syntactic feature of word
order plays a role. That is, the marking of objects with ba is restricted to preverbal
objects.
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obligatory for human objects independent of their definiteness. The same
holds for animate objects.
Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan; van Bergen 2006)
(69) Ta
He
*(ba)
ba
na-ge
that-cl
laoshi
teacher
piping
criticise
le.
prt
’He criticised that teacher.’
(70) Ta
He
*(ba)
ba
yi-ge
a-cl
laoshi
teacher
piping
criticise
le.
prt
’He criticised a teacher.’
(71) Ta
He
*(ba)
ba
laoshi
teacher
piping
criticise
le.
prt
’He criticised the teacher.’
It should be noted that bare nouns in preverbal position receive a definite
interpretation.
Inanimate objects show a pattern different from the one for human
and animate objects. Ba is optional for inanimate objects that are overtly
marked with a definite determiner (72) and with bare inanimate objects
(73):
Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan; van Bergen 2006)
(72) Ta
He
(ba)
(ba)
na-ge
that-cl
pingguo
apple
chi
eat
le.
prt
’He ate that apple.’
(73) Ta
He
(ba)
(ba)
pingguo
apple
chi
eat
le.
prt
’He ate the apple.’
For inanimate objects that are overtly marked with an indefinite deter-
miner (yige), the use of ba is obligatory.26 This is shown in (74):
Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan; van Bergen 2006)
(74) Ta
He
*(ba)
ba
yi-ge
one-cl
pingguo
apple
chi
eat
le.
prt
’He ate an apple.’
These data show that animacy and definiteness work in different direc-
tions in Mandarin Chinese. Objects high in the animacy hierarchy are
obligatorily marked whereas the ones low in the hierarchy are not. For
definiteness the opposite pattern holds: elements low in the definiteness
26Abstracting away from the role of aspect, for the moment. See below for discussion.
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hierarchy are obligatorily marked and the ones high in the hierarchy not.
Deviating slightly from the analysis presented in Yang and van Bergen
(2007), we can attribute the opposite behavior of animacy and definite-
ness to two different functions fulfilled by ba.
On the one hand, ba is used to mark objects in order to distinguish
them from the subject. Recall that the canonical word order in Mandarin
is SVO and that in this order ba cannot be used. When the object moves
to the preverbal position and ends up at the same side of the verb as the
subject, ba can and sometimes must be used. In the canonical SVO order,
the verb distinguishes the subject from the object. In an SOV ordering
of the arguments, the verb no longer can fulfill its distinguishing role and
therefore another element, i.e., ba, takes over this function.27
An additional factor which supports such a distinguishability analysis
is the fact that apart from a preverbal subject and object position, Man-
darin sentences also have a clause initial topic position. This implies that
an NP NP V ordering could be either interpreted as topic/object-subject
or as topic/subject-object. The use of ba distinguishes the latter ordering
from the former. Indeed without ba a sentence with two animate prever-
bal NPs would be interpreted as topic(object)-subject as is shown in (75):
Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan; Yang and van Bergen 2007:6)
(75) Laohu
tiger
wo
I
chi
eat
le.
prt
‘I ate the tiger.’
Given that inanimate NPs do not qualify as natural subjects (cf. Ais-
sen 2003; see also chapter 3), the distinguishing function explains why
they need not be obligatorily marked in preverbal position. The optional
marking of (some) inanimate objects may be attributed to the fact that
although strictly speaking ba is not necessary to distinguish the object
from the subject, its presence still speeds up the interpretational process-
ing of sentences.
The other function of ba is related to definiteness and to restrictions
of the preverbal position with respect to this feature. It seems that the
preverbal position is restricted to elements which are semantically strong
and that ba is used to license elements that do not meet that requirement.
That the preverbal position requires strong elements can be seen from the
27This can be compared to the difference between clauses with local persons and
ones with solely third persons, discussed in the previous chapter. Only in the latter
case disambiguation is needed, as in the former grammatical functions are identified by
unique agreement morphology. Likewise, in Mandarin, SVO, but not SOV, uniquely
identifies the grammatical functions of arguments. Therefore, only in the latter case is
overt marking of the object needed.
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fact that bare nouns which can be either definite or indefinite, receive a
definite interpretation in preverbal position, cf. (71) above. The licensing
nature of ba with respect to weak elements can be illustrated with the
contrast between the example in (74) above and the ones in (76) and (77)
below.
Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan; Yang and van Bergen 2007:10-11)
(76) Ta
He
(ba)
(ba)
yi-ge
one-cl
pingguo
apple
chi-wan
eat-finish
le.
prt
’He finished an apple.’
(77) Ta
He
(ba)
(ba)
yi-ge
one-cl
pingguo
apple
dou
all
chi
eat
le.
prt
’He finished an apple.’
In (74) the use of ba on the weak indefinite is obligatory. By contrast,
the examples in (76) and (77) show that this obligatoriness disappears
when the indefinite object is given a strong interpretation. This can be
achieved by either embedding it under an accomplishment predicate (76)
(cf. Sybesma 1992) or by modifying it with a quantificational element
dou. As stated above, the fact that use of ba is still optional in these
cases can be ascribed to the distinguishing function it fulfills as well.
Mandarin Chinese provides an example of a language in which ani-
macy and definiteness both influence the use of a single object marker,
but each in their own way. Animacy is related to the distinguishing func-
tion of the object marker and definiteness to a ‘licensing’ function. The
interplay of these two functions results in an intricate pattern in which
objects sometimes are marked due to both functions (animate indefinite
objects), sometimes due to the distinguishing function only (animate defi-
nite objects), and sometimes due to the licensing function only (inanimate
indefinite objects). Thus, Mandarin Chinese can be seen as an additional
illustration of the claim put forward in this section that animacy and
definiteness do not influence case marking in the same way.
4.4.2 Split vs. Fluid Case Alternations
The different relations that animacy and definiteness/specificity exhibit
towards case marking can be analyzed as reflections of a more funda-
mental distinction among case alternations, that between split and fluid
alternations (de Hoop and Malchukov 2007). A case alternation based
on animacy exemplifies a split alternation as within one linguistic con-
text, i.e., animate nouns, case marking is obligatory, whereas it is not
in another linguistic context, i.e., inanimate nouns. A case alternation
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based on definiteness/specificity, on the other hand, exemplifies a fluid
case alternation as within one linguistic context the same noun can either
be case marked or not with a concomitant change in meaning. Thus, in
Hindi, the fact that human nouns obligatorily take ko represents a split
case alternation between human and non-human nouns. The fact that
within the class of non-human nouns a noun can either take ko or not
with a concomitant change in meaning represents a fluid alternation.
The fact that case marking on the basis of animacy represents a split
case alternation can be explained by the fact that animacy is an inherent
feature of noun phrases. If a language assigned case marking on the basis
of animacy, it can only do so by means of splitting the class of noun
phrases into groups along the animacy hierarchy, as it cannot change the
animacy of nouns. A case alternation based on definiteness/specificity
can nevertheless result in a fluid alternation. However, so far I have only
considered the relation between animacy and definiteness/specificity in
the domain of bare nouns.
There are often also possibilities to mark nouns lexically for their
definiteness by means of articles and other determiners. Marking an NP
with a definite determiner turns it into a DP with an inherent definiteness
value. That is, the DP the man due to the lexical definiteness value of its
determiner will be interpreted as definite. Similarly, the indefinite DP a
man due to its lexical indefiniteness value will be interpreted as indefinite.
The use of case marking cannot influence this lexical definiteness value
of a DP. A lexically definite DP remains definite with or without case
and the same holds for a lexically indefinite DP although the use of case
may result in an indefinite specific interpretation in the latter case (a
fluid alternation). Nevertheless, when one finds fluid case alternations
with bare NPs, one may expect to find split case alternations on the basis
of lexical definiteness. This expectation is confirmed by the data to be
discussed below.
Consider the following Hebrew examples, discussed in chapter 2, which
show that in in this language DOM is related to definiteness:
Hebrew (Semitic; Aissen 2003:453)
(78) Ha-seret
the-movie
herPa
showed
’et-ha-milxama.
et-the-war
‘The movie showed the war.’
(79) Ha-seret
the-movie
herPa
showed
(*’et)-milxama.
et-war
‘The movie showed a war.’
The contrast between (78) and (79) suggests that definite objects go with
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the object marker ’et and that indefinite objects resist this marker. Danon
(2001), however, argues that an account based on the semantic definite-
ness of noun phrases cannot explain all the occurrences of this object
marker. For instance, the examples in (80) and (81) are problematic for
such an analysis:
Hebrew (Semitic; Danon 2001:1076)
(80) KaraPti
I-read
sefer
book
ze.
this
‘I read this book.’
(81) KaraPti
I-read
’et-ha-sefer
et-the-book
ha-ze.
the-this
‘I read this book.’
From a semantic point of view the object in (80) is as definite as the one in
(81). In fact, there does not seem to be any semantic difference between
the two examples. Nevertheless, only the object in (81) occurs with the
object marker. This contrast clearly cannot be explained by referring to
semantic definiteness. There is, however, a syntactic difference between
the two examples, as only the object in (81) is preceded by the definite
article ha. Danon (2001) takes this presence of the definite article to be
a prerequisite for the occurrence of the object marker: only objects that
are preceded by the article ha can be marked with ’et.
Further evidence for the fact that DOM in Hebrew is determined by
the presence of the definite article comes from the following examples:
Hebrew (Semitic; Danon 2001:1076)
(82) RiPayanti
interviewed.1sg
(*et)
(et)
kol
every
muPamad
candidate
(*ha-)recini.
(the)-serious
‘I interviewed every serious candidate.’
(83) RiPayanti
interviewed.1sg
*(et)
(et)
kol
every
ha-muPamadim
the-candidates
ha-reciniyim.
the-serious.pl
‘I interviewed all the serious candidates.’
These examples present universally quantified DPs with the determiner
kol meaning ‘every’/‘each’/‘all’. In order to appreciate these examples
one should know that Hebrew has obligatory definiteness agreement be-
tween nouns and adjectives. If a noun is preceded by the definite article
ha its adjective has to be as well, but if the noun is not preceded by the
article the adjective cannot be either. The determiner kol can precede
both singular indefinite and singular/plural definite nouns. Danon notes
that although there are semantic differences between the examples in (82)
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and (83) these do not concern the semantic definiteness, as most semantic
approaches would treat them as equivalent in this respect. Again, how-
ever, we see that (82) cannot occur with the object marker, whereas (83)
has to. And again we find a difference in lexical definiteness: the example
preceded by the object marker (83) is marked with the definite article,
whereas the example without the object marker (82) is not, as can be
seen from the ungrammaticality of the use of ha on the adjective recini.
Danon (2001) discusses additional evidence from partitives and
construct-state nominals to support the claim that DOM in Hebrew is
not driven by semantic definiteness but by the presence of the definite
article. Hebrew thus seems to represent a language with a split case al-
ternation in which the split is based on the lexical definiteness of the
object.
The above discussion shows that definiteness is not related to the
occurrence of overt case marking in a uniform way. On the one hand,
lexical definiteness can trigger the occurrence of case marking, and, on the
other hand, case marking can trigger the semantic definiteness assigned
to a noun phrase. In other words, definiteness can be involved in both
a split and a fluid case alternation. Approaches that make use of the
definiteness hierarchy repeated from (20) conflate this dual behaviour of
definiteness:
(84) Definiteness Scale: Pronouns > Proper Names > Definite NPs
> Indefinite Specific NPs > Indefinite Non-specific NPs
On the one hand, this hierarchy contains what one could call a lexical
definiteness or NP type hierarchy which triggers split alternations like
the one found in Hebrew. This hierarchy is given in (85):
(85) Lexical Definiteness/NP Type Hierarchy : Pronouns > Proper
Names > Definite NPs > Indefinite NPs
On the other hand, the hierarchy in (84) also incorporates interpreta-
tional effects of the use of case marking on certain types of noun phrases.
That is, indefinite NPs can be interpreted as specific or non-specific when
they occur with or without case respectively. The same holds for bare
nouns, cf. the discussion of Hindi and Kannada above. The lower part
of the hierarchy thus represents a fluid alternation. Conflation of these
two types of definiteness into one hierarchy like (84) obscures the fact
that definiteness does not show uniform behaviour with respect to the
occurrence of overt case marking.
The discussion of Hindi, Kannada, and Hebrew has shown that there
are both fluid case alternations and split case alternations on the basis of
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definiteness. Spanish provides an example of both a fluid and a split case
alternation on the basis of definiteness within a single language. The dis-
tribution of the Spanish object marker a has been extensively discussed
in the literature but still is not entirely understood (for discussion, see
Bruge´ and Brugger 1996; Torrego 1998; Delbecque 2002; von Heusinger
and Kaiser 2003; Leonetti 2004; Bleam 2005, among many others). Be-
low, I will show that the occurrence of a follows an intricate pattern in
which different split alternations and a fluid case alternation interact.
The factors underlying the case splits are animacy, lexical definiteness,
and mood, and the one underlying the fluid case alternation is specificity.
I will focus here solely on prominence-based use of a and leave its distin-
guishing function, discussed in the previous chapter, out of consideration.
The primary split is between animate and inanimate noun phrases
in that only the former can take the object marker.28 This contrast be-
tween animate and inanimate objects can be seen by comparing (86)-(87)
to (88):
Spanish (Romance; Bruge´ and Brugger 1996:3)
(86) Esta
this
man˜ana
morning
he
have.1sg
visto
seen
*(a)
a
Juan/la
Juan/the
hermana
sister
de
of
Mar´ıa.
Mar´ıa
‘This morning I saw Juan/Mar´ıa’s sister.’
(87) Esta
this
man˜ana
morning
he
have.1sg
visto
seen
*(a)
a
mi
my
perro.
dog
‘This morning I saw my dog.’
(88) Esta
this
man˜ana
morning
he
have.1sg
visto
seen
(*a)
a
la
the
nueva
new
iglesia.
church
‘This morning I saw the new church.’
Examples (86) and (87) show that human and animate objects have to be
marked with the prepositional object marker. For the inanimate object
in (88) it is prohibited.
The obligatoriness of the object marker with human and animate ob-
jects only holds in context in which they are not preceded by an indefinite
article. Hence, the second split case alternation in Spanish is determined
by lexical definiteness. Indefinite human and animate objects can occur
with or without the object marker:
28The language is changing at this point, as the object marker is also intruding into
the domain of inanimates (for discussion, see the previous chapter and Delbecque 2002;
Company 2002; Morimoto and de Swart 2006).
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Spanish (Romance; Hopper and Thompson 1980:256)
(89) Celia
Celia
quiere
want.3sg
mirar
watch.inf
un
a
bailar´ın.
ballet.dancer
‘Celia wants to watch a (non-specific) ballet dancer.’
(90) Celia
Celia
quiere
want.3sg
mirar
watch.inf
a
a
un
a
bailar´ın.
ballet.dancer
‘Celia wants to watch (specific) a ballet dancer.’
The absence and presence of a correlate with a change in meaning. An
indefinite object preceded by the object marker can be interpreted as spe-
cific, something which is not possible for an unmarked indefinite object.
In order to establish that lexical definiteness and specificity each play
a separate role in Spanish DOM, contra von Heusinger and Kaiser (2003)
who claim that only specificity but not definiteness is a relevant factor,
consider the following examples:
Spanish (Romance; Leonetti 2004:83, Garc´ıa Garc´ıa 2005:23)
(91) Esta´
be.3sg
buscando
looking.for
a
a
alquien.
someone
‘(S)he is looking for someone.’
(92) No
not
esta´
be.3sg
buscando
looking.for
a
a
nadie.
anyone
‘(S)he is not looking for anyone.’
(93) Beso´
kissed.3sg
a
a
todo
whole
el
the
mundo.
world
‘(S)he kissed everybody.’
The examples in (91)-(93) all involve lexically definite objects and have to
be preceded by the object marker. Crucially, despite its presence none of
the objects receive a specific interpretation. In fact, the examples all rep-
resent non-specific direct objects. This shows that lexical definiteness is
a factor independent from specificity. Furthermore, it shows that lexical
definiteness takes priority over specificity in determination of the occur-
rence of the object marker. Only when the direct object is not lexically
definite, the object marker can be used to indicate its specificity. Defi-
niteness itself is in turn outweighed by animacy resulting in the following
partial ordering of the relevance of the factors discussed so far: animacy
> definiteness > specificity.
Finally, there is a split on the basis of mood illustrated in (94) and
(95):
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Spanish (Romance; Bleam 2005:17)
(94) Juan
Juan
busca
look.for
*(a)
a
un
a
estudiante
student
que
that
habla
speaks.ind
france´s.
French
‘Juan is looking for a student who speaks French.’
(95) Juan
Juan
busca
look.for
(a)
a
un
a
estudiante
student
que
that
hable
speaks.sbj
france´s.
French
‘Juan is looking for a student who speaks French.’
When an animate direct object is modified by a relative clause, it is
obligatorily preceded by a in case the finite verb in the relative clause is
in the indicative (cf. (94)), but may be optionally preceded by a (given
that it is an indefinite noun phrase) when the relative clause is in the
subjunctive mood (cf. (95); see von Heusinger and Kaiser 2003:48-50 for
an overview; see also Bleam 2005:16-17). In the latter case the object can
be interpreted as specific only when it is preceded by the object marker.
The pattern in (95) in which the occurrence of a results in a specific
interpretation, and the absence of a does not is the general pattern for
direct objects for which a is not obligatory, i.e. indefinite and bare nouns.
The correlation between specificity and the occurrence of a is in need
of some further discussion. Leonetti (2004) argues that direct objects
without a can only be interpreted as non-specific. Indefinite objects pre-
ceded by a, by contrast, can be interpreted as both specific and non-
specific.29 If this is the case, the pattern in Spanish differs from the
pattern found in Hindi and Kannada in which the absence of case goes
with both a specific and a non-specific reading and the presence of case
only with a specific reading.
The significance of Spanish lies in the fact that it shows that more than
one split alternation can take priority over a fluid alternation. Moreover,
it shows that definiteness and specificity can be involved in differential
object marking independently and in different ways. Finally, it provides
evidence that when both animacy and definiteness are involved in split
alternations, the former still takes priority over the latter.
The above discussion has shown how a fluid case alternation, which
surfaces as a correlation between overt case marking and strong inter-
pretations, can be overruled by other factors. The primary focus of the
discussion has been on the semantic factor animacy, and was expanded
later on to include lexical definiteness and mood. I want to conclude this
section with a discussion of Turkish, in which the correlation between case
marking and specificity is blocked by formal requirements of the gram-
mar of the language. In this way, Turkish provides us with an example of
29The same observation is voiced by Judith Aissen (p.c.) on the basis of discussion
with native speakers of Spanish.
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yet another way in which fluid case marking based on specificity can be
overruled. The discussion below is based on von Heusinger and Kornfilt
(2005) and Kornfilt (to appear).
It has been noted several times throughout this thesis that in Turkish
accusative case on a direct object corresponds with a specific reading. The
contrast between marked and unmarked direct objects is demonstrated
once more in (96):
Turkish (Turkic; von Heusinger and Kornfilt 2005:8)
(96) (Ben)
I
bir
a
kitap
book
oku-du-m.
read-pst-1sg
‘I read a book.’
(97) (Ben)
I
bir
a
kitab-ı
book-acc
oku-du-m.
read-pst-1sg
‘I read a certain book.’
Von Heusinger and Kornfilt (2005) show, however, that accusative case is
only a reliable indicator of specificity when the direct object immediately
precedes the verb. In any other position, use of accusative is obligatory
and can conceal a non-specific reading of the object. This is demonstrated
in the following example in which the object ‘tea’ receives a non-specific
(generic) reading:
Turkish (Turkic; von Heusinger and Kornfilt 2005:11)
(98) Bizim
our
ev-de
house-loc
c¸ay-ı
tea-acc
her.zamen
always
aytu¨l
Aytu¨l
yap-ar.
make-aor
‘Aytu¨l always makes the tea in our family.’
A similar thing can be observed with the marking of embedded subjects.
When they directly precede the verb and are unmarked they receive a
non-specific reading, cf. (99), but when they are marked with genitive
case they have to be interpreted as specific, cf. (100):
Turkish (Turkic; von Heusinger and Kornfilt 2005:15)
(99) [Yol-dan
road-abl
bir
a
araba
car
gec¸-tigˇ-in]-ı
pass-nmz-3sg-acc
go¨r-du¨-m.
see-pst-1sg
‘I saw that a car [non-specific] went by on the road.’
(100) [Yol-dan
road-abl
bir
a
araba-nın
car-gen
gec¸-tigˇ-in]-ı
pass-nmz-3sg-acc
go¨r-du¨-m.
see-pst-1sg
‘I saw that a car [specific] went by on the road.’
Like direct objects, when the embedded subject is moved away from the
preverbal position it has to be marked with genitive case and can receive
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either a specific or non-specific reading. This is illustrated in (101):
Turkish (Turkic; von Heusinger and Kornfilt 2005:16)
(101) [bir
a
araba*(-nın)
car-gen
yol-dan
road-abl
gec¸-tigˇ-in]-ı
pass-nmz-3sg-acc
go¨r-du¨-m.
see-pst-1sg
‘I saw that a car [non-specific or specific] went by on the road.’
Yet another environment in which the correlation between specificity
and overt case marking breaks down involves partitives. When partitive
direct objects occur with a lexical head they can surface with or without
accusative case, resulting in the familiar difference in interpretation. This
can be seen by comparing (102) and (103):
Turkish (Turkic; von Heusinger and Kornfilt 2005:32)
(102) Ali
Ali
bu¨ro-ya
office-dat
c¸ocuk-lar-dan
child-pl-abl
iki
two
kız
girl
al-acak.
take-fut
‘Ali will hire, for the office, two (non-specific) girls of the chil-
dren.’
(103) Ali
Ali
bu¨ro-ya
office-dat
c¸ocuk-lar-dan
child-pl-abl
iki
two
kız-ı
girl-acc
al-acak.
take-fut
‘Ali will hire, for the office, two (specific) girls of the children.’
When the lexical head of the partitive, kız in (102) and (103), is missing
it has to be replaced by an agreement marker, sin in (104). This agree-
ment marker, however, comes with the morphological requirement that
it has to be followed by accusative case (in transitive contexts). Due to
this formal requirement, accusative case can no longer be used to indicate
specificity and as a result partitives objects without a lexical head can be
interpreted as both specific and non-specific. This is illustrated in (104):
Turkish (Turkic; von Heusinger and Kornfilt 2005:34)
(104) Kitap-lar-dan
book-pl-abl
iki-sin*(-ı)
two-agr(3)-acc
al,
buy
geri-sin-ı
remainder-agr(3)-acc
kutu-da
box-loc
bırak.
leave
‘Take (any) two of the books and leave the remainder [of the
books] in the box.’
Thus, Turkish provides a good illustration of how formal requirements
of the grammar, i.e., word order and agreement, can overrule the other-
wise robust correlation between overt case marking and specificity. These
formal requirements can be seen as split case alternations, e.g., a split
between preverbal and non-preverbal position or between presence and
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absence of agreement morphology. In this way, the Turkish system pro-
vides additional evidence for the fact that split alternations take priority
over fluid ones.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have argued that not only the need to ensure recoverabil-
ity but also the prominence of arguments per se can trigger differential
case marking. The prominence of an argument can be influenced by a
wide range of factors, including animacy, definiteness, specificity, and
person. Moreover, I have shown that two levels of prominence should
be distinguished: semantic or inherent prominence and discourse or con-
textually derived prominence. As a matter of fact, the former type can
influence the latter, because an element which is inherently prominent is
more likely to be the topic of conversation.
The prominence of arguments is generally determined on the ba-
sis of hierarchies which visualize the internal structure of a prominence
category. Elements ranking high in the hierarchy are considered high-
prominent and those ranking low low-prominent. I have shown that it is
not straightforward to ground such prominence hierarchies in general cog-
nitive patterns or independently motivated theoretical constructs such as
constituent hierarchies. As a result, they cannot be considered universal
primitives.
Not in every case where prominence features seem to play a role on
the surface can they be held solely responsible for the observed alterna-
tions, however. I illustrated this with the obligatory voice alternations
found in Coast Salish languages. Although on the surface they seem to
be constrained by a person hierarchy, on closer scrutiny they were shown
to fall out of general principles of the grammars of these languages. In
particular, I analyzed them in terms of cross modular constraint conflicts
because of which active constructions become suboptimal when they con-
tain two agreement suffixes or, alternatively, a sequence of two vowels.
Differential object marking is another phenomenon which seems to be
triggered by prominence features, in this case animacy, and definiteness or
specificity. Objects that are high in animacy and/or high in specificity/-
definiteness occur with overt case marking cross-linguistically. Closer
examination of these case alternations revealed that the two features in
fact play a radically different role with respect to case marking. That
is, while animacy can only trigger the occurrence of case marking, case
marking can trigger a definite/specific interpretation. This was argued
to be the result of the fact that only animacy but not definiteness is an
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inherent feature of arguments. Moreover, I have shown that inherent
features always take priority over derived features in the determination
of case marking.
The discussion in this chapter has revealed that although prominence
has a clear effect on the morphosyntactic marking of arguments, two con-
ditions have to be met before it can be invoked as an explanation of a
given phenomenon. Not all apparent prominence effects turn out to be
real as some can be reduced to the interaction of other independent princi-
ples. Also, the direction of the cause-effect relation between a prominence
feature and overt marking may vary. Not only can overt marking be the
effect of prominence, it can also be the other way around, when overt
marking affects prominence.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In the introduction to this dissertation (chapter 1), I formulated three re-
search questions raised by the by now familiar differential object marking
pattern found in Malayalam. In this language animate but generally not
inanimate objects are marked with accusative case. The first question
concerns the formal status of the constructions with and without overt
case marking. Given that accusative case is often considered the hallmark
of a transitive clause, should we conclude that the caseless object does
not represent a transitive construction even though it seems to express
a semantically two-place predicate? The second question focuses on the
influence of animacy on the morphosyntactic alternation. Why should
animacy have this effect on morphosyntactic structure and why does this
effect surface the way it does? The third and final question addresses the
relation between animacy and other semantic features. Are there other
semantic features which have an effect on morphosyntactic structure sim-
ilar to that of animacy in Malayalam? And if such features exist, to what
extent are they similar to or different from animacy? In the remainder of
the thesis my aim was to answer these questions.
In chapter 2, I have argued for a gradient approach to transitivity
in which sentences can be assigned different degrees of transitivity. This
approach solves the question concerning the transitive status of the con-
structions involved in differential object marking. Both the construction
with a case marked object and the one without are formally transitive,
yet the former shows a higher degree of transitivity due to the presence
of accusative case. A transitive status for both constructions is in line
with the observation that both express a semantically transitive relation.
Apart from this gradient nature of transitivity, I have shown that
there are clear mismatches between form and meaning in the domain of
transitivity. That is, we find constructions that are morphosyntactically
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intransitive, but semantically transitive. Likewise, there are morphosyn-
tactically transitive constructions which correspond to semantically in-
transitive configurations. A prime example of the latter phenomenon is
the cognate object construction in English. Semantically, it should be an-
alyzed as intransitive with the cognate object functioning as an adverbial.
Syntactically, however, the cognate object patterns with regular direct ob-
jects on a number of different tests. Indeed, its syntactic behaviour has
led many researchers to the conclusion that also semantically it repre-
sents a direct object. On the basis of cross-linguistic data, however, I
have argued that a semantically intransitive analysis is more adequate.
Evidence for this comes from languages that show a transparent mapping
from semantic to morphosyntactic transitivity. For instance, in Russian
differences in semantic transitivity are clearly reflected in the morphosyn-
tactic transitivity. In this language, we indeed find that cognate objects
mirror their semantic status as they behave syntactically just like adver-
bials. English by contrast maps a wide range of semantic configurations
to the same syntactically transitive construction, in this way obscuring
differences in semantic transitivity in its surface structure. As a result the
cognate object construction surfaces as a transitive construction syntac-
tically, even though semantically it is intransitive. The English cognate
object construction provides a good illustration of how a cross-linguistic
perspective is needed in order to fully understand a phenomenon in a
single language.
Having established that transitivity involves different degrees, the
question arises what triggers this difference. In chapter 2, a number
of parameters were discussed which influence the degree of transitivity of
a clause. Among them we can distinguish verb-related parameters such
as aspect, subject-related parameters such as volitionality, and object-
related parameters such as affectedness. I have singled out animacy as
a special parameter given its relation to both the subject and the object
argument. Indeed, the animacy of the subject and the object have a clear
impact on the encoding of arguments, in particular on the phenomenon
of differential object marking.
In chapter 3, I have explored the explanation that the occurrence of
accusative case on direct objects is due to potential ambiguity: a speaker
may case mark a direct object in order to avoid misunderstanding of the
sentence on the side of the hearer. I have shown that animacy provides
crucial information about the role an argument plays in the event de-
scribed by the predicate. When animacy information is neutralized, i.e.,
the two arguments of a transitive relation share their animacy value, other
sources of information have to be used to interpret the sentence.
This need to avoid misunderstanding as a force behind differential
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object marking can be accounted for within a model of bidirectional opti-
mization. In particular, I have defended an asymmetric speaker’s model
in which the speaker takes the hearer’s perspective to determine whether
the intended meaning is recoverable from the form used. Only forms
that ensure such recoverability are considered optimal output candidates.
This bidirectional model can account for a range of phenomena beyond
differential object marking. A nice illustration of this are the word order
restrictions on exceptional case marking (ECM) constructions found in
Dutch. In this language, embedded direct objects cannot precede ECM
subjects with which they share their animacy feature. This pattern can
be interpreted in terms of ambiguity avoidance. Or rather, the word order
restrictions can be said to follow from a need to avoid misinterpretations
or to secure the recoverability of the intended meaning. Therefore, when
certain odd interpretations do arise, they are not perceived as misinter-
pretations, but as correct/optimal, yet pragmatically strange, interpreta-
tions. In this way, the system optimizes recoverability and at the same
time maximizes expressivity.
The increase in transitivity observed with accusative marked objects
in differential object marking systems can be explained by the pressure
to avoid ambiguity. Animacy is an important trigger in the occurrence
of case marking as it can cause ambiguities. However, not all instances
of differential object marking can be explained in terms of ambiguity
avoidance. At the end of chapter 3, I have demonstrated on the basis of
historical data from Spanish that a strategy to mark all and only animate
objects can develop out of a strategy of ambiguity avoidance. The result is
a prominence-based system in which animate objects are marked because
of their animacy and irrespective of any actual ambiguity.
In chapter 4, I have shown that prominence-based marking is wide-
spread. However, not every phenomenon which seems to involve promi-
nence on the surface does so on closer scrutiny. This was demonstrated
with obligatory voice alternations found in Coast Salish languages. Given
that they involve exclusions of certain person combinations, these alter-
nations are often analyzed in terms of person hierarchies. I have argued
that the influence of person is only visible on the surface and that an
analysis in terms of conflicting morphophonological constraints which are
independently available in the grammar provides a better account of these
alternations.
In the remainder of chapter 4, I have examined the similarities and the
differences between the prominence features animacy and definiteness/-
specificity. Together with animacy this latter feature is often singled out
as the primary trigger for overt case marking in differential object marking
languages. Although both features can be subsumed under the general
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notion of prominence, each plays a radically different role when it comes
to differential object marking. This difference comes out most clearly in
languages with two-dimensional differential object marking, where both
animacy and definiteness/specificity are involved. I have argued that in
these languages definiteness/specificity only plays a role when animacy
does not require case marking. This was based on the observation that
case marked objects can only be unambiguously interpreted as definite/-
specific when they can also occur without case marking. That is, ani-
mate objects require case marking because of their animacy value, and
can be interpreted either as definite or indefinite. Inanimate objects, on
the other hand, do not require case marking but when they do appear
with case they have to be interpreted as definite/specific. I attributed
this difference between the two features to the fact that animacy but not
definiteness/specificity is an inherent feature of noun phrases. As such,
case marking can change the definiteness/specificity but not the animacy
of direct objects. The priority of animacy over definiteness/specificity
was shown to be an instantiation of a general pattern in which inherent
features take priority over contextually derived features. That is, case
marking can only be used to indicate a derived feature when it is not re-
quired by an inherent one. An additional difference between animacy and
definiteness is the fact that the former feature shows a strong correlation
with semantic roles, which is absent for definiteness/specificity. As was
shown in chapter 3, animacy can therefore be used to determine the role
of an argument, and neutralization of the animacy values of two argu-
ments can result in ambiguity. Case marking and other morphosyntactic
mechanisms are employed to keep the roles distinguished. Given that this
does not hold for definiteness/specificity, we again find that animacy is a
more basic factor in case marking.
This dissertation has shown how semantic properties of direct objects
can influence their morphosyntactic encoding. It has also shown that lan-
guages differ in their sensitivity to and their encoding of such semantic
properties. Moreover, even a cross-linguistically uniform phenomenon can
have different underlying motivations. I have shown for differential object
marking based on animacy that two factors can be identified: recoverabil-
ity and prominence-based marking. Finally, different semantic properties
can relate to one single phenomenon in different ways as was shown for
animacy and definiteness/specificity. Only when the above mentioned
types of variation are taken into consideration, we can account for the
cross-linguistic variation in object marking.
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Samenvatting
Summary in Dutch
Crosslingu¨ıstische variatie in de markering van
objecten
Talen verschillen in de manier waarop ze hun directe objecten (lijdende
voorwerpen) markeren. Zelfs binnen een taal kan er verschil bestaan tus-
sen objecten. Dit wordt ge¨ıllustreerd door de volgende voorbeelden uit
het Malayalam, een Dravidische taal gesproken in India:
Malayalam (Dravidisch; Asher and Kumari 1997:203)
(1) Avan
hij
oru
een
paSuvin-e
koe-acc
vaññi.
kocht
‘Hij kocht een koe.’
(2) ñaan
ik
teeñña
kokosnoot
vaññi.
kocht
‘Ik kocht een kokosnoot.’
Beide zinnen rapporteren een gebeurtenis waarbij iemand iets gekocht
heeft en in dit opzicht zijn ze semantisch vrijwel identiek. Morfosyntac-
tisch verschillen ze echter van elkaar: alleen het object in (1) is gemarkeerd
met de accusatief naamval. Dit verschil in vorm is toe te schrijven aan een
semantisch verschil tussen de twee objecten. Het object ‘koe’ in (1) ver-
wijst naar een levende (animate) entiteit, terwijl ‘kokosnoot’ in (2) naar
een niet-levende (inanimate) entiteit verwijst. In het Malayalam resul-
teert dit semantische verschil in animacy in een morfosyntactisch verschil.
Deze alternantie in objectmarkering reflecteert een crosslingu¨ıstisch terug-
kerend fenomeen, dat bekend staat als gedifferentieerde objectmarkering
(Bossong 1985; Aissen 2003).
De voorbeelden uit het Malayalam illustreren hoe een semantisch ver-
schil kan resulteren in een morfosyntactisch verschil. Tegelijkertijd roepen
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deze voorbeelden vragen op waarvan er drie centraal staan in dit proef-
schrift: (i) Is er een verschil in transitiviteit tussen (1) en (2)? Het feit
dat het object in (2) geen accusatief naamval draagt – waarbij accusatief
naamval vaak wordt gezien als een kenmerk van transitiviteit– kan wor-
den gezien als indicatie dat (2) niet transitief is. Dit lijkt echter in strijd
met het feit dat deze zin wel een transitieve handeling uitdrukt en roept
op tot een algemenere discussie over de relatie tussen morfosyntactische
en semantische transitiviteit; (ii) De voorbeelden laten duidelijk zien dat
animacy een effect kan hebben op de morfosyntaxis, maar waarom is dit
het geval en waarom is dat effect zodanig dat animate objecten, maar
niet inanimate objecten, gemarkeerd worden?; (iii) Zijn er naast anima-
cy wellicht nog andere (semantische) eigenschappen van objecten die van
invloed kunnen zijn op hun markering? Als dergelijke eigenschappen
ge¨ıdentificeerd kunnen worden, kunnen we ons afvragen in welke mate ze
lijken op en/of verschillen van animacy.
Zoals valt op te maken uit bovenstaande vragen is het terugkerende
thema in dit proefschrift de relatie tussen semantiek en morfosyntaxis. De
vragen worden behandeld binnen het domein van semantisch transitieve
relaties, d.w.z. relaties tussen twee entiteiten. Het onderzoek richt zich
in het bijzonder op de invloed die (semantische) eigenschappen van het
lijdend voorwerp kunnen uitoefenen op hun morfosyntactische realisatie.
In hoofdstuk 2 beargumenteer ik dat transitiviteit niet als een zwart-
wit onderscheid moet worden gezien maar als een gradueel verschijnsel (in
navolging van o.a. Hopper and Thompson 1980). Zo kan de constructie in
(2), ondanks de afwezigheid van accusatief naamval, als transitief worden
beschouwd, zij het in mindere mate dan die in (1). Naast het graduele
karakter van transitiviteit laat ik in dit hoofdstuk zien dat er duidelijke
verschillen kunnen bestaan tussen de morfosyntactische en semantische
transitiviteit van een constructie. Niet alleen vinden we morfosyntactisch
intransitieve constructies die semantisch als transitief beschouwd moeten
worden, ook zijn er morfosyntactisch transitieve constructies die seman-
tisch intransitief zijn. Bovendien kunnen talen verschillen in de manier
waarop zij variatie in semantische transitiviteit koppelen aan variatie in
morfosyntactische transitiviteit.
Ter illustratie van dat laatste presenteer ik de resultaten van een stu-
die naar zogenaamde cognate objecten in het Engels, waarbij het object
hetzelfde lijkt uit te drukken als het (intransitieve) werkwoord (bv. li-
ve a happy live, laugh a loud laugh). Semantisch gezien gedragen deze
objecten zich als een adverbiaal element dat de handeling die door het
werkwoord wordt uigedrukt, modificeert. Syntactisch gezien gedragen zij
zich echter vrijwel identiek aan reguliere directe objecten, wat ertoe geleid
heeft dat ze in de literatuur vaak ook semantisch als objecten zijn geanaly-
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seerd. Aan de hand van crosslingu¨ıstische data laat ik zien dat een analyse
waarbij de cognate objecten semantisch als intransitief worden gezien su-
perieur is. In het Russisch, bijvoorbeeld, gedragen deze objecten zich ook
syntactisch als bijwoorden. Een bijkomend verschil tussen het Engels en
het Russisch is dat het Russisch een transparantere afbeelding laat zien
van semantische transitiviteit op morfosyntactische transitiviteit. In deze
taal is er bijna sprake van een een-op-een relatie tussen semantische en
formele transitiviteit. Het Engels daarentegen gebruikt e´e´n enkele for-
meel transitieve constructie om verschillende gradaties van semantische
transitiviteit uit te drukken. Op deze manier worden verschillen in se-
mantische transitiviteit verbloemd in de morfosyntactische structuur. De
cognate-objectconstructie vormt hier een duidelijke illustratie van.
De observatie dat transitiviteit een gradueel verschijnsel is, roept de
vraag op welke factoren van invloed zijn bij het vaststellen van de mate
van transitiviteit van een constructie. In hoofdstuk 2 bespreek ik een aan-
tal van dergelijke parameters. Speciale aandacht gaat uit naar animacy
omdat dit een eigenschap van zowel subjecten als objecten is. De invloed
van animacy op morfosyntactische verschijnselen wordt verder uitgediept
in hoofdstuk 3.
In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik dat accusatief naamval op objec-
ten ingezet kan worden om een mogelijke ambigu¨ıteit te voorkomen: de
spreker kan een object markeren om er zo voor te zorgen dat de hoorder
de zin correct zal interpreteren. Animacy speelt hierbij een belangrijke
rol omdat het informatie verschaft over de rol van een argument in de
zin. Zo zijn subjecten vaak animate, terwijl een dergelijke voorkeur voor
objecten niet bestaat. In het geval er geen verschil is in animacy tussen
de twee argumenten van een transitieve relatie moet een hoorder andere
informatie gebruiken om een zin juist te interpreteren. Naamval vormt
een cruciale indicatie voor de functie van een argument in de zin.
Om dit desambiguerende gebruik van naamval te beschrijven ontwik-
kel ik een asymmetrisch model van bidirectionele optimalisatie waarbij
de spreker het perspectief van de hoorder in acht neemt om te bepalen
of de betekenis die hij wil uitdrukken volledig herleidbaar (recoverable)
is uit de vorm die hij kiest. Enkel en alleen die vormen die een derge-
lijke terugvindbaarheid garanderen worden als optimale vormen voor die
betekenis gezien. Dit model is niet alleen toepasbaar op het fenomeen ge-
differentieerde objectmarkering, maar ook op andere fenomenen waarbij
terugvindbaarheid van betekenis een rol speelt. Ik demonstreer dit aan
de hand van twee verschillende verschijnselen. Het eerste verschijnsel is
de one nominal interpretation constraint zoals die wordt gevonden in ver-
schillende inheemse talen van Noord-Amerika. Deze regel bepaalt dat in
zinnen met twee derde-persoonsargumenten waarvan er e´e´n een volle NP
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is, deze laatste altijd als object ge¨ınterpreteerd wordt. Ten tweede zijn er
beperkingen op de woordvolgorde in exceptional case marking construc-
ties (ook wel accusativus cum infinitivo genoemd) in het Nederlands. Hier
vinden we dat wanneer het ingebedde subject en object dezelfde anima-
cywaarde hebben, zij in een vaste volgorde moeten voorkomen (subject
voor object). Echter, wanneer ze verschillen in animacy is variatie in
woordvolgorde wel mogelijk.
Wanneer we terugkeren naar het gebruik van accusatief naamval voor
niet alle objecten, dan moeten we vaststellen dat niet alle naamvalsge-
bruik kan worden toegeschreven aan het terugvindbaar maken van gram-
maticale functies. Er bestaan ook talen waarin animate objecten worden
gemarkeerd onafhankelijk van enige ambigu¨ıteit, maar juist omdat ze ani-
mate zijn. Een dergelijk op prominentie gebaseerd systeem verklaart ook
het gebruik van de accusatief naamval in de Malayalam voorbeelden (1)
en (2). De twee manieren waarop animacy het gebruik van objectsnaam-
val kan be¨ınvloeden staan niet noodzakelijk los van elkaar. Aan het eind
van hoofdstuk 3 laat ik zien dat een naamvalsysteem waarin alle en al-
leen animate objecten worden gemarkeerd zich kan ontwikkelen uit een
systeem waarin naamval wordt gebruikt om te desambigueren.
In hoofdstuk 4 bestudeer ik dergelijke op prominentie gebaseerde sys-
temen nader. Ik laat zien dat behalve animacy ook andere factoren, zoals
persoon en definietheid, een rol kunnen spelen. Ik stel echter ook vast dat
niet overal waar prominentie een rol lijkt te spelen, dit ook daadwerkelijk
het geval is. Dit illustreer ik aan de hand van een verplichte alternantie
van actieve naar passieve constructies in Coast Salish talen. In deze talen
kunnen bepaalde combinaties van personen niet als actieve constructies
worden gerealiseerd. In plaats daarvan moet er een passieve constructie
worden gebruikt. Deze alternantie wordt doorgaans toegeschreven aan de
invloed van een zogenaamde persoonshie¨rarchie waarbij actieve construc-
ties die ingaan tegen deze hie¨rarchie ongrammaticaal zijn. Ik beargumen-
teer dat de invloed van persoon slechts een oppervlakteverschijnsel is en
dat de verplichte alternantie beter geanalyseerd kan worden als het resul-
taat van een interactie van morfosyntactische en fonologische constraints
die elk een onafhankelijk gemotiveerde rol spelen in de grammatica’s van
deze talen.
In de tweede helft van hoofdstuk 4 bestudeer ik de overeenkomsten
en verschillen in de invloed van animacy en definitietheid, beide seman-
tische eigenschappen die bijdragen aan de prominentie van een object,
op het gebruik van objectsnaamval. Het is bekend in de literatuur (cf.
Bossong 1985; Aissen 2003) dat beide factoren een rol spelen in talen
met gedifferentieerde objectmarkering. Ik betoog echter dat hun rollen
verschillend zijn. Dit verschil komt het duidelijkst naar voren in talen,
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zoals bijvoorbeeld het Hindi, waarin beide factoren van invloed zijn op
het gebruik van objectsnaamval. Ik laat voor een aantal van dergelijke
talen zien dat definietheid alleen een rol speelt wanneer animacy het ge-
bruik van naamval niet verplicht maakt. Met andere woorden, animacy
heeft voorrang op definietheid. We zien namelijk dat animate objecten,
die verplicht naamval dragen, zowel een definiete als een indefiniete inter-
pretatie kunnen krijgen. Inanimate objecten, die geen naamval vereisen,
kunnen expliciet als definiet worden gemarkeerd door het gebruik van
objectsnaamval. Objectsnaamval resulteert dus in een verandering in de
definietheid van een object, terwijl de animacy van een object resulteert
in het gebruik van objectsnaamval. Het feit dat animacy prioriteit heeft
ten opzichte van definietheid kan worden verklaard uit het feit dat alleen
de eerste een inherente eigenschap van argumenten is. Definietheid daar-
entegen is een eigenschap die in context aan argumenten wordt toegekend.
Deze prioritering past in het algemene patroon dat inherente eigenschap-
pen voorrang hebben op contextafhankelijk eigenschappen. Naamval kan
enkel gebruikt worden om het laatste type eigenschappen uit te drukken.
Dit proefschrift laat zien hoe semantische eigenschappen van invloed
kunnen zijn op de markering van directe objecten. Talen verschillen in
of en hoe zij variatie in semantische eigenschappen tot uitdrukking laten
komen in de vorm van objecten. Bovendien kunnen er aan een cros-
slingu¨ıstisch uniform fenomeen verschillende verklaringen ten grondslag
liggen. In het geval van op animacy gebaseerd gebruik van objectsnaam-
val heb ik laten zien dat twee factoren van invloed zijn: desambiguering
en prominentie. Tenslotte kan er ook variatie optreden in de invloed van
twee verschillende semantische eigenschappen op hetzelfde fenomeen, zo-
als in het geval van animacy en definietheid. Alleen met inachtneming
van deze variatie kunnen we tot een sluitende beschrijving komen van de
crosslingu¨ıstische variatie in objectmarkering.
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